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1 General Introduction
1
1.1 Motivation and Background
This thesis consists of three essays on empirical asset pricing. To situate these three essays
within the panorama of the recent literature on empirical asset pricing research, it is useful
to consider the two pillars of asset pricing. They were introduced by Eugene F. Fama in
his Nobel Prize lecture delivered on December 8, 2013 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University
(Fama, 2014). According to Fama, they are the basis of empirical work in asset pricing.
The ﬁrst pillar is the research on the eﬃcient market hypothesis, and the second pil-
lar consists of the ongoing work to create more reﬁned asset pricing models. The eﬃcient
market hypothesis stipulates that asset prices reﬂect all information available in the mar-
ket. The consequence of this hypothesis is that all current information is embedded in the
current price and, if the information set does not change, asset prices do not ﬂuctuate. The
testable implication thus generated is that currently available information should not be
able to predict future returns. In the course of its decades-long development, this theory has
been split into three forms according to the information set considered (Fama, 1970). The
three forms are (1) weak-form eﬃciency (2) semi-strong-form eﬃciency and (3) strong-form
eﬃciency. In the weak-form eﬃciency, the information set consists of all previous prices, in
the semi-strong-form the information set contains all publicly available information, and in
the strong-form eﬃciency the information set additionally comprises all private information.
The asset pricing models considered to constitute the second pillar aim at explaining
how asset prices are expected to behave. The underlying assumption in the standard asset
pricing literature is that investors are both rational and able to include all available infor-
mation into prices instantaneously and correctly. In the framework of consumption-based
asset pricing, these assumptions lead to the ﬁst-order condition, which deﬁnes the price of
an asset today as the expected discounted future payoﬀs of the asset (see, e.g., Cochrane,
2009, for a derivation).1 The future payoﬀs of an asset are discounted with the stochastic
1pt = E(mt+1, Xt+1), where pt is the price in period t, mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Xt+1 is
the future payoﬀ, and function E is the expected value.
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discount factor which traditionally include macro and micro predictors. A branch of lit-
erature has challenged not only the assumptions leading to the equilibrium condition but
also the predictors incorporated into the stochastic discount factor (Cochrane, 2011, Adrian,
Etula, and Muir, 2014). For example, Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2009) and
Jagannathan and Wang (2007) ﬁnd that households do not participate in the stock market
actively enough to explain the cross-section of stock returns.
The two pillars of asset pricing cannot be considered in isolation from one another.
Speciﬁcally, to test the eﬃcient market hypothesis, it is necessary to deﬁne an appropriate
asset pricing model to determine the way asset prices are expected to behave. So, these two
avenues of research in the ﬁeld of asset pricing converge into the joint hypothesis problem
(Fama, 1970), in which any test of the eﬃcient market hypothesis is also jointly a test of the
asset pricing model used to assess whether the asset prices reﬂect all available information.
Figure 1: Thesis overview
This ﬁgure organizes the chapters of this thesis into the framework of the two pillars of asset pricing
introduced by Fama (2014) in his Nobel Prize lecture.
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The essays presented in this thesis can accordingly be placed into the framework of the
two pillars of asset pricing. Figure 1 shows how the essays constituting this thesis can be
placed with regard to the two pillars of asset pricing. The ﬁrst and second essays (Chapters
2 and 3) investigate the weak and semi-strong form of market eﬃciency, respectively, and
thus situate themselves in the ﬁeld of market eﬃciency research. The ﬁrst and third essays
(Chapters 2 and 4) examine behavioral asset pricing models and intermediary asset pricing
models, respectively, and contribute to the deﬁnition of market behavior.
As it can be seen in Figure 1, the ﬁrst essay (Chapter 2) can be rightfully placed in
both ﬁelds of asset pricing research. On one hand, it presents a new return anomaly that
cannot be explained by the classical market equilibrium models. On the other hand, it
applies a behavioral asset pricing model to show how return extrapolation and fundamental
traders lead to a market equilibrium that explains the return anomaly. The documented
return anomaly challenges the weak-form market eﬃciency because the theory of market
eﬃciency assumes that all information available on the value of a stock is instantaneously and
correctly incorporated into the stock price. However, the high number of return anomalies
documented in the literature pose a counter-argument to the eﬃcient market hypothesis (see,
e.g., Subrahmanyam, 2010, for an overview). The essay in Chapter 2 adds to this literature
and ﬁnds that a sequence of trading days with negative or positive returns is followed by
signiﬁcant return reversals. In light of the joint hypothesis problem, the return anomalies
observed in the literature do not oﬀer conclusive evidence whether the market eﬃciency
hypothesis is to be rejected or the asset pricing model is not appropriate. An alternative
model including both rational agents and return extrapolators, based on Da, Huang, and
Jin (2018), is successful in modeling stylized facts on asset returns, in particular momentum,
return reversals, volatility, and bubbles (see, e.g., Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014, Barberis,
Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, 2015, 2018, Da, Huang, and Jin, 2018). So far this model has
only been used to explain the return anomalies on a weekly or monthly basis, and we expand
its scope to daily return reversals.
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The second essay (Chapter 3) is a test for semi-strong market eﬃciency. Typically, to test
the semi-strong market eﬃciency, the reaction of stock prices to stock speciﬁc announcements
(see, e.g. Ball, 1978, Watts, 1978, for a discussion) or macro data is examined. After macro
or stock-speciﬁc events, stock prices are observed to recover after an initial stronger reac-
tion. This suggests that stock prices overreact to news, another well documented behavioral
anomaly (see, e.g., DeBondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam,
1998). However, it contradicts the semi-strong eﬃcient market hypothesis, which assumes
that investors incorporate new information rationally and instantaneously. In accordance
with this approach, this essay investigates the post-referendum returns of shorted stocks
that received media attention. Overall, this essay conﬁrms that media attention of shorted
stocks results in an overreaction of the post-referendum returns.
The last essay of this thesis tests an intermediary asset pricing model in Europe. The
joint hypothesis problem postulates that testing market eﬃciency is also a test of the un-
derlying asset pricing model. In the consumption-based asset pricing model, the average
investor considered is the average household. However, Cochrane (2011) maintains that the
average household may not be the optimal average investor to consider, arguing that ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries are actually the ones making the investment decisions for the average
household. Therefore, Chapter 4 focuses on the leverage of European ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries to explain the cross-section of stock returns. Intuitively, due to the leverage constraints
of ﬁnancial intermediaries a devaluation of assets during market downturns forces banks to
sell assets contributing to the market downturn. For the US Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014)
ﬁnd that leverage of ﬁnancial intermediaries is a more informative marginal value of wealth
compared to the marginal value of wealth aggregated over households.
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1.2 Outline and Main Results of Thesis Projects
Chapter 2, with the title Daily Return Streaks, ﬁnds that consecutive days of positive
(negative) returns predict negative (positive) returns on the next day. We call the consecutive
days with the same return sign a return streak. A strategy based on return streaks generates
signiﬁcant returns on a value-weighted basis; this degree of return predictability stands out
compared to other work in this area (see, e.g., Fama and MacBeth, 1973, Jegadeesh, 1990,
Lehmann, 1990, Campbell, Grossman, and Wang, 1993, Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang,
2002, Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal, 2006, Nagel, 2012). The chapter also oﬀers out-of-
sample evidence of the return predictability of return streaks by testing the streak strategy
both for all US equity as well as on international markets. Furthermore, the empirical ﬁnding
of this paper is supported by the theoretical return extrapolator model by Da, Huang, and Jin
(2018). Our elegantly simple model suggests that consecutive days with a positive (negative)
return are a good proxy for days with high (low) extrapolators' sentiment. Furthermore, as
the sentiment becomes more extreme, the probability of a return reversal increases. The
relationship predicted by the model is conﬁrmed through our empirical analysis.
Chapter 3, titled Media Attention and Short Selling around the Brexit Referendum,
investigates the risk of additional media attention on shorted stocks after the Brexit refer-
endum. Not only do disclosed short positions bear the risk of manipulative attacks through
other short sellers, but they also increase the risk that unfavorable media attention nega-
tively aﬀects stock returns. For the empirical analysis in this paper, a database is constructed
containing the public short positions disclosed under the European short position disclosure
regime and data on news articles from the BBC Application Programming Interface (API)
called The Juicer.2 In this Chapter, I ﬁnd that stocks with open short positions do not have
more signiﬁcantly negative returns compared to their matched counterparts; however, if a
2Information on the API can be found at http://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/projects/juicer/, last accessed Febru-
ary 26, 2019.
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shorted stock receives media attention, it signiﬁcantly underperforms. From a regulatory
point of view, the short position disclosure regime, with consequent publication of informa-
tion previously not readily available, when coupled with media attention entails the risk of
worsening the eﬀect of an adverse market on shorted stocks.
Chapter 4, with the title Procyclical Leverage in Europe and its Role in Asset Pricing,
investigates the broker-dealer leverage and its explanatory power for a large cross-section
of stock returns in Europe. In the US market, broker-dealer leverage has recently proven
to be strongly procyclical, exhibiting explanatory power for a large cross-section of asset
returns. In Chapter 4, we can show that European and German broker-dealers actively
manage their balance sheets. Moreover, by applying standard Fama-MacBeth regressions
as well as dynamic asset pricing models (Adrian, Crump, and Moench, 2015a), we conﬁrm
that broker-dealer balance-sheet indicators are procyclical. In particular, leverage shows a
procyclical behavior with a positive price of risk.
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2 Daily Return Streaks
Coauthored by: Alexander Klos and Simon Rottke
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2.1 Introduction
Theories about return extrapolation have recently received growing attention in the ﬁnance
literature (Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014, Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, 2015, 2018,
Da, Huang, and Jin, 2018). Consistent with the literature on return extrapolation in other
ﬁelds of economics (see, e.g., Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015, Mankiw and Reis, 2002), the
time frame over which return extrapolation is analyzed empirically is often just one quarter
(Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer, 2018). Recent research has looked at even shorter
horizons. Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) analyze weekly data and ﬁnd evidence for short-term
return extrapolation. We pursue this avenue of investigation and explore the idea that return
extrapolation also plays a role in forming daily expectations.
We start by clarifying the form of return predictability that could arise from daily return
extrapolation. Intuitively, one would expect extreme sentiment among extrapolators after a
series of positive or negative daily returns. Extreme sentiment ﬁnds its way into equilibrium
prices if fundamental traders do not eliminate all mispricing caused by extrapolators. The
resulting temporary over- or underpricing tends to reverse on the following trading day. We
use a simpliﬁed version of the model by Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) to show that streaks
in daily returns are a useful proxy to identify stocks with high or low sentiment among
extrapolators. In our deﬁnition, a streak in daily returns of length n occurs when an asset
has outperformed or underperformed the market over n consecutive days.
Our ﬁrst empirical test of this theoretical result uses daily US stock returns from 1997
to 2017. We ﬁnd that stocks with streaks in daily returns up to day t− 1 exhibit signiﬁcant
reversals on day t, consistent with the theoretical prediction. Value-weighted, long-short
portfolios that long stocks with negative streaks in returns and short stocks with positive
streaks in returns earn economically sizeable returns over the next trading day. Returns of
long-short portfolios increase monotonically with streak length. Abnormal daily returns of
streak strategies are substantially higher for equally-weighted portfolios, consistent with the
idea that mispricing is more pronounced among smaller stocks.
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We then move to international data and ﬁnd qualitatively similar evidence in equity
markets around the globe. The time series of local streak strategy returns exhibit only
modest correlations among each other. Building a global diversiﬁed streak strategy portfolio
increases the Sharpe ratio further.
Subsequently we revisit the US evidence, where data availability allows to gather further
empirical evidence. Returns from streak strategies are higher on earnings announcement
days and if the holding day coincides with high trading volume. We further show that
streaks are distinct from classic short-term reversal strategies and bid-ask bounces. Excess
returns calculated based on mid-quote prices still earn 11.6 bps per day in the US. After
bid-ask spreads have fallen dramatically in the early 2000's, a streak strategy with trading-
cost mitigation enhancements outperforms the market after transaction costs. The value-
weighted streak strategies considered here are conceptually diﬀerent from return-weighted
reversal strategies designed to capture compensation for liquidity provision (Nagel, 2012).
Streak strategy returns cannot be explained by the ﬁve Fama-French factors and the short-
term reversal factor. We additionally match stocks in streak portfolios with control stocks
that have similar returns on day t − 1 but no streak in returns. A value-weighted portfolio
of stocks with streaks outperforms a value-weighted portfolio of control stocks on day t and
the outperformance increases with streak length. We also regress daily returns on streak
dummies, previous day, and cumulative previous n-days excess returns in market value-
weighted Fama-MacBeth regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973, Green, Hand, and Zhang,
2017). Streak dummies remain statistically signiﬁcant and economically sizable.
To investigate the role of institutional ownership, we sort all stocks by institutional
ownership (IOR) and implement the streak strategy on stocks with high IOR and low IOR.
We ﬁnd that, for equally-weighted portfolios, returns from streak strategies of low IOR ﬁrms
contribute more to the empirical success of streak strategies. Surprisingly, excess returns of
value-weighted streak strategies do not follow this pattern in the sense that value-weighted
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strategies for high IOR ﬁrms do not underperform value-weighted strategies for medium IOR
ﬁrms. We consider this result to be remarkable for two reasons. First, it helps explain why
the value-weighted streak strategies exhibit high Sharpe ratios, as there is a sizeable eﬀect
among a subgroup of large ﬁrms. Second, to the extent that institutional ownership proxies
for the fraction of fundamental traders in the population, this result is inconsistent with
the extrapolation model laid out in Section 2.2. A larger eﬀect among ﬁrms with high IOR
compared to ﬁrms with medium IOR is also inconsistent with alternative explanations that
interpret returns from streak strategies as compensation for liquidity provision.
2.2 Inferring a New Testable Implication from Behavioral Models
on Return Extrapolation
We explore the model of Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) to develop previously unstated impli-
cations of recent theories on return extrapolation. In Da, Huang, and Jin (2018), agents
trade a risk-free asset with a zero interest rate and multiple risky assets. Each asset i has a
time-invariant supply of shares Qi and pays a terminal dividend Di,T = Di,0 +i,1 +...+i,T at
time T . The dividend innovations i,t are observed by all traders at time t. Da, Huang, and
Jin (2018) assume that the dividend innovations consist of a ﬁrm-speciﬁc and a market-wide
component. We simplify their setting by assuming that all dividend innovations for all assets
i come from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2. The dividend innova-
tions, therefore, have only a ﬁrm-speciﬁc component and are identically and independently
distributed over assets and time. If N is the number of risky assets in the economy, we can
think of these risky assets as N time-series realizations of the same data-generating process.
We drop the asset index i in the following for the sake of brevity.
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Two types of agents with constant absolute risk aversion γ exist in the model: extrapo-
lators and fundamental traders. The extrapolators' belief about the next price change of an
asset in period t is given by:
EEt [Pt+1 − Pt] = λ0 + λ1St. (2.1)
The expected price change in the next period is a linear function of this period's sentiment,
which is deﬁned as
St = (1− λ2)
t−1∑
k=0
λk2 (Pt−k − Pt−k−1) + λt2S0. (2.2)
Sentiment is a weighted average of past price changes and a starting value S0. The
parameter 0 < λ2 < 1 governs how strongly the extrapolator is inﬂuenced by recent price
changes relative to more distant ones. Fundamental traders form the second group of traders.
They maximize their expected utility of wealth next period and assume that any mispricing
will be corrected next period. The population of traders can be split into a fraction µE of
extrapolators and a fraction µF = 1− µE of fundamental traders.
Deﬁning αt = γσ
2Q
(
T − t− 1 + 1
µF
)
, Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) derive a closed-form
solution for the equilibrium price of all assets in this economy. The price change of an asset
is the diﬀerence between two adjoining prices and, in our setting, given by
Pt − Pt−1 =
Dt + (µ
F )−1µE[λ0 + λ1
[
(1− λ2)
∑t−1
k=1 λ
k
2 (Pt−k − Pt−k−1) + λt2S0
]− λ1(1− λ2)Pt−1]− αt
1− (µE/µF )λ1(1− λ2)
−Dt−1 + (µ
F )−1µE[λ0 + λ1
[
(1− λ2)
∑t−2
k=1 λ
k
2 (Pt−k−1 − Pt−k−2) + λt−12 S0
]− λ1(1− λ2)Pt−2]− αt−1
1− (µE/µF )λ1(1− λ2)
=
1
1− (µE/µF )λ1(1− λ2)
[
t + γσ
2Q
]
− (µ
F )−1µEλ1(1− λ2)
1− (µE/µF )λ1(1− λ2)
[
t−1∑
k=1
(λk−12 − λk2)(Pt−k − Pt−k−1)
]
(2.3)
− (µ
F )−1µEλ1
1− (µE/µF )λ1(1− λ2)
[
((λ2)
t−1 − (λ2)t)S0
]
.
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The price change is a weighted sum of (i) the most recent dividend innovation t and the
market risk premium γσ2Q, (ii) the past price changes, and (iii) the starting sentiment S0.
The weights depend on the degree of return extrapolation (captured by the parameters λ1
and λ2) and the fraction of extrapolators µ
E in the economy.3
Equation (2.3) suggests that price changes in period t are just a function of previous
dividend innovations and the starting sentiment S0. The following proposition states an
exact formula for our setting. Appendix 2.7.1 contains the proof.
Proposition 1 (Price changes as a function of past epsilon shocks for t ≥ 2). For S0 = γσ2Q,
Pt − Pt−1 =
(
1
1− A
)
t − A(1− λ2)
(1− A)2
t−1∑
j=1
j
(
λ2 − A
1− A
)t−1−j
+ γσ2Q, (2.4)
with A = (µE/µF )λ1(1− λ2).
In Proposition 1 we assume S0 = γσ
2Q.4 This assumption implies that extrapolators'
belief about the mean of the ﬁrst price change in the economy is a linear function of the
market risk premium. For λ0 = 0 and λ1 = 1, the beliefs of all agents about the ﬁrst price
change coincide and are equal to the market risk premium.
An interesting special case is the parameterization λ2 = A. Equation (2.4) in Proposition
1 becomes
Pt − Pt−1 = 1
1− λ2 t −
λ2
1− λ2 t−1 + γσ
2Q. (2.5)
We consider λ2 = A to be an attractive parameter choice for an application to daily data
for two reasons. First, equation (2.5) implies that dividend innovations from the day be-
fore yesterday have no predictive power for price changes today, consistent with the idea
that several days old information is hardly of value for predicting price changes. Second,
equation (2.5) further implies that this period's price change is normally distributed with
mean γσ2Q − λ2
1−λ2 t−1 and variance
1
(1−λ2)2σ
2. The mean of this period's price change is
3Note that equation (2.3) holds for all assets in the economy. Diﬀerences in prices across assets are only
caused by diﬀerences in dividend innovations.
4Equation (2.23) in Appendix 2.7.1 states the more involved formula for an arbitrary S0.
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larger (smaller) than the market risk premium if the previous period's dividend innovation
was negative (positive), consistent with the evidence on negative autocorrelations of daily
returns. We therefore work with the assumption λ2 = A, although the derivation of our
empirical implications is also valid for other parameterizations.
Equations (2.4) and (2.5) show that this period's dividend innovation t has predictive
power for the next price change Pt+1 − Pt. A classic problem in ﬁnancial economics is that
researchers cannot directly observe dividend innovations. Even for salient information, it is
often hard to pin down the exact day the information hits the market (see, for example, the
discussion in MacKinlay, 2017, among others), let alone the more diﬃcult task of extracting
the exact piece of information that agents trade on for each asset on each single day.
However, in our setting it is possible to use past prices to make inferences about the most
recent dividend innovation. Solving equation (2.5) for t gives
t = (1− λ2)(Pt − Pt−1) + λ2t−1 − (1− λ2)γσ2Q. (2.6)
It further holds for the dividend innovation in the previous period t−1,
t−1 = (1− λ2)(Pt−1 − Pt−2) + λ2t−2 − (1− λ2)γσ2Q. (2.7)
In equation (2.6) we can substitute t−1 with its expression from equation (2.7). Iterating
this procedure for n periods, the formula for this period's dividend innovation becomes
t = λ
n
2t−n + (1− λ2)
t∑
i=t−n+1
λt−i2
[
(Pi − Pi−1)− γσ2Q
]
. (2.8)
An econometrician who observes an asset from the start of the economy is able to deduct
all dividend innovations if the market risk premium (γσ2Q) and the degree of return ex-
trapolation (λ2) are known and constant over time. However, time-constant parameters are
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unlikely, given the ample evidence on time-varying risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane,
1999), volatility jumps (Merton, 1976, Duﬃe, Pan, and Singleton, 2000), and time-variation
in investor sentiment (Baker and Wurgler, 2006).
A more realistic assumption is that the market risk premium and the degree of return
extrapolation are approximately constant for a suﬃciently short time period. Under this
assumption, equation (2.8) suggests that past price changes from n previous periods can
serve as a proxy for today's dividend innovation. Even without exact knowledge of γ, σ2,
and λ2, assets that outperformed the market several times in a row ((Pi−Pi−1) > γσ2Q over
the previous n periods) tend to have a higher dividend innovation t in this period. Assets
that have underperformed over the previous n periods tend to have a smaller dividend
innovation t. We call a situation where an asset has outperformed (underperformed) the
market over n previous periods without an exception a positive (negative) streak of length
n. We are now ready to formulate the main empirical predictions that we test in this paper.
Main Empirical Predictions: First, assets that have experienced a negative (positive)
streak in returns over the previous periods are expected to outperform (underperform) the
market going one period forward. Second, these abnormal returns tend to increase in absolute
terms the longer the streak length becomes.
2.3 Data
Theory provides little guidance on how long the empirical equivalent of one model period
should be. As discussed in more detail in Da, Huang, and Jin (2018), the behavioral as-
sumptions of the model imply quick reversals of sentiment and prices and therefore seem
more suitable for short-term data. We have argued in Section 2.2 that the implications of
the model are broadly consistent with existing empirical evidence collected on daily data.
Our main analysis is therefore conducted with daily US data. The fact that our empiri-
cal implications can be tested using only past prices as data inputs allows us to examine
international markets as well.
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2.3.1 US Data
For the US, we use daily stock data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
The data of stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ are collected over the period
from January 1, 1997 to October 29, 2017.5 We consider common stocks (share code 10
or 11) and exclude stocks quoted below $1 at the end of the previous month. Returns are
calculated on the basis of closing prices and dividends. On delisting days, we adjust the
returns using the delisting returns provided by CRSP. Turnover is calculated as number of
shares traded on a given day divided by number of shares outstanding.
In order to test whether our results are driven by bid-ask bounces, we also calculate
portfolio returns on the basis of mid-quotes, using end-of-day bid and ask prices as well as
dividends. We control for possible data inconsistencies by removing any observation where
the bid to midpoint ratio is smaller than 50%, and the percentage point diﬀerence between
midpoint return and closing price return is larger than 100% or smaller than -50%. This
ﬁlter follows Nagel (2012).
Streaks in returns can be identiﬁed with market-adjusted returns of the past few trading
days. The market-adjusted return is the raw stock return minus the market return, which is
the value-weighted portfolio of all stocks in the sample. A streak in returns of length n has
market-adjusted returns of the same sign on each day between t− 1 and t−n, where n is in
the set {2,...,5}.
Quarterly earnings announcements are collected from Compustat and matched to the
stocks in our sample. There are 371,351 successfully matched earnings announcements. The
dates of the earnings announcements are deﬁned as the day with a trading volume reaction.
This allows especially earnings announcements that are published during non-trading hours
to be matched to the date of the ﬁrst possible day a trading reaction could occur.
5We exclude data before 1997 to concentrate on a period with lower transaction costs and lower bid-ask
spreads (Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz, 1999). As noted by Nagel (2012), these are all
factors that could inﬂuence the serial autocorrelation and lead to regime switches within the sample.
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We compute institutional ownership based on 13-F ﬁlings provided by Thomson-Reuters.
The institutional ownership ratio (IOR) is the number of shares held by institutional owners
divided by the number of shares outstanding reported in CRSP. As in Nagel (2005), the IOR
of stocks without reported institutional holdings is set to zero. Institutional ownership is
only reported on a quarterly basis: therefore, the ﬁlings at the beginning of a quarter are
used for all days in the following quarter. Data corrections are implemented as in Daniel,
Klos, and Rottke (2018).
To test the relationship between streak strategy returns and trading volume on the hold-
ing day, we compute the detrended trading turnover. For this computation, we calculate
turnover as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding. The
detrended turnover variable is the trading turnover minus the average turnover of the past
200 days; this value is positive or negative when turnover in t is respectively larger or smaller
than the average turnover of the past 200 days.
2.3.2 International Data
In an out-of-sample test, we compare our empirical implications with data from the regions
Japan, Asia Paciﬁc, Europe and Canada. The regions investigated are based on Fama and
French (2012), with the exception that we investigate Canada separately from the US. We
collect daily market values and return data from Datastream from January 1, 1997 to October
29, 2017 for all stocks that are primarily quoted in the regions Japan, Asia Paciﬁc, Europe
and Canada. In order to correct for data mistakes, we ﬁlter the data following Ince and
Porter (2006) and Schmidt, von Arx, Schrimpf, Wagner, and Ziegler (2017). Furthermore, we
expand the word searches from Ince and Porter (2006) by the country speciﬁc screens reported
in Griﬃn, Kelly, and Nardari (2010). We adjust the monthly dynamic ﬁlters implemented
by Ince and Porter (2006) for daily data along the lines of Jacobs (2016), so that returns
higher than 300% are set to missing, as well as returns for which Rett and Rett−1 are
larger than 100% and (1+Rett)(1+Rett−1)−1 is smaller than 50% (Ince and Porter, 2006).
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Furthermore, companies that account for more than 90% of the entire market capitalization
of the country are eliminated. Micro-cap stocks, i.e. stocks with an end of month unadjusted
price below the 5% percentile of the domestic price distribution, are removed from the
dataset. All observations are expressed in USD, and the market values and returns reported
in other currencies are converted to USD using exchange rates from Datastream. During the
considered time period, on January 2, 2002, many EU countries have switched to the Euro.
In Datastream, all stocks delisted before the switch in 2002 still have their values reported in
the original currency, whereas stocks that have delisting dates following the currency change
or are still active are reported in Euro.
Streaks in daily returns are identiﬁed in the same manner as those on the US market.
The market-adjusted return is the raw return of the stock minus the market return of the
country in which the stock is listed. The market return for each country is calculated as the
value-weighted portfolio of all the stocks primarily listed in that country.
2.4 Main Results
In this section, we report our main tests of the empirical implications derived in Section 2.2.
The model suggests that streaks in daily returns have predictive power for the stock return
of the following day.
2.4.1 US Evidence
In a ﬁrst approach, we examine the return predictability of streaks using an event study.
Table 2.1 reports equally-weighted holding day returns and average turnover during and
after streaks. Returns behave in the manner predicted by the model: after positive streaks,
we see negative returns on the holding day t. Negative streaks are followed by positive daily
returns. This suggests that streaks in returns are an empirical proxy to identify the days in
which a stock is more likely to over- or underperform.6
6To some readers, the average absolute returns in Table 2.1 during a streak might seem to be high, with
about 2% during a positive streak and about -2% during a negative streak. However, note that these values
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Table 2.1 shows further that holding day returns after negative streaks tend to be larger in
absolute terms than holding day returns after positive streaks. This result is consistent with
the idea that negative returns inﬂuence extrapolators' beliefs more strongly than positive
returns (see Cassella and Gulen, 2018, and Da, Huang, and Jin, 2018, for direct empirical
evidence). It also suggest that returns are not driven entirely by market frictions, as short
selling stocks after positive streaks is less proﬁtable than buying stocks after negative streaks,
although we do not control for short selling costs.
We continue by forming 10 portfolios based on the sign of past daily market-adjusted re-
turns and assume that stocks are bought at the day's closing price.7 In what follows, we focus
on value-weighted portfolios because previous explanations of short-term autocorrelations,
like non-trading periods or non-synchronous trading (see, e.g., Boudoukh, Richardson, and
Whitelaw, 1994), are less likely to apply for larger and more actively traded stocks. Further-
more, classic short-term reversal returns tend to be substantially weaker for value-weighted
portfolios, making value-weighted portfolios a more challenging ex-ante testing ground. In
addition, trading costs, particularly market impact costs, tend to be smaller for larger stocks.
For the sake of completeness, we also report results for equally-weighted portfolios.
are conditional average returns, where we take averages only over positive or only over negative daily returns.
A simple simulation in Appendix 2.7.2 shows that the reported magnitudes are well expected.
7A diﬃculty is that we need to know the closing price at the end of a day in order to determine whether
or not a streak in returns is intact. At the same time, though, a straightforward testing procedure would
assume that a stock can be bought at the closing price. This constitutes a timing problem, which can be
dealt with in at least two ways. First, one can construct a portfolio shortly before the closing auction,
including only those stocks that have extreme returns today and are unlikely to break streaks during the
closing auction. From a theoretical point of view, such stocks are also those with the highest expected return
in absolute terms over the holding period. Second, the strategy can be implemented by placing limit-on-close
(LOC) orders for stocks whose streaks have a substantial probability to break in the closing auction. For
example, let's assume that a stock has had a four-day negative streak in returns and has closed at $100.01
on the previous day. Shortly before bids for the closing auction must be submitted, the stock is trading at
$99.99 and the market is expected to earn a zero return today. Assuming that the market return is indeed
zero, the streak will be intact if the closing price is smaller than or equal to $100. A LOC order with a
buying limit of $100 ensures that the stock will only be bought if the streak in daily returns continues. A
recent academic paper that discusses order types in closing auctions at the US stock exchanges in detail is
Comerton-Forde and Putnin
,
² (2011).
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Table 2.1: Event study around streaks in returns
This table reports the equally-weighted average stock returns and turnover in an event study. A streak in
returns of length n has market-adjusted returns of the same sign on each day between t− 1 and t−n, where
n is in the set {2, ..., 5}. The variable n measures the streak length in days. Day t is the holding day of
the streak strategy and day t+ 1 to t+ 20 are the days following it. Return and turnover are expressed as
percentages. The return reported is the market-adjusted return.
Positive streak returns Negative streak returns
Portfolio with 5-day streak length
Day Return Turnover Return Turnover
t-20 0.017 0.757 0.009 0.861
t-5 2.076 0.808 -2.047 0.780
t-4 2.121 0.860 -2.031 0.783
t-3 2.187 0.921 -2.069 0.813
t-2 2.261 0.988 -2.158 0.857
t-1 2.317 1.058 -2.316 0.920
t -0.117 0.977 0.289 0.949
t+1 -0.100 0.907 0.189 0.932
t+2 -0.071 0.876 0.141 0.912
t+3 -0.042 0.855 0.107 0.899
t+4 -0.038 0.847 0.078 0.885
t+5 -0.013 0.837 0.046 0.879
t+20 0.031 0.758 0.007 0.850
Portfolio with 4-day streak length
Day Return Turnover Return Turnover
t-20 0.018 0.785 0.010 0.828
t-5 -0.191 0.770 0.324 0.836
t-4 2.144 0.806 -2.066 0.764
t-3 2.198 0.866 -2.046 0.768
t-2 2.283 0.935 -2.106 0.802
t-1 2.343 1.013 -2.263 0.859
t -0.122 0.934 0.270 0.886
t+1 -0.070 0.871 0.149 0.875
t+2 -0.053 0.844 0.119 0.862
t+3 -0.040 0.829 0.088 0.854
t+4 -0.030 0.820 0.074 0.847
t+5 -0.025 0.813 0.055 0.839
t+20 0.032 0.750 0.010 0.840
Portfolio with 3-day streak length
Day Return Turnover Return Turnover
t-20 0.016 0.766 0.017 0.808
t-5 -0.044 0.751 0.113 0.806
t-4 -0.217 0.758 0.330 0.809
t-3 2.216 0.799 -2.086 0.741
t-2 2.282 0.868 -2.082 0.748
t-1 2.366 0.946 -2.211 0.794
t -0.137 0.879 0.255 0.822
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1  (continued from previous page)
Positive streak returns Negative streak returns
t+1 -0.050 0.827 0.108 0.819
t+2 -0.035 0.806 0.092 0.813
t+3 -0.026 0.796 0.075 0.810
t+4 -0.026 0.792 0.065 0.806
t+5 -0.015 0.785 0.052 0.803
t+20 0.027 0.741 0.019 0.800
Portfolio with 2-day streak length
Day Return Turnover Return Turnover
t-20 0.021 0.776 0.026 0.731
t-5 -0.006 0.737 0.059 0.775
t-4 -0.038 0.736 0.096 0.776
t-3 -0.239 0.742 0.317 0.777
t-2 2.304 0.787 -2.124 0.715
t-1 2.377 0.864 -2.191 0.733
t -0.153 0.815 0.236 0.764
t+1 -0.031 0.781 0.079 0.770
t+2 -0.018 0.767 0.065 0.770
t+3 -0.010 0.76 0.056 0.770
t+4 -0.013 0.759 0.053 0.769
t+5 -0.010 0.757 0.045 0.769
t+20 0.024 0.771 0.018 0.745
Table 2.2, Panel A, reports the value-weighted returns of portfolios formed on diﬀerent
streak lengths. After negative streaks in returns, portfolio returns increase with streak length;
analogously, a longer positive streak is associated with lower returns.8 For example, if we
build a value-weighted portfolio with stocks that have lost value relative to the market on all
the ﬁve previous trading days, the average market-adjusted return of this portfolio over the
next trading day is 13.1 basis points, with a t-stat of 8.408.9 Controlling for bid-ask bounces
by using mid-quote returns does not eliminate the eﬀect: see Panel B of Table 2.2. This
result is not surprising, since we are building value-weighted portfolios, and spreads tend to
be small for large stocks (Amihud, 2002).10
8These portfolio returns are qualitatively similar to the price changes that we observe in simulated data
using the model from Section 2.2, see Appendix 2.7.3, Table 2.20.
9Table 2.21 in Appendix 2.7.4 reports the Fama-French three-factor model (FF3) alphas of the value-
weighted streak portfolios. The portfolio with stocks that have lost value during all previous 5 trading days
yields a Fama-French three-factor alpha of 12.5 basis points with a t-stat of 6.985.
10Our results also contrast Cox and Peterson (1994), who investigate the returns following large price
declines. They ﬁnd that, when accounting for size and bid-ask bounce, there is no daily reversal eﬀect after
October 1987. We ﬁnd that bid-ask bounces do not account for our streak strategy returns.
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Table 2.2: Value- and equally-weighted market-adjusted returns of streak portfolios
For streak portfolios with diﬀerent streak lengths, this table reports average market-adjusted portfolio re-
turns, standard deviations, t-stats, and average number of stocks in the portfolio. The length of a streak is
measured in number of days ranging from 1 to 5. The values reported are those recorded on the day following
the streak. Portfolio returns are based on closing prices in Panels A and C, and on mid-quote prices in Panels
B and D. No. of stocks reports the average number of ﬁrms in each portfolio per day. For each portfolio and
day, we compute the value-weighted and the equally-weighted average of the quoted half-spreads. Panel A
(C) reports the time series of the value-weighted (equally-weighted) quoted half-spreads. Portfolio returns,
their standard deviation, and quoted half-spreads are reported in percentages. Panels A and B report the
portfolio returns weighted on the basis of the market value of the previous day. Panels C and D report
the returns of an equally-weighted portfolio. The t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolio returns (in %)
After negative streaks 0.009 0.046 0.069 0.107 0.131
Std. dev. 0.333 0.517 0.689 0.864 1.081
t-stat 2.318 7.120 7.632 7.914 8.408
No. of stocks 2,400 1,187 579 282 138
VW quoted half-spread 0.151 0.153 0.156 0.161 0.170
After positive streaks −0.009 −0.037 −0.052 −0.061 −0.085
Std. dev. 0.311 0.462 0.582 0.714 0.858
t-stat −2.412 −5.596 −5.678 −5.798 −6.543
No. of stocks 2,250 1,037 476 220 103
VW quoted half-spread 0.148 0.146 0.146 0.147 0.149
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolio returns with midquotes (in %)
After negative streaks −0.004 0.033 0.054 0.091 0.118
Std. dev. 0.346 0.536 0.708 0.892 1.113
t-stat −0.880 4.926 5.742 7.044 7.271
No. of stocks 2,348 1,160 566 276 135
After positive streaks 0.006 −0.021 −0.038 −0.044 −0.068
Std. dev. 0.325 0.474 0.595 0.737 0.886
t-stat 1.465 −3.442 −4.051 −4.180 −5.291
No. of stocks 2,201 1,013 466 215 100
Panel C: Equally-weighted portfolio returns (in %)
After negative streaks 0.141 0.194 0.211 0.227 0.240
Std. dev. 0.294 0.462 0.596 0.720 0.873
t-stat 16.760 18.804 20.134 20.207 17.970
No. of stocks 2,400 1,187 579 282 138
EW quoted half-spread 0.777 0.740 0.697 0.660 0.630
After positive streaks −0.145 −0.149 −0.125 −0.107 −0.098
Std. dev. 0.290 0.407 0.485 0.559 0.675
t-stat −16.543 −16.225 −14.161 −11.663 −9.582
No. of stocks 2,250 1,037 476 220 103
EW quoted half-spread 0.750 0.677 0.603 0.540 0.492
Panel D: Equally-weighted portfolio returns with mid-quotes (in %)
After negative streaks −0.049 −0.015 0.012 0.045 0.076
Std. dev. 0.278 0.440 0.570 0.692 0.843
t-stat −7.936 −2.364 1.609 5.445 7.537
No. of stocks 2,348 1,160 566 276 135
After positive streaks 0.034 0.037 0.037 0.029 0.015
Std. dev. 0.294 0.404 0.488 0.560 0.677
t-stat 5.405 5.114 4.650 3.502 1.606
No. of stocks 2,201 1,013 466 215 100
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Panel A also reports the time-series average of the value-weighted, quoted half-spread on
the holding day. We follow the market microstructure literature and compute the quoted
half-spread of a stock as the diﬀerence between the quoted bid and the quoted ask prices
divided by two times the mid-price (see, e.g. Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2010). If
trades are executed at the quoted ask and bid prices, quoted half-spreads can be viewed as a
proxy for the one-way transaction costs of a trade. CRSP quoted spreads closely approximate
TAQ eﬀective spreads, especially in recent years (Chung and Zhang, 2014, Abdi and Ranaldo,
2017). On average, spreads are higher than portfolio returns. However, the comparison of
averages masks considerable time-variations in portfolio returns and quoted half-spreads,
which we will be discussed shortly.
Panel C shows that market-adjusted returns tend to be higher in equally-weighted portfo-
lios than in value-weighted portfolios.11 However, market-adjusted returns are not monotonic
in the length of streaks after a positive streaks in daily returns. Returns are much more af-
fected by using mid-quote prices instead of end-of-day prices (see Panel D). Market-adjusted
returns after positive streaks are even positive. Perhaps surprisingly, if we compute port-
folio returns based on mid-quotes, value-weighted portfolio returns are more extreme than
equally-weighted portfolio returns. These results suggests that, while equally-weighted re-
turns from streak strategies are largely caused by bid-ask bounces, value-weighted returns
cannot solely be explained by large bid-ask spreads.
Overall, portfolios formed on the basis of streaks in daily returns strongly support the
main empirical predictions of the theoretical model. The return of the trading strategy
increase monotonically with streak length. This holds especially for the value-weighted
portfolios.12
11In Nagel's (2012) computation of liquidity provision returns, he uses the stock returns for the portfolio
weighting, resulting in large weights for small stocks, even compared to equally-weighting. In Appendix
2.7.5, we apply a similar weighting scheme to our streak portfolios. In this speciﬁcation, we use the absolute
sums of daily returns during the streaks as weights to construct the portfolios.
12The results of a market-value-weighted Fama-MacBeth regression in Appendix 2.7.6 conﬁrm that the
streak strategy returns increase with streak length.
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Table 2.3: Summary of the dollar-neutral long-short strategy
The long leg consists of an equally-weighted portfolio including the four value-weighted streak
portfolios based on negative streaks stretching over 2 to 5 days. The short leg consists of an
equally-weighted portfolio of the four value-weighted portfolios based on positive streaks stretching
over 2 to 5 days. The reported daily returns of the strategy are based on end-of-day prices in
column 1 and on mid-quote prices in column 2. Portfolio returns and standard deviations are
reported in percentages. The Sharpe ratio of the long-short portfolio is annualized. The t-statistics
are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term.
The strategy beta is the coeﬃcient of the full sample time-series regression of the trading strategy
on the CRSP value-weighted market.
End-of-day returns Mid-quote returns
Ret (in %) 0.147 0.116
Std. dev. (in %) 1.118 1.135
t-stat 8.422 6.758
Annualized Sharpe ratio 2.086 1.629
Beta 0.227 0.233
The value-weighted portfolios based on a streak length of 2 to 5 days in Table 2.2 are used
to create a dollar-neutral long-short portfolio. The short leg consists of the four portfolios
with a positive return streaks of 2 to 5 days; the long leg consists of the portfolios with
negative return streaks of 2 to 5 days. In the long and the short leg, each streak-length
portfolio receives the weight of 1
4
. Within each streak-length portfolio, stocks are still value-
weighted. Descriptive statistics of the dollar-neutral long-short portfolio are reported in
Table 2.3. We calculate returns based on transaction prices and based on mid-quotes. The
value-weighted portfolios earn 14.7 (t-stat: 8.422) and 11.6 (t-stat: 6.758) basis points on
average, respectively. Based on transaction prices, the strategy has an annualized Sharpe
ratio of 2.086. Using mid-quotes reduces the annualized Sharpe ratio to 1.629.13 To put
these numbers into perspective, Nagel's (2012) value-weighted industry reversal strategy,
calculated on the basis of transactions prices, earns 2 bps per day and has an annualized
Sharpe ratio of 0.56.
13Figure 2.4 in Appendix 2.7.7 reports the betas of the long-short streak strategy over time.
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Figure 2.1 contains four panels that show the development of streak-returns and several
short-term reversal strategies over time. These panels highlight diﬀerences and similarities
among them.
Panel A shows the six-month moving average of streak returns and quoted half-spreads.
Half-spreads, which are expressed as percentages of mid-prices and are weighted in exactly the
same way as returns, are high in the late 90's. In the early 2000's, spreads signiﬁcantly decline
as a result of the decimalization of quotes (Bessembinder, 2003) and the rise of algorithmic
trading (Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011). Afterwards, they continue to decrease at
low levels with a temporary rise after the market decline during the ﬁnancial crisis (Hameed,
Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010). Starting in mid 2002, value-weighted quoted half-spreads
roughly equal portfolio returns. In the following years, returns seem to be slightly higher
than spreads. This pattern is consistent with a limits of arbitrage story. To the extent
that streak returns constitute mispricing, arbitraging the mispricing away was impossible
in the late 90's. After spreads have fallen in the 2000's, streak returns have decreased as
well. However, they have decreased in such a way that one can earn slightly more than the
transaction costs implied by quoted spreads (see Section 2.5 for further details). Recognizing
that there are other transaction costs than bid-ask spreads, the strategy earns most likely
just its costs for a small arbitrageur that does not move prices much.
Panel B of Figure 2.1 plots the development of $1 invested in the long-short streak
portfolio, calculated either on the basis of end-of-day prices or mid-quotes. The ﬁgure further
compares our long-short streak strategy to the market portfolio, a value-weighted long-short
portfolio that goes long on all previous day's losers and short on all previous day's winners,
and the short-term reversal (STR) strategy from Kenneth French's data library. Panel C
compares these four strategies in terms of their six-month moving average.
26
Panel A Panel B
0.0000
0.0025
0.0050
0.0075
0.0100
2000 2005 2010 2015
6M Moving Average
Long−Short Streak
VW half−spreads
1
10
50
100
500
1000
1500
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
Po
rtf
o
lio
 V
a
lu
e 
(Lo
g S
ca
le)
Dollar Values
CRSP Market
Long−Short Streak
Long−Short Streak
(based on MID)
STR Factor
VW Reversal
Panel C Panel D
−0.005
0.000
0.005
0.010
2000 2005 2010 2015
6M Moving Average
CRSP Market
Long−Short Streak
STR Factor
VW Reversal
0.00
0.01
0.02
2000 2005 2010 2015
6M Moving Average
Nagel (2012)
RW half−spreads
RW Reversal Strategy
Figure 2.1: Returns and spreads over time
Panel A reports the six-month moving average of daily returns and the average value-weighted quoted half-spreads of the
long-short streak portfolio. The average value-weighted quoted half-spreads are computed as simple average of the ten value-
weighted quoted half-spreads of all portfolios that were combined to long-short streak strategy as in Table 2.3. The weighting
schemes of returns and spreads in Panel A are identical. Panel B plots how a dollar invested in each of the four strategies at the
beginning of 1997 would have developed over time before costs. The long-short streak strategy is plotted based on end-of-day
returns and on mid-quote returns. The graph also shows the development for the value-weighted market and the short-term
reversal factor. Panel C reports the six-month moving average of daily streak returns (as in Panel A) but adds the market
portfolio, the STR factor, and a value-weighted portfolio that longs (shorts) all stocks that have underperformed (outperformed)
the market over the previous days. Panel D shows the six-month moving averages of Nagel's (2012) reversal strategy (Data
source: https://voices.uchicago.edu/stefannagel/code-and-data/, last accessed: April 2019) and of the return-weighted average
of quoted half-spreads. The RW reversal strategy forms a portfolio that long (short) the stocks that have underperformed
(outperformed) the market over the previous day, and weights each stock with the absolute value of the market-adjusted return
from the previous day. The weighting schemes of RW Reversal Strategy and RW half-spreads in Panel D are identical.
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On a value-weighted basis, our streak strategy outperforms the well-known Fama-French
short-term reversal factor by a wide margin. This is a fair comparison, as the STR factor,
like our long-short portfolio, is a combination of value-weighted portfolios. Note that the
outperformance of the streak portfolio is not achieved by overweighting small stocks; on
the contrary, our long-short portfolio invests in larger ﬁrms than the STR factor. The
stocks in streak portfolios have an average market capitalization of $3,714.6 millions and
a value-weighted average market capitalization of $80,987.24 millions. The corresponding
numbers for the STR factor are $2,885.1 millions and $75,480.17 millions, respectively. Both
diﬀerences are highly statistically signiﬁcant (t-stats > 10) and based on our replication of
the STR factor.
Panel D shows the six-month moving average of a return-weighted reversal strategy. This
strategy overweights small stocks and is therefore conceptually diﬀerent from the strategies
that partly or completely follow value-weighted approaches. Not surprisingly, returns and
spreads for these smaller stocks are much higher. We also plot Nagel's (2012) reversal
strategy, which is an equally-weighted combination of ten return-weighted reversal portfolios.
Return-weighted strategies are highly correlated with return-weighted quoted half-spreads
over the entire sample, while returns from streak strategies are substantially smaller than
spreads in the late 90's and during several months of the bear market in the early 2000's. This
observation is consistent with the idea that return-weighted strategies solely capture returns
from liquidity provisions, while streak strategies do not. We further see that a simple value-
weighted reversal strategy underperforms the market (Panel B). Value-weighted strategies
tend to perform well when the market does poorly (Panels B and C).
We want to make sure that our strategy is conceptually and economically diﬀerent from
established short-term reversal strategies, beyond the qualitative discussion of the patterns
visualized in Figure 2.1. Therefore, we conduct four empirical tests.
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Table 2.4: Alphas of streak portfolios controlled for the Fama-French ﬁve-factors and the
short-term reversal factor
This table reports the regression of the value-weighted (Panel A) and equally-weighted (Panel B) streak
portfolios on the ﬁve Fama-French factors, the Fama-French three-factors, and the short-term reversal factor.
The t-statistics are reported in brackets below the estimates. The factors are taken from Kenneth French's
website: MktRF is the market portfolio minus the risk free rate; SMB is the small-minus-big factor; HML
is the high-minus-low factor; RMW is the factor robust-minus-weak, and CMA is the conservative-minus-
aggressive factor. More detail on the factors can be found in Fama and French (1993, 2015). STR is the
short-term reversal factor from Kenneth French's data library. The t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics
corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term. The streak portfolios are based on
daily data of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and collected from CRSP for the sample period
from January 1, 1997 to October 31, 2017.
Panel A: Value-weighted streak portfolio
Constant 0.124∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(6.643) (6.429) (6.303) (7.511)
MktRF 0.039 0.086∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(1.490) (3.010) (7.163)
SMB −0.040 −0.015 −0.017
(−1.107) (−0.399) (−0.461)
HML 0.022 −0.070 −0.139∗
(0.386) (−1.191) (−1.806)
RMW −0.129∗∗
(−2.262)
CMA −0.266∗∗∗
(−2.970)
STR 0.499∗∗∗ 0.525∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗
(10.841) (10.184) (11.076)
Adj. R2 0.238 0.227 0.067 0.218
Panel B: Equally-weighted streak portfolio
Constant 0.312∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(20.195) (17.923) (15.643) (16.749)
MktRF 0.088∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗
(3.626) (4.812) (9.044)
SMB 0.008 0.040 0.039
(0.240) (1.047) (0.749)
HML −0.063 −0.077∗ −0.139∗∗∗
(−1.169) (−1.660) (−2.698)
RMW −0.128∗∗
(−2.575)
CMA −0.016
(−0.223)
STR 0.464∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
(12.447) (12.656) (12.651)
Adj. R2 0.259 0.256 0.092 0.239
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First, our long-short streak portfolio generates a daily alpha of 12.4 basis points after
controlling for the ﬁve Fama-French factors and the short-term reversal factor (see Table
2.4). If our strategy is just a diﬀerent way of calculating the well-known reversal-factor
portfolio, we would observe an alpha of zero.
Second, we investigate if our streak strategy does solely capture that stocks with extreme
t − 1 returns have more extreme reversal returns on the following day. We match streak
stocks to stocks without streaks on size and return in t− 1. As in Barber and Lyon (1997),
we ﬁrst ﬁnd all stocks with a market value between 70% and 130% of the market value of
the streak stock, choosing then from this group of possible control stocks those with the
returns on day t− 1 closest to the streak stocks. If the streak strategy is only capturing the
reversal of a stock with very high return in t − 1, then portfolios of the streak stocks and
their matched control stocks would not have signiﬁcantly diﬀerent returns.
In Panel A of Table 2.5, we report the daily value-weighted portfolio return on the holding
day for streak stocks and control stocks. We report the value-weighted returns after negative
and positive streaks in returns. Streak length varies from 2 to 5 days. For example, if a
stock has a 5-day negative streak in returns, then the market-adjusted returns on all 5 days
prior to t are negative; however, the matched control stock has a negative market-adjusted
return only on day t− 1, but a positive one on day t− 2. We report the diﬀerence in returns
between the streak stock portfolio and control stock portfolio in the last column of Table
2.5.
On holding day t, returns of streak portfolios are consistently more extreme than re-
turns of portfolios built on control stocks. All diﬀerences are highly statistically signiﬁcant.
The Newey-West t-statistics are reported underneath the values in brackets. We further ob-
serve that, for both negative and positive streaks, diﬀerences in the absolute value-weighted
portfolio returns increase with streak length.
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Table 2.5: Holding day returns of streak stocks vs. control stocks
This table reports the holding day returns of stocks with streaks in returns and those of the matched control
stocks. To ﬁnd matching controls for size and the most recent daily return, the following two step procedure
is used. First, the universe of possible control stocks is deﬁned as all ﬁrms where (i) the market-adjusted
return on the day before yesterday has the opposite sign of yesterday's market-adjusted return and (ii) the
market capitalization lies between 70% and 130% of the market capitalization of the streak stock. Second,
stocks with streaks in returns are matched to potential control stocks based on the most recent daily return.
The table reports the average value- and equally-weighted holding day return for a portfolio of streak stocks
and a portfolio of matched control stocks in Panel A and B, respectively. The length of a streak is measured
in number of days, ranging from 2 to 5. The sign of the streak return is reported in the second column.
The values reported are those recorded on the day after the streak. Portfolio returns are based on returns
of closing prices. The last column reports the diﬀerence in holding day returns of the streak stocks and the
control stocks. Returns are expressed as percentages. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the average
returns. The t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity
in the error term.
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolios
Streak Return streak Streak Control Diﬀerence
length sign stocks stocks
5 - 0.170 0.063 0.107
(7.600) (3.603) (5.836)
4 - 0.146 0.058 0.088
(7.128) (3.519) (5.706)
3 - 0.108 0.059 0.049
(6.101) (3.990) (4.142)
2 - 0.085 0.056 0.029
(5.272) (3.696) (3.121)
5 + -0.047 0.114 -0.160
(-2.522) (5.698) (-8.344)
4 + -0.022 0.100 -0.122
(-1.192) (5.456) (-8.125)
3 + -0.013 0.104 -0.117
(-0.773) (5.850) (-7.964)
2 + 0.002 0.097 -0.095
(0.125) (5.635) (-7.546)
Panel B: Equally-weighted portfolios
Streak Return streak Streak Control Diﬀerence
length sign stocks stocks
5 - 0.301 0.122 0.179
(12.221) (6.583) (11.789)
4 - 0.287 0.116 0.171
(12.352) (6.502) (13.288)
3 - 0.271 0.114 0.157
(12.298) (6.578) (14.124)
2 - 0.255 0.116 0.139
(12.471) (6.798) (14.672)
5 + -0.036 -0.012 -0.024
(-1.753) (-0.59) (-1.988)
4 + -0.045 -0.016 -0.029
(-2.139) (-0.830) (-2.954)
3 + -0.064 -0.023 -0.042
(-2.868) (-1.167) (-4.916)
2 + -0.088 -0.035 -0.053
(-3.900) (-1.776) (-7.429)
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We also report equally-weighted returns in Panel B of Table 2.5. This approach is equiv-
alent to comparing the simple average of all streak stocks to that of all matched stocks.
Panel B shows that, as with the value-weighted portfolios, absolute returns of streak stocks
are larger compared to returns of control stocks. However, the diﬀerences in the equally-
weighted portfolios do not show a monotonic increase in streak length after positive streaks
in returns.
Our third test deals with the possibility that streak strategies are just picking up large
liquidity shocks among highly illiquid stocks. The premise would then be that those shocks
need more than a day to ﬁnd their way into prices. We consider this possibility to be ex-ante
unlikely, given the excess returns that we have already reported for value-weighted portfolios.
In a value-weighted portfolio, the stocks with the highest weights tend not to be illiquid.
To address the argument formally, we run Fama-MacBeth regressions weighted on market
value. Streak dummies always remain signiﬁcant, no matter if we include just the market-
adjusted return of the previous day or additionally the previous n-day market-adjusted re-
turns (see Panels C and D in Table 2.24, Appendix 2.7.8).14
In our fourth and ﬁnal test, we ﬁrst sort the cross-section of returns by its t− 1 market-
adjusted return each day. Then we divide the stocks into four equally sized quartiles based
on their previous day's returns. Afterwards, we calculate streak strategies within these
quartiles. Table 2.6 reports the value-weighted market-adjusted returns on the holding day.
We ﬁnd that value-weighted portfolios in the upper and lower t− 1 return quartile still have
signiﬁcant holding day returns after streaks. This provides further evidence that streaks in
returns do not simply identify stocks with high t− 1 returns.
14It is interesting to note that some streak dummies switch signs in standard Fama-MacBeth regressions
after adding previous n-day market-adjusted returns as additional control variables (see Panels A and B
in Table 2.24). Earlier forms of daily return predictability tend to vanish with ﬁrm size. In contrast, the
empirical importance of streaks in daily returns seems to be even more robust among large stocks.
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Table 2.6: Sorts on t-1 returns within each streak portfolio
On each day, the cross-section of stocks is ranked based on their market-adjusted return yesterday (t − 1)
and assigned to one of four buckets. For the assignment of the stocks, the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantiles of
yesterday's returns are used as breakpoints. In each bucket, the streak portfolios are constructed for a streak
length of 1 to 5 days, and the resulting portfolios are value-weighted. The returns are market-adjusted and
the t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error
term. No. of stocks reports the average number of stocks in the portfolio for all days for which the portfolio is
not empty. The 75% quantile breakpoint is negative on 8 diﬀerent dates due to a skewed return distribution
on these days: August 9, 1997, September 29, 1999, March 22, 2000, April 4, 2000, May 25, 2000, May 5,
2002, and October 2, 2002. The portfolios with negative streaks in returns and a t − 1 return above the
75% quantile are not reported because of their limited size. The 25% quantile breakpoint is positive on two
occasions  August 34, 2015 and September 30, 2017  and the portfolio returns of stocks with a positive
streak and a t− 1 return in the lower 25% quantile are also not reported due to the small sample.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Market-adjusted returns above the 75% quantile on day t− 1
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.017 -0.046 -0.070 -0.094 -0.128
Std. dev. 0.581 0.706 0.848 1.019 1.241
t-stat -2.212 -4.621 -4.965 -6.564 -6.834
No. of stocks 1,171 526 241 111 52
Market returns above the 50% and below the 75% quantile on day t− 1
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.006 -0.030 -0.044 -0.050 -0.056
Std. dev. 0.319 0.474 0.617 0.775 0.965
t-stat -1.404 -5.178 -5.345 -4.536 -4.199
No. of stocks 965 454 209 97 45
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.005 0.029 0.021 0.061 0.099
Std. dev. 0.454 0.598 0.863 1.068 1.581
t-stat 0.542 2.527 1.379 3.232 3.401
No. of stocks 464 244 118 55 27
Market returns above the 25% and below the 50% quantile on day t− 1
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.016 -0.021 -0.054 -0.060 -0.043
Std. dev. 0.632 0.777 1.006 1.152 1.403
t-stat -1.242 -1.233 -2.434 -2.377 -1.397
No. of stocks 280 140 66 31 15
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.002 0.030 0.044 0.076 0.086
Std. dev. 0.309 0.465 0.672 0.819 1.056
t-stat 0.446 4.829 4.837 6.081 5.816
No. of stocks 974 489 239 116 57
Market returns below the 25% quantile on day t− 1
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.031 0.083 0.119 0.179 0.230
Std. dev. 0.737 0.927 1.116 1.335 1.583
t-stat 3.334 7.245 8.177 9.349 10.284
No. of stocks 1,168 561 274 135 67
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2.4.2 International Evidence
The theory-driven trading strategy based on streaks in returns exhibits signiﬁcant daily
abnormal returns when applied to US stocks. In the following, we replicate these results
on international stock markets for two reasons. First, going outside the US provides out-
of-sample evidence (see, e.g., the discussion in Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen, 2013).
Second, a larger stock universe would allow us to develop a streak strategy that achieves a
higher level of diversiﬁcation.
We analyze four additional international regions: Japan, Europe, Asia Paciﬁc, and
Canada, which we have chosen following Fama and French (2012). Unlike their work, we
do not include the US stock market in the same region as Canada, because we have already
given a detailed summary of the streak strategy in the US stock market.
Table 2.7: International streak portfolios by region
This table presents the value-weighted streak portfolio returns for diﬀerent streak lengths for 4 regions: Japan,
Canada, Europe, and Asia Paciﬁc. For each streak portfolio with diﬀerent streak lengths of positive and
negative returns, this table reports portfolio market-adjusted returns, standard deviations, and t-statistics.
The length of a streak is measured in number of days, ranging from 1 to 5. The values reported are those
recorded on the day following the streak. No. of stocks is the average number of stocks in each portfolio on
each day. Portfolio returns and their standard deviations are expressed as percentages. The t-statistics are
Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Japan
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.011 0.026 0.065 0.094 0.108
Std. dev. 0.332 0.511 0.669 0.824 1.006
t-stat -2.058 3.777 7.334 8.241 7.187
No. of stocks 1,263 667 351 183 94
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.016 -0.017 -0.044 -0.070 -0.082
Std. dev. 0.416 0.617 0.831 1.040 1.308
t-stat 2.214 -1.846 -3.514 -4.601 -4.431
No. of stocks 1,112 511 232 104 46
Europe
Continued on next page
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Table 2.7  (continued from previous page)
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.008 0.024 0.041 0.056 0.066
Std. dev. 0.271 0.396 0.518 0.651 0.788
t-stat -1.890 5.071 6.842 6.538 6.183
No. of stocks 2,731 1,423 737 384 201
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.008 -0.018 -0.044 -0.059 -0.068
Std. dev. 0.266 0.385 0.496 0.640 0.812
t-stat 1.986 -3.581 -6.539 -7.686 -6.723
No. of stocks 2,424 1,118 513 234 109
Asia Paciﬁc
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.027 0.019 0.048 0.078 0.105
Std. dev. 0.280 0.442 0.592 0.783 0.955
t-stat -6.250 3.255 6.376 7.658 8.034
No. of stocks 1,472 780 408 213 111
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.027 -0.011 -0.034 -0.062 -0.064
Std. dev. 0.286 0.443 0.612 0.792 1.046
t-stat 5.890 -1.872 -4.314 -6.175 -4.759
No. of stocks 1,223 531 228 97 42
Canada
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.017 0.026 0.044 0.058 0.083
Std. dev. 0.529 0.740 0.926 1.203 1.580
t-stat -2.212 2.466 3.174 3.167 3.469
No. of stocks 444 221 108 52 25
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.013 -0.021 -0.019 -0.034 -0.032
Std. dev. 0.512 0.696 0.924 1.180 1.664
t-stat 1.795 -2.086 -1.413 -2.000 -1.299
No. of stocks 401 178 78 35 15
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In all regions, similar return predictability after streaks in daily returns can be observed.
Table 2.7 reports the value-weighted market-adjusted returns after 1- to 5-day streaks. In
all regions, we see sizeable returns. Absolute portfolio returns on the holding day increase
with streak length in the predicted direction.15 In terms of magnitude, absolute returns
in international markets tend to be slightly smaller than in the US. This result is broadly
consistent with Jacobs (2016) and Jacobs and Müller (2019), who report that stock mar-
ket anomalies are often of comparable magnitude and sometimes even less pronounced in
international markets.
Table 2.8: Correlation of streak strategy in diﬀerent regions
Correlation matrix of the long-short streak portfolios of diﬀerent regions. For the regions Japan, Canada,
Europe, Asia Paciﬁc and US, the long-short streak portfolio is computed. In each region, the long leg consists
of the four portfolios with streaks of 2 to 5 days in negative returns; the short leg consists of the portfolios
with streaks of 2 to 5 days in positive returns.
Japan Canada Europe US Asia Paciﬁc
Japan 1 0.072 0.134 0.043 0.214
Canada 0.072 1 0.267 0.424 0.098
Europe 0.134 0.267 1 0.358 0.181
US 0.043 0.424 0.358 1 0.058
Asia Paciﬁc 0.214 0.098 0.181 0.058 1
The US and international streak portfolios do not exhibit highly correlated returns, as re-
ported in Table 2.8. This suggests further beneﬁts from diversifying internationally. Indeed,
a diversiﬁed streak strategy that puts the same weight on the regions Japan, US, Canada,
Europe and Asia Paciﬁc increases the annualized Sharpe ratio to 2.696. A strategy based
solely on US stocks has an annualized Sharpe ratio of 2.086.
15In Appendix 2.7.9, Table 2.25 and Table 2.26 report the streak portfolio returns for each country
separately.
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2.5 Further Empirical Evidence
In this section, we gather further empirical evidence on the US streak strategy. First, we
estimate the model parameter λ2 empirically and show that stocks which are subject to a
higher degree of return extrapolation earn higher streak returns. Second, we test whether the
streak strategy has signiﬁcant returns after accounting for trading costs. This is especially
important for a trading strategy that is rebalanced daily. Third, we look at streak strategy
returns on earnings announcement days. Fourth, we investigate the relationship between
trading volume on the holding day and streak strategy returns. Last, we test the streak
strategy on stocks with diﬀerent level of institutional ownership.
Estimating the level of extrapolation λ2
The model suggests that the holding day returns after streaks in daily returns should be
higher for stocks with a higher λ2 parameter. Let's recall that the parameter λ2 determines
the weight extrapolators put on more recent price changes compared to price changes that
are further back in the past. To test whether stocks with a higher λ2 have higher holding
day returns after streaks, we estimate an empirical λ2 for each stock in our sample.
We go back to the model and rearrange equation (2.8) to write Pt−Pt−1 as a function of
the last 5 price changes, so that n = 6. This leads to the following speciﬁcation of Pt−Pt−1:
Pt − Pt−1 = Qγσ2 − λ52
(
Pt−5 − Pt−6 −Qγσ2
)− λ42 (Pt−4 − Pt−5 −Qγσ2)
− λ32
(
Pt−3 − Pt−4 −Qγσ2
)− λ22 (Pt−2 − Pt−3 −Qγσ2)
− λ2
(
Pt−1 − Pt−2 −Qγσ2
)
+
t − λ62t−6
1− λ2 .
(2.9)
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A time-series regression is run separately for each stock in the sample:
AdjReti,t = αi + βi,1AdjReti,t−1 + βi,2AdjReti,t−2 + βi,3AdjReti,t−3
+ βi,4AdjReti,t−4 + βi,5AdjReti,t−5 + ui,
(2.10)
where AdjReti,t is the market-adjusted return of stock i in period t. Equations (2.9) and
(2.10) allow to set up the following minimization problem to estimate the λˆi,2 of stock i given
the estimated βˆi's from equation (2.10):
λˆi,2 = arg minλi,2 (βˆi,1+λi,2)
2+(βˆi,2+λ
2
i,2)
2+(βˆi,3+λ
3
i,2)
2+(βˆi,4+λ
4
i,2)
2+(βˆi,5+λ
5
i,2)
2. (2.11)
Using the estimated λˆ2 values, we compute the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantile breakpoints
and use them to separate the stocks into quartiles. We compute the streak strategy returns
within each of the four quartiles. Table 2.9 reports the value- and equally-weighted re-
turns. Consistent with the theory, we observe that streak strategy returns are monotonically
increasing in λˆ2.
Note that an implicit assumption in this empirical exercise is that each stock in the sample
has a time-constant λ2, while our main tests in Section 2.4 rely on the weaker assumption
that λ2 is constant over a few days.
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Table 2.9: Relationship between streak strategy returns and estimated λˆ2
For the cross-section of US equity, the estimated λˆ2 values are used to compute the 25%, 50%, and 75%
quantile breakpoints. The breakpoints are used to separate the streak portfolios into four quartiles. In each of
the buckets, the 5 positive and negative streak portfolios are computed. Panel A reports the value-weighted
portfolio returns and Panel B the equally-weighted portfolio returns. The High-Low column computes the
diﬀerence in return of the portfolios with an estimated λˆ2 over the 75% quantile breakpoint and the portfolios
with an estimated λˆ2 below the 25% quantile breakpoint. The Newey-West statistics corrected for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term are reported in brackets next to the High-Low value.
The returns are expressed as percentages.
Panel A: Value-weighted portfolios
Streak length Return streak Estimated λˆ2
sign High Low High-Low
1 day + -0.189 -0.059 -0.011 0.019 -0.207 (-11.712)
2 days + -0.244 -0.087 -0.036 -0.009 -0.235 (-13.883)
3 days + -0.241 -0.092 -0.051 -0.03 -0.211 (-11.919)
4 days + -0.244 -0.092 -0.072 -0.037 -0.207 (-9.216)
5 days + -0.235 -0.092 -0.089 -0.06 -0.175 (-6.819)
1 day - 0.175 0.066 0.021 -0.027 0.203 (14.162)
2 days - 0.253 0.103 0.067 0.001 0.252 (13.692)
3 days - 0.290 0.121 0.09 0.023 0.267 (12.595)
4 days - 0.320 0.170 0.141 0.050 0.270 (11.27)
5 days - 0.370 0.201 0.154 0.064 0.305 (9.136)
Panel B: Equally-weighted portfolios
Estimated λˆ2
High Low High-Low
-0.455 -0.131 -0.013 0.081 -0.536 (-16.731)
-0.526 -0.132 -0.014 0.083 -0.609 (-16.246)
-0.480 -0.115 -0.016 0.079 -0.558 (-15.446)
-0.397 -0.108 -0.025 0.066 -0.463 (-15.457)
-0.333 -0.098 -0.044 0.062 -0.396 (-12.711)
0.509 0.162 0.06 -0.044 0.553 (17.716)
0.659 0.219 0.102 -0.012 0.671 (17.339)
0.710 0.253 0.127 0.007 0.703 (16.402)
0.735 0.287 0.158 0.042 0.693 (15.752)
0.737 0.326 0.199 0.064 0.672 (13.723)
Streak Strategy and Trading Costs
Implementing the streak trading strategy entails a large amount of daily trading. For
example, the 5-day streak portfolio requires, on average, 102 sales and 138 buys per day with
a holding period of only one day. A growing number of recent studies investigates the trading
costs faced by institutional investors (see, e.g., Keim and Madhavan, 1997, Korajczyk and
Sadka, 2004, Lesmond, Schill, and Zhou, 2004, Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz, 2012, Engle,
Ferstenberg, and Russell, 2012, Groot, Huij, and Zhou, 2012, Novy-Marx and Velikov, 2016,
Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz, 2018).
A full analysis of the question whether daily return predictability could be economically
exploited is beyond the scope of the paper. However, we aim to get a rough idea on how
close to tradeability the strategy might be. We start approaching this question by looking
at quoted half-spreads. Assuming that trades occur at quoted bids and asks, quoted spreads
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equal the trading costs of a round-trip, and half-spreads equal the costs of a single trade.
We look at an equally-weighted average of the two value-weighted long portfolios consisting
of stocks that have experienced a negative streak in daily returns of length 4 and 5 days,
respectively (long 4/5 strategy). Table 2.2 shows that these portfolios are the two best
performing ones in the entire sample. Furthermore, long portfolios avoid concerns regarding
short-sale costs.
Panel A of Figure 2.2 plots the six months moving averages of portfolio returns based on
transaction prices and value-weighted quoted half-spreads. The overall pattern is similar to
the one for the long-short streak portfolio shown in Panel A of Figure 2.1.
To get an idea whether the performance after costs could be higher than the performance
of the market, we perform the following calculation:
rACt =
Nt∑
i=1
wi,tri,t −
Nt∪Nt−1∑
i=1
|wi,t − wi,t−1|qi,t, (2.12)
where rACt is the portfolio return after transaction costs on day t, Nt is the number of stocks
in the portfolio at time t, wi,t is the portfolio weight of stock i at time t, ri,t is the raw
return, and qi,t is the quoted half-spread. Stocks that get delisted on day t− 1 do not have a
valid quoted-half spread on day t, and we assume that these stocks earn the delisting return
without further transaction costs. If a stock has a valid quoted half-spread on day t− 1 but
not on day t, we take the quoted half-spread from day t−1 to approximate the trading costs.
This procedure is necessary if a stock no longer belongs to the tradeable universe according
to our ﬁlters. We then close the position assuming that the spread of the previous day equals
the spread today. The union in the second summand ensures that trading costs are also paid
if a position is entirely sold.16
16An alternative way of calculating returns after paying the bid-ask spread would be to start with $1m
on January 1, 2004. We then determine the number of shares that we want to hold based on mid-prices. We
truncate the number of shares to the next smaller integer and buy this number of shares at the ask price.
Cash holding on the ﬁrst day is the diﬀerence between $1m and the cash we need to build the portfolio and is
due to imperfect divisibility. We assume that neither positive nor negative cash holdings yield any interest.
After the ﬁrst day, we value our portfolio at closing mid-prices. The current value of the strategy is now the
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To reduce trading costs, we apply a straightforward trading-cost mitigation strategy. On
each day, we only consider stocks in the low cost universe. Following Novy-Marx and Velikov
(2016), we restrict our strategy to those stocks that lie within the tercile with lowest bid-ask
spreads at the time of portfolio formation. Novy-Marx and Velikov (2016) perform a double
sort on size and spreads to avoid a large cap bias (page 138). The goal of our exercise here
is to implement a strategy among the most liquid stocks, irrespective of size. We therefore
just do a single sort each day.
Panel B of Figure 2.2 reports on the development of the value of the trading cost mini-
mized long 4/5 strategy. The strategy starts with an investment amount of $1m on January
1, 2004. The starting date is chosen after inspection of the plots in Panel A. With the be-
ginning of the year 2004, spreads have fallen to a level where proﬁtability after costs seems
feasible. We include the value of a strategy that invests in the market. The investment in
the market is before costs and simply tracks the value-weighted return of all stocks listed in
CRSP. Between 2004 and the ﬁnancial crisis the long 4/5 strategy performs slightly better
than the market. In this time period, excess returns are approximately eaten up by the
transaction costs implied by quoted bid-ask spreads. Given that the long 4/5 strategy has
a beta sightly above 1 (see Panel D), the graph suggests a near zero alpha. Spreads and
returns before costs increase dramatically during the ﬁnancial crisis, but the overall picture
of excess returns being roughly equal to transaction costs remains unchanged.
portfolio value at closing mid-prices plus the cash holding. We rebalance the portfolio by determining the
numbers of shares that we want to hold based on mid-prices, truncate these numbers to the next integer,
and buy at asks as well as sell at bids. If a share is delisted, we assume that the money invested in the
stock earns the delisting return. If necessary, the number of shares is adjusted using CRSP's adjustment
factor for the number of shares outstanding (FACSHR). The updated cash position is the cash position from
the previous day plus capital inﬂows from selling shares and delistings minus capital outﬂows from buying
shares. Typical transactions are the selling of shares after a streak is broken and the increase of positions
if a streak continues. We have excluded Berkshire Hathaway and Kerr-McGee Corp in May 2005 from the
sample. Berkshire's high stock price yields high cash holdings as we truncate the number of shares to next
smaller integer. Kerr-McGee bought back shares in a Dutch auction above the market price in May 2005. We
were unable to construct the details of this event. The time-series correlation of the daily returns calculated
using equation (2.12) and the more detailed method described in this footnote is 0.998.
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However, the situation changes signiﬁcantly after the ﬁnancial crisis. Spreads come down
to levels below the spreads we have seen in the years preceding the ﬁnancial crisis and
continue to fall at low levels (see Panel C). At the end of the sample, the average of the
value-weighted quoted half-spreads of the 4- and 5-day portfolios is roughly 1 basis point.
At the same time, returns do not fall as much as spreads, making positive excess returns
possible. After costs, the alpha of the strategy with respect to the ﬁve Fama-French factors
is 3.05 bps with a Newey and West (1987) adjusted t-statistic of 3.0338 in the time period
from January 1, 2004 until the end of the sample in September 2017.
The main takeaway of the empirical exercise shown in Figure 2.2 is that the dramatic
increase in liquidity since the early 2000's opens the door to the possibility that a value-
weighted portfolio strategy with daily rebalancing can be proﬁtable after costs, in contrast
to the situation in the twentieth century.17 There are certainly further ways to increase
proﬁtability after transaction costs (Novy-Marx and Velikov, 2016). However, even if a short-
term strategy is not proﬁtable after trading costs, it is still possible that the reported return
predictability provides useful information for optimizing already existing trading and/or
transaction-costs minimization strategies.18
17The main open question is the potential price impact of trades. There is reason to believe that streak
strategies have much smaller price impact costs than most other daily strategies. First, our main results are
based on value-weighted portfolios, and most trading takes place in liquid stocks. Second, our strategy buys
on days with falling prices and sells on days with rising prices, suggesting that a ﬁnancial institution which
implements the strategy is rather liquidity provider than demander. However, the reliable estimation of the
strategies' capacity is not possible due to the lack of the necessary data.
18Our results seem to be at odds with recent evidence reported by Chen and Velikov (2019). They show
that many anomalies face high trading costs post-publication, that is, in recent years. The reason for this
qualitative diﬀerence is that the long 4/5 strategy trades only the most liquid and largest stocks, while the
anomalies analyzed by Chen and Velikov (2019) often form equally-weighted portfolios over the entire CRSP
universe, leading to portfolios with much higher average spreads.
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Figure 2.2: Streak strategies and transaction costs implied by quoted half-spreads
The ﬁgure considers an equally-weighted portfolio of the two value-weighted portfolios built based on
negative streaks with length 4 and 5, respectively. The red line in Panel A shows the six-month moving
average of daily returns based on transaction prices. The green line shows the six-month moving average of
the simple average of the two value-weighted quoted half-spreads. Panel B reports on the development of
a $1m investment amount in the trading cost-minimized long 4/5 strategy as outlined in the text. Panel C
shows the six-month moving average of the number of stocks in the portfolio and the value-weighted average
of the quoted half-spreads. To calculate the value-weighted average of quoted half-spreads, we use exactly
the same weights as for weighting the portfolio returns in Panel B. Panel D shows the six-month average
of the strategies' market beta. Each day, market beta is calculated by estimating the beta with daily data
from the previous six month. The graphs in Panels A and D refer to the strategy without trading costs
minimization, while the graphs in Panels B and C rely on a version of the strategy that trades only in the
low cost universe.
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Earnings Announcements
Recent evidence suggests that behavioral agents trade more aggressively during the days
preceding an earnings announcement. Prior to an earnings announcement, retail demand for
lottery-stocks (Liu, Wang, Yu, and Zhao, 2019) and for stocks with recent previous earnings
surprises (Frieder, 2008, Shanthikumar, 2012, Ertan, Karolyi, Kelly, and Stoumbos, 2019)
increases. The increased demand is associated with abnormal price increases before earnings
announcements and reversals afterwards (Liu, Wang, Yu, and Zhao, 2019, Ertan, Karolyi,
Kelly, and Stoumbos, 2019).19 To the extent that these results carry over to return ex-
trapolation, we would expect returns from streak strategies to be higher if the holding day
coincides with an earnings announcement day. Initial evidence consistent with this predic-
tion comes from So and Wang (2014), who document that an equally-weighted short-term
reversal strategy based on cumulative three-day returns is more proﬁtable around earnings
announcements.20
Table 2.10 reports the value-weighted returns on holding days with an earnings announce-
ment. The returns are substantially higher than the returns of the portfolios reported in our
baseline speciﬁcation (see Table 2.2, Panel A). Since an earnings announcement and a streak
in daily returns on the same day are a rarer event than a streak in daily returns alone, streak
portfolios do not contain at least a ﬁrm every day, unlike the baseline portfolios. Table 2.10
shows the percentage of holding days with earnings announcements in the baseline streak
portfolios. For example, 56% of the holding days in the 5-day negative streak portfolio are
also included in the portfolio that additionally requires an earnings announcement day. Due
to the discrepancy in holding days, we run additional Fama-MacBeth regressions to test for
a diﬀerence in holding day returns on announcement days and non-announcement days.
19Going beyond short-term horizons, several authors have investigated patterns in earning surprises (see,
e.g., Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), including streaks (Loh and Warachka, 2012) and their implications for
longer term returns.
20So and Wang (2014) interpret their empirical result as an increased compensation for liquidity provision
prior to uncertain information events. Our alternative interpretation, mutually non-exclusive with theirs,
is that extrapolators cause more mispricing prior to earnings announcements, and that this mispricing gets
eliminated afterwards.
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Table 2.11 reports the results. The dependent variable in the Fama-MacBeth regression
is the daily stock return minus the risk-free rate. With the use of dummy variables, we
indicate the length and sign of the preceding streak in returns. The dummies take on the
value one for the maximal streak length only, and not for each of the shorter streaks, in order
to facilitate the interpretation of the coeﬃcients. In this case, the coeﬃcient of each dummy
indicates the size of the holding day return associated with the streak length instead of just
the marginal change.
The coeﬃcients of the interaction term between the streak dummies and the earnings
announcement dummy show an increase of absolute holding day returns after streaks in re-
turns when the holding day coincides with the earnings announcement. For positive streak
dummies, the returns on the holding day are signiﬁcantly smaller if there is an earnings an-
nouncement on that day. For negative streak dummies, the coeﬃcients of interaction terms
are signiﬁcantly positive. The only exception in regressions weighted on market value is the
2-day negative streak with an estimated coeﬃcient of −0.005. The results are broadly consis-
tent with the idea that earnings announcements reduce mispricing caused by disagreement
among market participants (Berkman, Dimitrov, Jain, Koch, and Tice, 2009, Engelberg,
Reed, and Ringgenberg, 2018, Daniel, Klos, and Rottke, 2018).
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Table 2.10: Streak portfolio returns and earning announcements
For both positive and negative streaks in returns, this table reports the value-weighted streak portfolio
returns for diﬀerent streak lengths with an earnings announcement on the holding day. Returns are end-
of-day returns are expressed as percentages. The t-statistics are Newey-West statistics corrected for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term. No. of stocks reports the number of stocks in each
portfolio on the days the portfolio can be constructed. Share of announcements holding days in streak
portfolios reports the percentage of holding days in the overall streak portfolios that are also in the streak
portfolio conditioned on earnings announcements.
1 2 3 4 5
Value-weighted portfolio with earning announcement on holding day
After negative streak 0.269 0.348 0.415 0.472 0.703
Std. dev. 2.891 3.451 4.385 5.372 6.848
t-stat 4.109 4.401 4.089 3.867 4.632
No. of stocks 69 34 16 8 4
Share of announcements holding days in streak portfolio 0.974 0.934 0.819 0.723 0.561
After positive streak -0.071 -0.145 -0.166 -0.298 -0.259
Std. dev. 2.896 3.268 3.913 4.955 6.678
t-stat -1.091 -2.011 -1.990 -2.676 -1.682
No. of stocks 69 32 15 7 3
Share of announcements holding days in streak portfolio 0.975 0.933 0.848 0.704 0.536
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Table 2.11: Fama-MacBeth regression on streak portfolio returns, earning announcements,
and institutional ownership ratio
Results of Fama-MacBeth regressions with stock returns on day t as dependent variable (Rt). Each regression
is conducted once weighted by market value of the previous day (t-1) and once without any weighting. The
streak dummy variables indicate whether there has been a positive or negative streak in returns of length
5, 4, 3, or 2 days. The dummies take on value 1 if there was a streak between t-1 and t-5. The dummies
take on the value 1 for the maximal streak length only, and not for each of the shorter streaks. In column
(1) and (2) the variable eat is a dummy variable indicating whether there was an earnings announcement
or not. In column (3) and (4) the variable IORlow (IORhigh) is a dummy variable indicating whether
the institutional ownership ratio is below (above) the 33% (66%) quantile of the IOR. The coeﬃcients are
expressed as percentages and all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weighted Not weighted Weighted Not weighted
Intercept 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.034
Streak+5 -0.076 -0.065 -0.073 -0.041
Streak+4 -0.034 -0.089 -0.039 -0.051
Streak+3 -0.039 -0.115 -0.036 -0.059
Streak+2 -0.014 -0.145 -0.015 -0.083
Streak−5 0.130 0.266 0.117 0.205
Streak−4 0.079 0.242 0.070 0.175
Streak−3 0.041 0.222 0.016 0.152
Streak−2 0.030 0.207 0.020 0.139
Streak+5 ∗ eat -0.359 -0.465
Streak+4 ∗ eat -0.087 -0.135
Streak+3 ∗ eat -0.316 -0.257
Streak+2 ∗ eat -0.134 -0.020
Streak−5 ∗ eat 0.373 0.178
Streak−4 ∗ eat 0.123 -0.043
Streak−3 ∗ eat 0.209 0.064
Streak−2 ∗ eat -0.005 0.008
eat 0.119 0.164
Streak+5 ∗ IORlow 0.058 -0.117
Streak+4 ∗ IORlow -0.038 -0.257
Streak+3 ∗ IORlow -0.022 -0.314
Streak+2 ∗ IORlow -0.062 -0.355
Streak−5 ∗ IORlow 0.127 0.401
Streak−4 ∗ IORlow 0.109 0.372
Streak−3 ∗ IORlow 0.116 0.375
Streak−2 ∗ IORlow 0.069 0.340
Streak+5 ∗ IORhigh -0.009 0.007
Streak+4 ∗ IORhigh 0.049 0.049
Streak+3 ∗ IORhigh -0.010 0.061
Streak+2 ∗ IORhigh 0.004 0.097
Streak−5 ∗ IORhigh 0.036 -0.077
Streak−4 ∗ IORhigh 0.024 -0.074
Streak−3 ∗ IORhigh 0.057 -0.078
Streak−2 ∗ IORhigh 0.026 −0.068
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Trading Volume and Streaks in Daily Returns
The model predicts that, when mispricing caused by extrapolators is corrected, trading
activity is higher in these stocks. We therefore consider stocks where the market-adjusted
return on the holding day has the opposite sign of the streak in daily returns. Table 2.12
reports value-weighted returns of portfolios consisting of such stocks. We further sort ﬁrms
based on the trading volume on the holding day. Consistent with the model, we observe that
larger absolute returns are reported for stocks with higher trading activity on the holding
day. In the model, extrapolators' sentiment changes signiﬁcantly when a streak is broken
and, as a result, extrapolators trade extensively with fundamental traders.
However, there is one empirical pattern regarding turnover that is inconsistent with the
model. Table 2.1 shows that turnover increases during the formation of a streak in daily
returns. Theoretically, turnover is generated by trading between extrapolators and funda-
mental traders. If expectations of extrapolators are reinforced through dividend innovations,
there is not much incentive to trade. We would therefore expect low levels of trading volume
during the formation of a streak. This inconsistency between model and empirical results
mirrors the inability of classic long-term extrapolation models to account for high trading
volume during the formation of an asset price bubble (see Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and
Shleifer, 2018, DeFusco, Nathanson, and Zwick, 2018, Liao and Peng, 2019, for recently
proposed models that address this issue).
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Table 2.12: Relationship between streak portfolio returns and trading volume
In each streak portfolio where a signiﬁcant holding day return is actually observed, stocks are sorted on the
basis of their demeaned trading turnover on the holding day, i.e. the day the stocks are held. The stocks in
the portfolios with high value have a demeaned turnover larger than the 75% quantile, and in the low value
portfolios the stocks' demeaned turnover is below the 25% quantile. In each of the 40 portfolios, the returns
are value-weighted and expressed as percentages. The demeaned turnover is the trading turnover in t minus
the mean turnover of the previous 200 days.
Turnover on holding day
Streak Return High Low
length streak sign
1 day + -2.030 -1.094 -1.079 -1.341
2 day + -2.008 -1.136 -1.128 -1.361
3 day + -1.995 -1.186 -1.167 -1.379
4 day + -2.020 -1.264 -1.227 -1.418
5 day + -2.088 -1.369 -1.324 -1.505
1 day - 2.198 1.189 1.130 1.354
2 day - 2.208 1.247 1.196 1.415
3 day - 2.252 1.323 1.271 1.477
4 day - 2.327 1.445 1.368 1.581
5 day - 2.466 1.603 1.523 1.689
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Institutional Ownership in Streak Stocks
Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) use IOR as a proxy to determine the share of extrapolators
involved in a stock. More precisely, low IOR would indicate a higher share of extrapolators
and vice versa. Based on the literature, we expect the holding day returns after streaks to
be extremer when the ratio of stocks held by institutions is lower, because the mispricing is
assumed to be higher with a lower level of non-institutional owners (Nagel, 2005).
Table 2.13 reports both the value-weighted (Panel A) and equally-weighted (Panel B)
streak portfolio returns sorted by the institutional ownership ratio (IOR). For the equally-
weighted portfolios, we observe a monotonic increase in absolute portfolio returns with de-
creasing IOR. This result is also reﬂected in the Fama-MacBeth regression in Table 2.11.
Column (4) reports the coeﬃcients of a standard Fama-MacBeth regression testing the rela-
tionship between streak returns and IOR. The coeﬃcients show that streak returns among
high IOR stocks are smaller in absolute terms than streak returns of stocks with lower IOR.
Therefore, consistent with the model in Section 2.2, the mispricing due to return extrapola-
tors is inversely proportional to the share of institutional ownership of the stock.
The value-weighted portfolio sorts in Table 2.13, Panel A, draw a diﬀerent picture. The
diﬀerences between portfolios with high IOR stocks and portfolios with low IOR stocks tend
to be less pronounced and are sometimes insigniﬁcant. Furthermore, a comparison of streak
portfolio returns shows that value-weighted portfolios with high IOR stocks tend to have a
slightly higher absolute return than equally-weighted portfolios with high IOR stocks.
We continue along the lines of Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) and test the relationship
between streak portfolio returns and institutional ownership by testing the diﬀerence in
performance of the long-short streak strategy based on stocks with an IOR level in the
top third and an IOR level in the bottom third. The results are reported in Table 2.14.
Consistent with the results presented in Table 2.13, the equally-weighted portfolio returns
are monotonically decreasing with the IOR. However, for the value-weighted portfolios, the
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streak returns are smallest for a portfolio of medium IOR stocks and not for a portfolio of
high IOR stocks. A market value-weighted Fama-MacBeth regression reported in Table 2.11
indicates signiﬁcantly higher returns after negative streaks in daily returns for high IOR
stocks compared to medium IOR stocks (see column (3)). These results suggest that the
reason for the sizeable value-weighted returns documented in our baseline speciﬁcation is the
presence of a considerable eﬀect among large stocks, even for those with high IOR.
This empirical observation is inconsistent with the theory laid out in Section 2.2, as long
as IOR is assumed to be a good proxy for the share of extrapolators in the population. It is
also inconsistent with alternative explanations that interpret returns from streak strategies
as a compensation of liquidity provision.
Table 2.13: Relationship between streak portfolio returns and institutional ownership ratio
For the cross-section of US equity, the 25%, 50%, and 75% quantile breakpoints based on the institutional
ownership ratio are computed. Each day the stocks are separated into four equally sized institutional
ownership buckets. In each of the buckets, the 5 positive and negative streak portfolios are computed. Panel
A reports the value-weighted portfolio returns, and Panel B the equally-weighted portfolio returns. The
Overall row shows the equally-weighted portfolios of all streak portfolios within an IOR bucket. The High -
Low column computes the diﬀerence in return of the portfolios with an IOR over the 75% quantile breakpoint
and the portfolios with an IOR below the 25% quantile breakpoint. The Newey-West statistics corrected
for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term are reported in brackets beside the High-Low
value. The returns are expressed as percentages.
Panel A: Value-weighted
Streak length Return sign Institutional ownership ratio
in streak High Low High-Low
1 day + -0.004 -0.013 -0.015 -0.041 0.037 (3.195)
2 days + -0.038 -0.035 -0.038 -0.048 0.009 (0.668)
3 days + -0.060 -0.054 -0.037 -0.029 -0.031 (-1.626)
4 days + -0.065 -0.055 -0.076 -0.037 -0.028 (-1.017)
5 days + -0.087 -0.063 -0.085 -0.019 -0.067 (-1.875)
Overall + -0.051 -0.044 -0.05 -0.035 -0.016 (-0.910)
1 day - 0.032 0.005 -0.028 0.047 -0.015 (-1.321)
2 days - 0.068 0.040 0.005 0.094 -0.026 (-1.799)
3 days - 0.092 0.062 0.016 0.122 -0.029 (-1.607)
4 days - 0.122 0.104 0.065 0.177 -0.055 (-2.213)
5 days - 0.147 0.115 0.111 0.240 -0.094 (-3.229)
Overall - 0.092 0.065 0.034 0.136 -0.044 (-2.642)
Panel B: Equally-weighted
Institutional ownership ratio
High Low High-Low
0.017 -0.027 -0.123 -0.365 0.382 (18.739)
0.000 -0.031 -0.115 -0.386 0.386 (17.886)
-0.012 -0.025 -0.087 -0.316 0.304 (15.17)
-0.021 -0.028 -0.071 -0.241 0.22 (10.024)
-0.038 -0.035 -0.047 -0.161 0.124 (4.416)
-0.026 -0.009 -0.082 -0.31 0.284 (14.334)
0.050 0.068 0.150 0.387 -0.337 (-16.984)
0.077 0.100 0.200 0.501 -0.423 (-16.766)
0.090 0.115 0.219 0.539 -0.449 (-17.014)
0.115 0.133 0.244 0.564 -0.450 (-17.128)
0.123 0.147 0.27 0.606 -0.483 (-15.585)
0.082 0.093 0.227 0.574 -0.491 (-17.873)
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Table 2.14: Long-short streak strategy for high and low IOR
First, the universe of US stocks is sorted based on the level of IOR. The sorted stocks are then separated
into 3 buckets: the ﬁrst bucket consists of all stocks with low IOR (below the 33% quantile), the second
bucket contains all stocks with medium IOR level (above the 33% and below the 66% quantile), and the
third bucket all stocks with high IOR (above the 66% quantile). Within each of these buckets, the long-short
streak portfolios are computed and the return is reported. The column Low-High tests the diﬀerence in
returns of the streak strategy based on low IOR stocks minus high IOR stocks. To oﬀer a comparison, the
market return and the return of the one-day reversal strategy are reported as well. In Panel A, all the
portfolio returns are equally-weighted, Panel B reports value-weighted returns. The market return is based
on all stocks reported in CRSP. The one-day reversal strategy buys (sells) all stocks in t with a negative
(positive) return in t− 1. Each return is expressed as percentages and use t-statistics Newey-West standard
errors corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
Panel A: Equally-weighted portfolios
Long-short streak portfolios
Low IOR Medium IOR High IOR Low-High Market One-day reversal
Return 0.769 0.194 0.119 0.649 0.061 0.285
t-stat 16.246 11.516 8.911 15.027 3.415 16.661
Panel B: Value-weighted portfolios
Long-short streak portfolios
Low IOR Medium IOR High IOR Low-High Market One-day reversal
Return 0.309 0.088 0.149 0.161 0.039 0.018
t-stat 11.148 6.115 8.097 6.484 2.694 2.317
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2.6 Conclusion
A simpliﬁed version of the extrapolation model by Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) implies that
streaks in returns have predictive power for future returns. Consistent with the theoreti-
cal predictions, we ﬁnd that value-weighted long-short portfolios based on streaks in daily
returns earn sizable returns on the US and other international markets. Diversifying in-
ternationally and across diﬀerent streak lengths yields an annualized Sharpe ratio before
costs of 2.696. Several additional tests in the US show that the form of return predictability
documented in this paper is economically diﬀerent from previously reported forms of daily
return predictability.
Excess returns from streak strategies vary systematically with institutional ownership. In
our simplest test, we subdivide the cross-section of stocks on each day into stocks with high,
medium, and low IOR. For equally-weighted portfolios, excess returns decrease monotonically
with institutional ownership. However, for value-weighted portfolios, we do not see such
a monotonic decline. This result raises the question of why large stocks with high IOR
show such strong daily return predictability. Neither theories of liquidity provision nor
extrapolation models with IOR as a proxy for the importance of fundamental traders are
able to explain this ﬁnding.
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2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Proof
Proof of Proposition 1. To derive the corresponding formula, it is useful to take a closer look
at the early price changes in an economy that sees its ﬁrst dividend innovation 1 in period
1. Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) call 1
1−(µE/µF )λ1(1−λ2) the ampliﬁcation factor. For the sake of
brevity, we set A = (µE/µF )λ1(1 − λ2) and therefore 11−A = 11−(µE/µF )λ1(1−λ2) . For the ﬁrst
price change, we have:
P1 − P0 = 1
1− A
[
1 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(1− λ2)S0, (2.13)
(we deliberately do not cancel the (1 − λ2) in the second term). The second price change
can be written as
P2 − P1 = 1
1− A
[
2 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(λ2 − λ
2
2)S0
− A
(1− A)
[
(1− λ2)
[
1
1− A
[
1 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(1− λ2)S0
]]
=
1
1− A
[
2 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)2 (1− λ2)
[
1 + γσ
2Q
]
− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(λ2 − λ
2
2)S0 +
A2
(1− A)2(1− λ2)(1− λ2)
2S0.
(2.14)
Now consider the coeﬃcients of the summands who contain the dividend innovation 1.
In P2−P1, 1 appears in just one summand with coeﬃcient − A(1−A)2 (1−λ2). 1 appears once
in P2−P1, because P1−P0 enters P2−P1 once with coeﬃcient − A(1−A)(1−λ2) and 1 enters
P1 − P0 once with coeﬃcient 11−A .
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The third price change can be written as
P3 − P2 = 1
1− A
[
3 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(λ
2
2 − λ32)S0
− A
(1− A)
[
(1− λ2)(P2 − P1) + (λ2 − λ22)(P1 − P0)
]
=
1
1− A
[
3 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)2 (1− λ2)
[
2 + γσ
2Q
]
+
A2
(1− A)3 (1− λ2)
2
[
1 + γσ
2Q
]− A
(1− A)2 (λ2 − λ
2
2)
[
1 + γσ
2Q
]
− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(λ
2
2 − λ32)S0
+
A2
(1− A)2(1− λ2)(1− λ2)(λ2 − λ
2
2)S0 −
A3
(1− A)3(1− λ2)(1− λ2)
3S0
+
A2
(1− A2)(1− λ2)(1− λ2)(λ2 − λ
2
2)S0. (2.15)
In P3 − P2, 1 now appears in two summands with coeﬃcients A2(1−A)3 (1 − λ2)2 and
− A
(1−A)2 (λ2 − λ22).
1. The coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst summand with factor (1 + γσ
2Q) comes from the fact that
1 enters P2 − P1 once with coeﬃcient − A(1−A)2 (1 − λ2). P2 − P1 has now coeﬃcient
− A
(1−A)(1 − λ2) in P3 − P2. The overall coeﬃcient of the ﬁrst appearance of 1 must
therefore be A
2
(1−A)3 (1− λ2)2.
2. The coeﬃcient of the second summand with factor (1+γσ
2Q) comes from the fact that
1 enters P1−P0 once with coeﬃcient − 1(1−A) . P1−P0 has coeﬃcient − A(1−A)(λ2− λ22)
in P3 − P2. The overall coeﬃcient of the second appearance of 1 must therefore be
A
(1−A)2 (λ2 − λ22).
There are two helpful ways to think about these two changes that have happened to the
original coeﬃcient of 1 in P2 − P1 as we build P3 − P2.
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1. Reproduction: The 1-term with the old coeﬃcient− A(1−A)2 (1−λ2) already incorporated
in P2−P1 reproduces itself, as this coeﬃcient is also part of P3−P2. The new coeﬃcient
is the old coeﬃcient − A
(1−A)2 (1− λ2) times − A(1−A)(1− λ2).
2. Aging: The 1-term with the old coeﬃcient − A(1−A)2 (1 − λ2) already incorporated in
P2 − P1 is also still part of P3 − P2, as P3 − P2 is a function of P2 − P1. However,
the coeﬃcient becomes older in the sense that it receives weight (λ2 − λ22) instead of
(1− λ2), thereby transforming − A(1−A)2 (1− λ2) into − A(1−A)2 (λ2 − λ22).
Reproduction and Aging happens to all coeﬃcients when we go one price change in
the future, i.e. from Pt−Pt−1 to Pt+1−Pt. Note that any Reproduction comes along with
a sign ﬂip of the coeﬃcient. Figure 2.3 illustrates this process for summands with the term
(1 + γσ
2Q) for the ﬁrst four price changes.
Generalizing this reasoning, we can write all summands that include the factor (1+γσ
2Q)
in price diﬀerence Pt − Pt−1 as
A
(1− A)2
[
t−2∑
i=0
(
t− 2
i
)(
A
1− A
)i
(1− λ2)i(−1)i+1
(
λt−2−i2 − λt−1−i2
)]
(1 + γσ
2Q). (2.16)
The summands that include the factor (2 + γσ
2Q) in price diﬀerence Pt − Pt−1 evolve
exactly in the same way, except that the dividend innovation 2 starts one period later than
1. We can write all summands as
A
(1− A)2
[
t−3∑
i=0
(
t− 3
i
)(
A
1− A
)i
(1− λ2)i(−1)i+1
(
λt−3−i2 − λt−2−i2
)]
(2 + γσ
2Q). (2.17)
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Applying this logic to all t dividend innovations that determine Pt−Pt−1 yields a formula
for all summands in price diﬀerence Pt − Pt−1 that include a dividend innovation:(
1
1− A
)
(t + γσ
2Q)+
t−1∑
j=1
(j + γσ
2Q)
[
A
(1− A)2
t−1−j∑
i=0
(
t− 1− j
i
)(
A
1− A
)i
(1− λ2)i(−1)i+1
(
λt−1−j−i2 − λt−j−i2
)]
.
(2.18)
Note that (−1)x = (−1)−x ∀x ∈ Z. We can write equation (2.18) as
(
1
1− A
)
(t + γσ
2Q)+
t−1∑
j=1
(j + γσ
2Q)
[
A
(1− A)2
t−1−j∑
i=0
(
t− 1− j
i
)(
A
1− A(1− λ2)
)i
(−1)t−j(−λ2)t−1−j−i
− Aλ2
(1− A)2
t−1−j∑
i=0
(
t− 1− j
i
)(
A
1− A(1− λ2)
)i
(−1)t−j(−λ2)t−1−j−i
]
.
(2.19)
The general binomial theorem allows us to simplify to
(
1
1− A
)
(t + γσ
2Q)+
t−1∑
j=1
(j + γσ
2Q)
[(
A
(1− A)2 −
Aλ2
(1− A)2
)(
A
1− A(1− λ2)− λ2
)t−1−j
(−1)t−j
] (2.20)
and ﬁnally
(
1
1− A
)
(t+γσ
2Q)+
A
(1− A)2 (1−λ2)
t−1∑
j=1
(j+γσ
2Q)
(
A
1− A(1− λ2)− λ2
)t−1−j
(−1)t−j.
(2.21)
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We can make a similar argument with regard to the coeﬃcients of all terms that share
S0 as a factor. All terms including S0 as a factor can be written as
− A
(1− A)(1− λ2)(λ
t−1
2 −λt2)S0−
(
A
1− A
)2
S0
t−1∑
j=1
(λj−12 −λj2)
(
A
1− A(1− λ2)− λ2
)t−1−j
(−1)t−j.
(2.22)
Combining the terms from equations (2.21) and (2.22), we get
Pt − Pt−1 =(
1
1− A
)
(t + γσ
2Q) +
A
(1− A)2 (1− λ2)
t−1∑
j=1
(j + γσ
2Q)(−1)t−j
(
A
1− A(1− λ2)− λ2
)t−1−j
− A
1− Aλ
t−1
2 S0 −
(
A
1− A
)2
S0
t−1∑
j=1
λj−12 (1− λ2)(−1)t−j
(
A
1− A(1− λ2)− λ2
)t−1−j
.
(2.23)
We now assume that extrapolators are unbiased at t = 0, in the sense that their expec-
tation of the ﬁrst price change is equal to the market risk premium if sentiment directly
determines demand (λ0 = 0 and λ1 = 1). This assumption implies S0 = γσ
2Q.21 All terms
with the market risk premium γσ2Q are given by
(
1
1− A
)
γσ2Q− A
(1− A)2 (1− λ2)γσ
2Q
t−1∑
j=1
(
λ2 − A
1− A(1− λ2)
)t−1−j
− A
1− Aλ
t−1
2 γσ
2Q+
(
A
1− A
)2
(1− λ2)γσ2Q
t−1∑
j=1
λj−12
(
λ2 − A
1− A(1− λ2)
)t−1−j
.
(2.24)
Equation (2.24) contains the sums of two ﬁnite geometric series.
Note that
∑t−1
j=1 x
t−1−j = xt−1
[∑t−1
j=0 x
−j − 1
]
= x
t−1−1
x−1 and∑t−1
j=1 λ
j−1
2 x
t−1−j = x
t−1
λ2
[∑t−1
j=0
(
λ2
x
)j − 1] = xt−1λ2−λt2
λ2(x−λ2) with x = λ2 − A1−A(1− λ2) = λ2−A1−A .
21Barberis, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2018) use the same assumption for initial sentiment.
59
Using these observations to rewrite equation (2.24) yields
(
1
1− A
)
γσ2Q− A
(1− A)2 (1− λ2)γσ
2Q
(
λ2−A
1−A
)t−1 − 1
λ2−A
1−A − 1
− A
1− Aλ
t−1
2 γσ
2Q+
(
A
1− A
)2
(1− λ2)γσ2Q
(
λ2−A
1−A
)t−1
λ2 − λt2
λ2
(
λ2−A
1−A − λ2
) . (2.25)
After some tedious rearrangements, equation (2.25) evaluates to just γσ2Q. Using this
insight together with equation (2.23) gives the formula in the proposition.
60
2.7.2 Plausibility of Average Conditional Returns
In the event study in Table 2.1, we report the average returns during streaks in returns and
in the days after the streaks. The returns during streaks, with an average of around 2.1%,
may seem to be high. To test if these values are plausible, we repeat the empirical exercise for
simulated returns. We draw realizations from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.0212%
and a standard deviation of 4.17%. These values are simply the unconditional mean and
standard deviation of all daily stock returns in our sample. For 10,000 hypothetical ﬁrms,
we draw 10,000 daily realizations from the normal distribution. We then report the same
event study as in Table 2.1 with the simulated returns for a streak length of 5. We observe
that average returns are large for t−5 to t−1. Here, we just look at streak stocks, which by
deﬁnition have only positive or only negative values for the periods from t−5 to t−1. In the
rows t to t+ 5, we see averages close to the mean of the normal distribution, consistent with
the fact that simulated returns are not predictable by construction. This simple exercise
shows that, during a streaks in returns, conditional daily absolute returns in excess of 2%
per day are not surprisingly high and should rather be well expected.
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Table 2.15: Simulated positive and negative streaks with mean = 0.0212% and sd = 4.174%
A random variable is generated by drawing 10,000 observations, one for each of the 10,000 days in
the sample. The independent random variables are drawn from a normal distribution with a mean
of 0.0212% and a standard deviation of 4.17%. In this table, we report the average of the random
variable when the variable is conditioned to be higher than 0 (positive streak) and lower than zero
(negative streak) on the days t 5 to t 1. The means on the days t to t + 5 are simple means, not
being conditioned to be larger or smaller than zero. The values are reported in percentage.
Positive streak Negative streak
t-5 3.335 -3.322
t-4 3.339 -3.322
t-3 3.333 -3.323
t-2 3.334 -3.323
t-1 3.338 -3.327
t 0.022 0.021
t+1 0.023 0.024
t+2 0.019 0.02
t+3 0.026 0.018
t+4 0.023 0.025
t+5 0.024 0.023
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2.7.3 Simulation of Cross-Sectional Extrapolation Model
We simulate asset prices for a market with 1,000 assets and 100 time periods in order to
illustrate the theoretical results and economic intuitions of the model. We allow each ﬁrm
i to have a diﬀerent pair of extrapolation parameters, λi,1 and λi,2. To emphasize this fact,
we will keep the index i, in contrast to large parts of the main text.
We set γ = 0.01, µE = 0.5, Q = 1, and σ2 = 1. λi,1 is sampled from a normal distribution
with mean 1 and standard deviation 1. We truncate the realization of λi,1 in the sense that
the realization cannot be smaller than 0.5 or larger than 5. Furthermore, λi,2 is sampled from
a normal distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.2 and required to be larger
than 0 and smaller than 1. If (µE/µF )λi,1(1− λi,2) > 1, we throw away the observation and
draw another λi,1 and λi,2 observation.
In Table 2.16, Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions show the relationship between ex-
trapolators' current sentiment and next period price changes. Consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the model, the coeﬃcient of this period sentiment is negative, showing that
the next period price changes will be lower if the sentiment today is more positive and vice
versa.
Table 2.16: Relationship between sentiment and next-day price change
Fama-Macbeth regression reporting the relationship between price change in t and sentiment in t-1. Price
changes and sentiment are calculated based on Da, Huang, and Jin (2018).
Price Changet
Sentimentt−1 −0.242∗∗∗
(−34.596)
Constant 0.398∗∗∗
(32.790)
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Our goal is to apply this insight to the entire cross-section of equity returns. The funda-
mental problem is that sentiment Sit is not directly observable and, as shown by equation
(2.2), depends not only on past price changes, but also on the stock-speciﬁc, unobservable,
and potentially time-varying parameter λi,2, not to mention the fact that further determi-
nants of extrapolators' demands, λi,0 and λi,1, are not directly observable either, and their
time-series properties are unknown.
To circumvent these problems, we look for empirical proxies that are easy to use and
correlate with sentiment Si,t in a reliable way. We start with equation (2.2), which deﬁnes
Si,t. Sentiment for stock i in period t is a non-linear function of recent price changes. If
past price changes have opposite signs and λi,2 is not known, it is almost always hard for
econometricians to determine if sentiment on any given day is positive or negative. However,
if all the most recent price changes have the same sign, sentiment today has this sign too, as
long as λi,2 and the absolute values of past price changes before the streak are not implausibly
high in absolute terms. We therefore hypothesize that past-price change streaks, i.e., several
days of price changes of the same sign, are a simple and powerful predictor of the next day's
price change. Section 2.2 in the main text develops this intuition in a rigorous way.
Table 2.17 reports the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression with the simulated data.
We observe that an increase in streak length of the most recent price changes increases
the magnitude of the sentiment prevailing in the current period. This conﬁrms that streak
length is a good proxy for the extrapolators' sentiment on a given day. The relationship
is monotonic, consistent with the intuition that sentiment tends to be higher the longer a
price-change streak lasts.
The model of Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) predicts further that extreme sentiment tends
to be followed by price changes of the opposite sign, as sentiment comes back to non-extreme
values in the absence of further extreme fundamental shocks. In Table 2.18, we test whether
price-change streaks can be used as a proxy for sentiment to predict future price changes.
Fama-MacBeth regressions show exactly this eﬀect, since longer price-change streaks steadily
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increase the negative predictability of next period's price changes, for streaks with both
negative and positive price changes. Further, we see that the streak dummies lose signiﬁcance
when we include the current sentiment Si,t, conﬁrming that price-change streaks per se do
not convey relevant information. Rather, streaks serve as easy observable proxies for the
current sentiment of extrapolators in our simulated data.
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Table 2.17: Sentiment and streak length
Fama-MacBeth regressions testing the relationship between sentiment on the last period of a streak and the
streak length are shown. The variable Streak+5 takes on the value 1 if the price changes of a given asset in
the past 5 periods have been positive. The index t − 1 highlights that the streaks are based on past price
changes. The streak variables are constructed in such a manner that, when a stock has had 5 periods of
positive price changes in the past, Streak+5 is one, while Streak
+
4 , Streak
+
3 , and Streak
+
2 are 0. The variable
Streak−5 takes on the value 1 if the price changes of a given asset in the past 5 periods have been positive.
To avoid the dummy trap caused by perfect multicollinearity in the streak dummy variables, the Streak+1,t−1
variable is removed from the speciﬁcation in the third column.
Sentimentt
Streak+1,t−1 0.195
∗∗∗
48.263
Streak+1,t−2 0.301
∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(50.904) (16.661)
Streak+1,t−3 0.386
∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(47.956) (22.932)
Streak+1,t−4 0.427
∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗
(40.211) (20.954)
Streak+1,t−5 0.491
∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
(42.895) (25.237)
Streak−1,t−1 −0.191∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗
(−44.982) (−24.462)
Streak−1,t−2 −0.309∗∗∗ −0.233∗∗∗
(−60.494) (−41.485)
Streak−1,t−3 −0.387∗∗∗ −0.311∗∗∗
(−45.053) (−35.856)
Streak−1,t−4 −0.452∗∗∗ −0.376∗∗∗
(−36.147) (−30.078)
Streak−1,t−5 −0.509∗∗∗ −0.433∗∗∗
(−44.653) (−35.999)
Constant 1.524∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ 1.719∗∗∗
(157.939) (181.097) (177.780)
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Table 2.18: Relationship between price change, sentiment, and price-change streaks
Fama-MacBeth regressions with simulated price changes, Price changet, as dependent variable. The variable
Streak+5,t−1 takes on the value 1 if the price changes of a given asset in the past 5 days have been positive. The
index t− 1 highlights that the streaks are based on past price changes. The streak variables are constructed
in such a manner that, when a stock has had 5 days of positive price changes in the past, Streak+5,t−1 is
one, while Streak+4,t−1, Streak
+
3,t−1, and Streak
+
2,t−1 are 0. The variable Streak
−
5 takes on the value 1 if
the price changes of a given asset in the past 5 days have been positive. As in Da, Huang, and Jin (2018),
Sentimentt−1 is the sentiment on the last day of the price-change streak. To avoid the dummy trap caused
by perfect multicollinearity in the streak dummy variables, the Streak+1,t−1 variable is removed from the two
speciﬁcations which includes the positive and negative Streak dummy variables.
Price changet
Streak+1,t−1 −0.142∗∗∗ −0.054 −0.037∗∗∗ −0.054∗
(−14.598) (−1.626) (−3.561) (−1.897)
Streak+1,t−2 −0.214∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗
(−17.047) (−3.663) (−3.856) (−2.346)
Streak+1,t−3 −0.206∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.019 −0.038
(−11.926) (−3.243) (−1.037) (−1.146)
Streak+1,t−4 −0.243∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.039 −0.057
(−9.756) (−3.802) (−1.495) (−1.529)
Streak+1,t−5 −0.216∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.020
(−8.377) (−3.164) (−0.031) (−0.513 )
Streak−1,t−1 0.138
∗∗∗ 0.050 0.031∗∗∗ −0.025
(14.163) (1.507) (2.997) (−0.887)
Streak−1,t−2 0.210
∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ −0.002
(16.527) (3.522) (3.969) (−0.060)
Streak−1,t−3 0.223
∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗ −0.016
(12.422) (3.679) (2.142) (−0.506)
Streak−1,t−4 0.238
∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.038 −0.018
(9.289) (3.659) (1.437) (−0.486)
Streak−1,t−5 0.273
∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗
(10.164) (4.419) (1.960)
Sentimentt−1 −0.227∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗∗
(−27.599) (−27.394) (−26.466)
Constant 0.088∗∗∗ −0.087∗∗∗ 0.000 0.391∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
16.641 −16.431 0.000 31.612 20.727 14.492
67
Table 2.19: Event study with simulated data based on Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) model
This table reports the average price diﬀerence, shocks, and sentiment for simulated data based on the Da, Huang, and Jin (2018) model. The
parameters used are the following: γ = 0.01 and µE = 0.5. λi,1 is sampled from a normal distribution with mean 1, standard deviation 1, and the
condition that λi,1 cannot be smaller than 0.5 or larger than 5. Furthermore, λi,2 is sampled from a normal distribution with mean 0.7 and standard
deviation 0.2 and conditioned to be larger than 0 and smaller than 1. The values of λi,1 and λi,2 are chosen so that (µ
E/µF )λi,1(1− λi,2) is smaller
than 1. Each variable value is reported for a positive and negative price-change streak of up to 5 days.
Panel B: Positive streaks in returns
1-day positive streak 2-day positive streak 3-day positive streak 4-day positive streak 5-day positive streak
∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading
volume volume volume volume volume
t-5 -0.010 -0.009 1.633 1.123 -0.029 -0.027 1.617 1.109 -0.067 -0.055 1.589 1.086 -0.146 -0.120 1.534 1.040 0.900 0.720 1.828 0.982
t-4 -0.019 -0.018 1.628 1.123 -0.053 -0.047 1.602 1.102 -0.122 -0.104 1.550 1.071 0.928 0.736 1.856 1.030 0.898 0.775 2.022 0.737
t-3 -0.032 -0.028 1.620 1.121 -0.117 -0.097 1.564 1.092 0.940 0.746 1.883 1.051 0.912 0.789 2.052 0.758 0.876 0.801 2.132 0.637
t-2 -0.086 -0.069 1.590 1.116 0.957 0.759 1.912 1.084 0.923 0.802 2.082 0.772 0.899 0.822 2.168 0.663 0.887 0.828 2.215 0.611
t-1 0.991 0.785 1.953 1.118 0.957 0.827 2.124 0.803 0.937 0.853 2.209 0.686 0.930 0.863 2.262 0.635 0.931 0.873 2.288 0.605
t -0.089 -0.006 1.790 1.121 -0.128 -0.001 1.876 1.167 -0.130 0.009 1.940 1.174 -0.143 0.008 1.978 1.193 -0.149 0.020 2.008 1.165
t+1 -0.032 -0.0001 1.731 1.118 -0.044 0.004 1.788 1.111 -0.070 -0.004 1.825 1.100 -0.067 0.001 1.854 1.072 -0.058 0.014 1.882 1.062
t+2 -0.015 -0.003 1.705 1.115 -0.031 -0.003 1.743 1.100 -0.031 -0.0003 1.774 1.070 -0.058 -0.017 1.791 1.053 -0.058 -0.007 1.816 1.044
t+3 -0.014 -0.006 1.691 1.114 -0.021 -0.008 1.717 1.094 -0.039 -0.017 1.737 1.061 -0.044 -0.016 1.753 1.045 -0.067 -0.034 1.763 1.025
t+4 -0.010 -0.009 1.681 1.119 -0.027 -0.018 1.698 1.094 -0.029 -0.014 1.713 1.077 -0.047 -0.028 1.724 1.062 -0.050 -0.029 1.732 1.023
t+5 -0.007 -0.008 1.677 1.115 -0.007 -0.004 1.690 1.101 -0.015 -0.010 1.700 1.080 -0.010 -0.004 1.713 1.067 -0.021 -0.011 1.715 1.021
Panel B: Negative streaks in returns
1-day negative streak 2-day negative streak 3-day negative streak 4-day negative streak 5-day negative streak
∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading ∆Price Shocks Sentiment Trading
volume volume volume volume volume
t-5 0.011 0.010 1.650 1.118 0.033 0.030 1.664 1.101 0.061 0.053 1.685 1.078 0.148 0.118 1.728 1.039 -0.913 -0.731 1.406 1.013
t-4 0.019 0.016 1.655 1.120 0.056 0.046 1.678 1.100 0.153 0.123 1.733 1.070 -0.918 -0.729 1.402 1.024 -0.875 -0.758 1.252 0.717
t-3 0.033 0.025 1.664 1.121 0.136 0.108 1.723 1.105 -0.941 -0.743 1.388 1.067 -0.900 -0.777 1.236 0.738 -0.910 -0.822 1.134 0.648
t-2 0.087 0.070 1.695 1.127 -0.965 -0.760 1.363 1.102 -0.928 -0.801 1.209 0.770 -0.925 -0.838 1.115 0.662 -0.917 -0.859 1.048 0.597
t-1 -0.998 -0.792 1.330 1.124 -0.963 -0.834 1.173 0.805 -0.954 -0.868 1.079 0.690 -0.955 -0.892 1.017 0.638 -0.945 -0.896 0.975 0.597
t 0.090 0.0002 1.515 1.120 0.134 -0.0005 1.427 1.173 0.149 -0.009 1.366 1.204 0.167 -0.004 1.321 1.218 0.186 0.005 1.291 1.210
t+1 0.033 -0.006 1.579 1.123 0.055 -0.008 1.525 1.127 0.071 -0.005 1.485 1.121 0.087 -0.003 1.453 1.104 0.086 -0.006 1.429 1.095
t+2 0.015 -0.008 1.608 1.125 0.031 -0.004 1.573 1.120 0.047 -0.001 1.546 1.100 0.042 -0.008 1.522 1.083 0.054 0.002 1.501 1.072
t+3 0.014 -0.002 1.627 1.124 0.031 0.002 1.605 1.105 0.027 -0.003 1.583 1.079 0.043 0.007 1.566 1.057 0.060 0.015 1.539 1.066
t+4 0.010 -0.004 1.639 1.118 0.010 -0.007 1.622 1.098 0.024 0.003 1.605 1.081 0.027 0.002 1.584 1.067 0.020 -0.009 1.570 1.058
t+5 0.007 -0.002 1.647 1.120 0.021 0.007 1.637 1.102 0.015 -0.002 1.620 1.083 0.031 0.005 1.610 1.055 0.062 0.026 1.612 1.043
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Table 2.20: Price change after positive and negative streaks
For the streak portfolio with diﬀerent streak lengths of positive and negative price changes, this table reports
portfolio price changes relative to the average market price change, standard deviations, t-stats, and average
number of assets in the portfolio. The length of a streak is measured in number of periods ranging from 1
to 5. The values reported are those recorded in the period following the streak. The portfolios are formed
using a simulated price process from the model by Da, Huang, and Jin (2018). The parameters used are
the following: γ = 0.01 and µE = 0.5. λi,1 is sampled from a normal distribution with mean 1, standard
deviation 1, and the condition that λi,1 cannot be smaller than 0.5 or larger than 5. Furthermore, λi,2
is sampled from a normal distribution with mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.2 and is conditioned to be
larger than 0 and smaller than 1. The values of λi,1 and λi,2 need to strictly fulﬁll the condition that
(µE/µF )λi,1(1 − λi,2) is smaller than 1. The t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Price changes after positive streaks -0.091 -0.129 -0.132 -0.143 -0.149
Std. dev. 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.015 0.023
t-stat -30.816 -21.526 -16.623 -9.623 -5.295
No. of risky assets 502 237.700 110.500 51.400 23.700
Price changes after negative streaks 0.092 0.131 0.147 0.166 0.177
Std. dev. 0.003 0.007 0.012 0.020 0.026
t-stat 29.416 19.041 12.476 8.304 6.920
No. of risky assets 498 233.800 106.200 47.800 21.500
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2.7.4 Fama-French 3-Factor Alphas
Table 2.21: Times series FF3-alphas of streak portfolios
For the streak portfolios with diﬀerent streak lengths, this table reports the Fama-French three-factor alphas
and the associated t-statistic. The length of a streak is measured in number of days ranging from 1 to 5.
The t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error
term. Daily data of stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ is collected from CRSP for the sample
period from January 1, 1997 to October 31, 2017.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Alpha of returns after positive streaks in returns -0.009 -0.036 -0.052 -0.060 -0.084
t-stat -2.224 -4.530 -4.937 -5.215 -5.344
Alpha of returns after negative streaks in returns 0.008 0.043 0.065 0.101 0.125
t-stat 1.930 5.831 6.144 7.406 6.985
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2.7.5 Weighting Streak Portfolios by Streak Returns
Table 2.22: Streak portfolios weighted by streak returns
This table reports each streak portfolio's average return, standard deviation and average number of stocks.
The portfolios are constructed with positive and negative return streaks of diﬀerent lengths. The length of a
streak is measured in number of days ranging from 1 to 5. The values reported are those of the holding day
after the streak. These portfolios are weighted by the absolute value of the sum of streak returns, following
Nagel (2012). Portfolio returns are based on closing prices. No. of stocks is the average number of stocks in
each portfolio each day. Portfolio returns and their standard deviation are expressed as percentages.
Length of streak (in days)
1 2 3 4 5
Portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.596 0.562 0.540 0.529 0.547
Std. dev. 1.574 1.788 1.819 1.962 2.206
t-stat 16.013 15.371 16.755 16.769 15.876
No. of stocks 2,400 1,187 579 283 138
Portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.388 -0.289 -0.240 -0.198 -0.189
Std. dev. 1.675 1.625 1.665 1.749 1.929
t-stat -11.106 -9.261 -8.268 -7.305 -6.924
No. of stocks 2,251 1,037 477 220 103
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2.7.6 Streak Length & Holding Day Returns: Fama-MacBeth Regression
We use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression to examine the increases in returns occur-
ring after longer streaks in returns. We replicate the Fama-MacBeth regression in Table 2.18,
applying it to the US stock market data. The dependent variable is the daily stock return
rt minus the risk free rate rf . The dummies take on value 1 if there was a streak between
t-1 and t-5. Column 1 reports the standard Fama-MacBeth coeﬃcients, and in column 2 the
observations are weighted by the previous day's market value. The coeﬃcients of these dum-
mies support the monotonically increasing return patterns observed in the portfolio sorts.22
These empirical results are analogous to the Fama-MacBeth results based on the simulated
price data in Table 2.18. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model,
where an increase in streak length increases the size of the predicted returns.
22Due to the fact that our dummies use forward-looking information, the estimated coeﬃcients in Table
2.23, column 1 and 2, do not add up to the portfolio returns reported in Table 2.2, Panel C. In our strategy
we also hold a stock that has a 4-day streak after just 2 and 3 days. Only for a 5-day streak the coeﬃcients
do add up to the portfolio returns, because in this case the dummy variable and the portfolio strategy pick
exactly the same stocks.
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Table 2.23: Fama-MacBeth regressions testing the relationship between holding day return
and streak length
Fama-MacBeth regressions with daily stock returns, Rt, as dependent variable. In the ﬁrst two columns, the
regression results are presented with the right-hand side variables as dummy variables indicating the length
of a streak in returns a stock has had and whether they were positive or negative. The variable Streak+5 takes
on the value 1 if the returns of a given stock in the past 5 days have been positive. The dummy variables
are constructed in such a manner that, when a stock has had 5 days of positive returns in the past, Streak+5
will be one, while Streak+4 , Streak
+
3 , and Streak
+
2 will be zero. The Fama-Macbeth regression is calculated
twice: once without weighting the observations (in columns 1), and once weighting each observation by the
market value of the previous day (t-1). The coeﬃcients are expressed as percentages and all coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
(1) (2)
Not weighted Weighted
Streak+5 −0.074 −0.085
Streak+4 −0.095 −0.041
Streak+3 −0.121 −0.045
Streak+2 −0.149 −0.022
Streak+1 −0.121 0.014
Streak−5 0.262 0.131
Streak−4 0.237 0.078
Streak−3 0.219 0.035
Streak−2 0.203 0.026
Streak−1 0.114 −0.025
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2.7.7 Rolling Betas
Figure 2.4 plots the time-varying market beta of the value-weighted long-short streak port-
folio over time. A 6-month rolling window is used for the estimation. A large spike in the
estimated beta can be observed in the early 2000's, most likely related to the burst of the
dotcom bubble. The period of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is not associated with comparable
high market betas. Overall, beta remains relatively low and, in some instances, the trading
strategy becomes a hedge to the market portfolio, with a negative beta.
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Figure 2.4: Rolling betas of long-short streak portfolio
Six-month moving average of rolling betas of the value-weighted long-short streak portfolio, as in Table 2.3.
Six months of daily observations are used to compute the portfolio's beta.
74
2.7.8 Streaks vs. Cumulative Return
Table 2.24: Streaks vs. cumulative return: Fama-MacBeth regressions
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth regression coeﬃcients for eight diﬀerent regressions. In each regression,
the market-adjusted return in t is the dependent variable. In each regression, a positive streak dummy, a
negative streak dummy, and the cumulative returns for the n-days before t are the independent variables.
Regressions reported in Panels B and D have the market-adjusted, previous-day return of a stock as an
additional control variable. The regressions are conducted for variables based on an n of two to ﬁve days.
Panels A and B report coeﬃcients of equally-weighted regressions. Panels C and D report coeﬃcients of
value-weighted regressions. The value-weighting is conducted on the basis of the last days market value. The
coeﬃcients are expressed as percentages and all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
2 days 3 days 4 days 5 days
Panel A: Equally-weighted
Intercept -0.0005 0.005 0.014 0.017
n-day positive streak 0.126 -0.033 0.203 0.221
n-day negative streak -0.016 0.039 -0.034 -0.029
n-day cumulative return -4.893 -0.285 -2.963 -2.439
Panel B: Equally-weighted
Intercept 0.003 0.0004 0.017 0.019
n-day positive streak 0.123 -0.588 0.193 0.207
n-day negative streak -0.024 0.0004 -0.047 -0.044
n-day cumulative return -2.346 -0.588 -1.464 -1.178
AdjRett−1 -5.094 0.0004 -5.694 -5.874
Panel C: Value-weighted
Intercept -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
n-day positive streak -0.007 -0.018 -0.015 -0.032
n-day negative streak 0.026 0.040 0.070 0.077
n-day cumulative return -0.578 -0.586 -0.563 -0.545
Panel D: Value-weighted
Intercept -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
n-day positive streak -0.005 -0.016 -0.013 -0.027
n-day negative streak 0.026 0.038 0.067 0.075
n-day cumulative return -0.939 -0.768 -0.691 -0.631
AdjRett−1 0.556 0.313 0.187 0.064
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2.7.9 Further International Evidence
Table 2.25 reports the value-weighted holding day returns for 10 countries. The countries
with the highest number of stocks traded are reported ﬁrst, followed, in descending order,
by countries with fewer reported stocks.
Streak strategies work in most countries. China is an exception in the sense that portfolio
returns are signiﬁcantly positive after positive streaks. Overall, streak strategies seem to
work better in larger stock markets. Furthermore, the success of streak strategies comes
predominately from the long leg. Returns after negative streaks are statistically signiﬁcant
in all countries. This asymmetry is consistent with the US results. Table 2.26 reports the
equally-weighted streak portfolio returns for international markets.
Table 2.25: Value-weighted international streak portfolios by country
This table presents value-weighted streak portfolios with positive and negative return streaks of diﬀerent
length for 10 countries: Canada, UK, Hong Kong, Germany, China, France, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, and
Spain. This table reports returns, standard deviations, and t-statistics of streak portfolios with positive
and negative returns streaks of diﬀerent lengths. The length of a streak is measured in number of days,
ranging from 1 to 5. The values reported are those recorded on the day following the streak. No. of stocks
is the average number of stocks in each portfolio each day. Portfolio returns and their standard deviation
are reported in percent. The t-statistics are Newey-West t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity in the error term.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Canada
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.017 0.026 0.044 0.058 0.083
Std. dev. 0.528 0.740 0.926 1.203 1.580
t-stat -2.212 2.466 3.174 3.167 3.468
No. of stocks 444 221 108 52 25
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.013 -0.021 -0.019 -0.034 -0.032
Std. dev. 0.512 0.696 0.924 1.180 1.664
t-stat 1.796 -2.085 -1.413 -2 -1.299
No. of stocks 401 178 78 35 15
UK
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.017 0.027 0.035 0.032 0.039
Std. dev. 0.396 0.625 0.874 1.155 1.377
t-stat -2.768 2.979 2.820 2.058 2.076
No. of stocks 719 386 206 111 61
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.020 -0.013 -0.036 -0.047 -0.027
Continued on next page
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Table 2.25  (continued from previous page)
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Std. dev. 0.374 0.578 0.780 1.095 1.328
t-stat 3.283 -1.688 -3.124 -3.212 -1.561
No. of stocks 643 312 151 72 35
Hong Kong
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.044 0.023 0.058 0.092 0.113
Std. dev. 0.449 0.702 0.910 1.203 1.591
t-stat -6.569 2.088 4.052 4.723 4.423
No. of stocks 497 258 132 68 34
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.051 0.015 -0.022 -0.059 -0.017
Std. dev. 0.454 0.791 1.048 1.345 1.877
t-stat 7.679 1.237 -1.330 -2.934 -0.585
No. of stocks 427 189 83 37 17
Germany
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.006 0.035 0.054 0.101 0.123
Std. dev. 0.551 0.802 1.002 1.285 1.936
t-stat 0.732 3.350 3.764 5.347 4.575
No. of stocks 354 181 92 47 24
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.003 -0.038 -0.073 -0.077 -0.111
Std. dev. 1.182 0.768 0.998 1.523 2.177
t-stat 0.176 -3.752 -5.816 -3.824 -3.532
No. of stocks 310 138 61 27 12
China
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.039 0.002 0.031 0.051 0.113
Std. dev. 0.441 0.609 0.745 0.889 1.133
t-stat -4.269 0.223 2.307 3.311 5.583
No. of stocks 373 197 101 51 26
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.039 0.034 0.054 0.088 0.083
Std. dev. 0.474 0.701 0.937 1.248 1.675
t-stat 4.133 2.842 3.483 4.231 3.091
No. of stocks 323 148 66 29 13
France
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.005 0.042 0.074 0.106 0.133
Std. dev. 0.389 0.613 0.881 1.147 1.490
t-stat 1.022 5.753 6.521 6.542 6.250
No. of stocks 406 210 108 55 28
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.010 -0.044 -0.102 -0.111 -0.095
Std. dev. 0.395 0.640 0.893 1.212 1.634
t-stat -1.860 -4.881 -7.944 -6.466 -4.379
No. of stocks 368 172 80 36 17
Sweden
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.018 0.069 0.099 0.167 0.221
Std. dev. 0.565 0.848 1.072 1.439 2.084
t-stat 2.058 5.270 6.682 7.855 6.526
No. of stocks 176 88 42 20 10
Continued on next page
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Table 2.25  (continued from previous page)
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.021 -0.054 -0.068 -0.051 -0.094
Std. dev. 0.550 0.807 1.087 1.424 2.230
t-stat -2.477 -5.145 -4.176 -2.384 -2.787
No. of stocks 162 74 33 15 7
Italy
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.003 0.025 0.068 0.072 0.110
Std. dev. 0.437 0.693 0.957 1.351 1.798
t-stat 0.439 2.444 4.987 3.555 3.836
No. of stocks 123 62 31 15 8
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.001 -0.008 -0.054 -0.028 0.023
Std. dev. 0.452 0.723 1.033 1.447 2.488
t-stat 0.173 -0.738 -3.449 -1.250 0.614
No. of stocks 112 51 23 10 5
Switzerland
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.028 0.004 0.054 0.108 0.114
Std. dev. 0.507 0.740 0.988 1.376 1.815
t-stat -3.593 0.336 3.578 4.903 4.138
No. of stocks 103 51 25 13 6
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.029 0.007 -0.054 -0.061 -0.096
Std. dev. 0.490 0.695 0.933 1.262 1.705
t-stat 3.818 0.613 -3.569 -3.151 -3.559
No. of stocks 100 47 22 10 5
Spain
Value-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.028 0.005 0.011 0.025 0.044
Std. dev. 0.733 0.907 1.119 1.454 1.976
t-stat -2.531 0.446 0.692 1.070 1.369
No. of stocks 66 34 18 9 5
Value-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.021 0.022 0.036 0.069 0.091
Std. dev. 0.520 0.804 1.148 1.688 2.211
t-stat 2.356 1.672 1.832 2.276 2.151
No. of stocks 61 29 14 7 3
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Table 2.26: Equally-weighted international streak portfolios by country
This table presents equally-weighted portfolios with diﬀerent streak length for 10 countries: Canada, UK,
Hong Kong, Germany, China, France, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, and Spain. For each portfolio with diﬀerent
streak length of positive and negative returns, this table reports returns, standard deviation, and t-statistics.
The length of a streak is measured in number of days ranging from 1 to 5. The values reported are those
recorded on the day following the streak. No. of stocks is the average number of stocks in each portfolio each
day. Portfolio returns and their standard deviation are reported in percent. The t-statistics are Newey-West
t-statistics corrected for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the error term.
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
Canada
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.441 0.565 0.599 0.613 0.616
Std. dev. 0.852 0.979 1.145 1.411 1.848
t-stat 14.140 15.035 16.286 17.927 19.343
No. of stocks 444 221 108 52 25
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.276 -0.318 -0.277 -0.220 -0.178
Std. dev. 0.811 0.914 1.133 1.397 1.883
t-stat -11.781 -11.910 -10.878 -9.308 -6.128
No. of stocks 401 178 78 35 15
UK
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.194 0.236 0.247 0.229 0.217
Std. dev. 0.854 0.857 0.911 1.033 1.288
t-stat 11.226 12.928 14.370 12.712 10.109
No. of stocks 643 312 151 72 35
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.146 -0.138 -0.120 -0.101 -0.075
Std. dev. 0.788 0.804 0.874 0.993 1.228
t-stat -10.998 -8.747 -7.434 -5.607 -3.533
No. of stocks 719 386 206 111 61
Hong Kong
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.084 0.145 0.181 0.219 0.245
Std. dev. 0.927 1.023 1.137 1.332 1.743
t-stat 4.781 7.076 7.848 8.776 8.734
No. of stocks 497 258 132 68 34
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.020 0.049 0.103 0.151 0.220
Std. dev. 0.955 1.086 1.259 1.611 2.247
t-stat 1.032 2.203 4.149 4.940 5.841
No. of stocks 427 189 83 37 17
Germany
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.212 0.301 0.357 0.381 0.396
Std. dev. 0.887 0.981 1.172 1.595 2.521
t-stat 13.102 15.648 16.940 14.565 10.172
No. of stocks 354 181 92 47 24
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.175 -0.186 -0.128 -0.060 -0.012
Std. dev. 0.909 1 1.238 1.724 2.495
t-stat -11.285 -9.093 -5.622 -1.952 -0.275
Continued on next page
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Table 2.26  (continued from previous page)
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
No. of stocks 310 138 61 27 12
China
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks -0.001 0.065 0.106 0.122 0.181
Std. dev. 0.767 0.826 0.903 1.056 1.373
t-stat -0.103 4.105 5.593 5.624 6.691
No. of stocks 373 197 101 51 26
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.052 0.033 0.061 0.115 0.144
Std. dev. 0.717 0.800 0.928 1.153 1.580
t-stat 3.721 2.226 3.282 4.719 4.606
No. of stocks 323 148 66 29 13
France
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.067 0.111 0.145 0.201 0.221
Std. dev. 0.828 0.835 0.967 2.282 4.271
t-stat 6.551 9.595 10.376 6.166 3.699
No. of stocks 406 210 108 55 28
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks 0.027 0.042 0.051 0.093 0.122
Std. dev. 0.905 0.939 1.029 1.241 1.649
t-stat 2.697 3.378 3.426 5.021 4.737
No. of stocks 368 172 80 36 17
Sweden
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.198 0.289 0.334 0.384 0.461
Std. dev. 0.855 0.979 1.204 1.567 2.394
t-stat 14.936 18.358 15.435 14.331 11.544
No. of stocks 176 88 42 20 10
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.126 -0.152 -0.121 -0.085 -0.112
Std. dev. 0.926 1.015 1.254 1.743 2.606
t-stat -8.462 -7.896 -5.087 -2.747 -2.832
No. of stocks 162 74 33 15 7
Italy
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.054 0.083 0.108 0.123 0.140
Std. dev. 0.688 0.739 0.885 1.178 1.633
t-stat 5.484 7.543 7.700 6.663 5.360
No. of stocks 123 62 31 15 8
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.050 -0.033 -0.001 0.042 0.071
Std. dev. 0.781 0.899 1.128 1.582 2.534
t-stat -4.499 -2.489 -0.044 1.706 1.877
No. of stocks 112 51 23 10 5
Switzerland
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.108 0.149 0.187 0.201 0.208
Std. dev. 0.678 0.723 0.905 1.290 1.717
t-stat 10.080 12.880 12.372 9.800 7.616
No. of stocks 103 51 25 13 6
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.048 -0.059 -0.070 -0.072 -0.096
Std. dev. 0.751 0.825 0.982 1.327 1.707
Continued on next page
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Table 2.26  (continued from previous page)
Length of streak (days)
1 2 3 4 5
t-stat -4.062 -4.410 -4.406 -3.545 -3.723
No. of stocks 100 47 22 10 5
Spain
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after negative streaks 0.020 0.052 0.072 0.083 0.082
Std. dev. 0.736 0.825 1.095 1.482 1.944
t-stat 1.663 3.778 4.335 3.656 2.651
No. of stocks 66 34 18 9 5
Equally-weighted portfolio returns after positive streaks -0.003 0.015 0.057 0.100 0.111
Std. dev. 0.795 0.987 1.272 1.801 2.312
t-stat -0.227 0.895 2.494 2.905 2.370
No. of stocks 61 29 14 7 3
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3 Media Attention and Short Selling around the Brexit
Referendum
Single authored
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3.1 Introduction
This paper takes the Brexit referendum on June 23, 2016 as a case study in which the eﬀect
of media attention for publicly shorted stocks on the post-referendum return is investigated.
The Brexit referendum is the ﬁrst major negative ﬁnancial event which took place after the
enforcement of the short selling disclosure regime. The extreme reactions of the ﬁnancial
market to its unexpected outcome made short selling a proﬁtable strategy, thus increasing
the already lively interest of the ﬁnancial public for disclosed short positions.23 Moreover,
the Brexit referendum outcome received extensive media coverage, in particular regarding its
implications for the ﬁnancial market as well as speciﬁc ﬁrms. Embedding these two aspects
in the context of a ﬁnancial upheaval, the referendum oﬀers an unparalleled opportunity
to study the impact media attention can have on the reaction and performance of shorted
stocks.
For the analyses conducted in this paper I collect all of the public short positions disclosed
since the introduction of the EU regulation No 236/2012 (. . . ) on short selling and certain
aspects of credit default swaps, on November 1, 2012, which requires short positions larger
than 0.5% of outstanding shares to be made public. Furthermore, the media attention data
made available through the BBC The Juicer API is matched to shorted and non-shorted
stocks to analyze the eﬀect of media attention for shorted stocks. The BBC API allows
access to 850 RSS (Rich Site Summary) feeds of media outlets both in the UK and Europe.
The number of articles are collected in which the name of the stock and the term Brexit are
tagged. The Brexit referendum oﬀers a unique possibility to analyze the news coverage of a
stock in relation to an event that is common to all ﬁrms.
23Christine Lagarde, International Monetary Fund chief, called the price movements following the ref-
erendum violent and brutal (Jopson, 2016). The British pound dropped to a 31-year low, and stocks
worldwide plummeted likewise: for instance, Barclays lost 20.68% on June 24 alone. On June 27, 2016, the
Monday following the referendum, the price drop of Barclays and RBS stocks was so fast that it triggered
automatic circuit breaks on the market: for ﬁve minutes, it was not possible to trade the stocks of these
banks (Sheﬃeld, 2016). Following these events, the rating agencies S&P and Fitch downgraded the UK's
rating based on the expected negative impact of the referendum on the economic growth of the UK in the
short run. Moreover, the betting markets were showing odds in favor of a Remain vote until late into the
evening of June 23, 2016 (Hughes, 2016, Shaddick, 2016).
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The publicly traded airline EasyJet is a compelling example of the combined impact of
media attention and disclosed short positions on stock returns after the Brexit referendum.
On June 24, 2016, EasyJet was discussed manifold in the media due to the proﬁt warnings
it issued in the wake of the referendum (see, e.g., Elliott, 2016). Furthermore, on June
24, 2016, a total of 1.49% of the outstanding EasyJet stock was held short in public short
positions. The EasyJet stock lost signiﬁcantly after the referendum: the 5-day, market-
adjusted, cumulative post-referendum return of EasyJet is -20.736%. By contrast, Wizz Air,
another publicly traded UK based airline, did not receive media attention on the day after
the referendum and was not shorted publicly at the time of the referendum; in the 5 days
after the referendum, its stock outperformed the market by 2.515%. To the extent that it
lends itself to generalization, this example illustrates the rationale for the analysis of the
joint eﬀect of media attention and open short positions on market movements and reactions.
Investigating the disclosed short positions around the events of the Brexit referendum
is of interest also from a regulatory point of view. The short-selling disclosure regime has
raised concerns. On one hand, fears were voiced that it could deepen and worsen the price
reactions that follow negative events by provoking herding behavior (European Central Bank,
2010). Another envisioned risk of the short position disclosure regime is that it would direct
additional media attention towards shorted stocks due to the increased visibility generated
by the mandatory disclosures, especially in times of ﬁnancial market instability. Websites
such as ShortTracker+ or WhaleWisdom,24 for instance, make the public short positions
easily accessible and further heighten their visibility. This increased coverage would sharpen
the interest of the informed public, whose reactions to the media coverage would in turn
inﬂuence market and stock price development. It is well documented that mass media play
a role in shaping stock market activity by inﬂuencing investors' sentiment and trade. Many
of the results presented in the literature, for instance, suggest that media coverage often
24ShortTracker+ conveniently report the UK short positions reported on the FCA's webpage. Short-
Tracker+ can be found at https://shorttracker.co.uk/, last accessed July 20, 2019. WhaleWisdom summa-
rizes  among others  the short positions reported in the UK, Germany, and France and can be found at
https://whalewisdom.com/short_position, last accessed July 20, 2019.
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has a positive eﬀect on stock returns in the short run (Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2018, Barber
and Odean, 2008, Fang and Peress, 2009). Therefore, in the context of short selling, the
disclosure regime and the media coverage evidently interplay and reciprocally strengthen
their eﬀect  be it positive or negative  making more detailed research worthwhile.
Overall, for a stock neither receiving media attention nor being excessively shorted seems
to be reliably associated with negative returns after the Brexit referendum. However, shorted
stocks that additionally receive media attention (treatment stocks) signiﬁcantly underper-
form control stocks that were shorted but not covered in the media. The 2-day, cumulative,
market-adjusted return of a portfolio of shorted stocks that received negative media atten-
tion around the Brexit referendum is -7.8%. In contrast, shorted stocks in the same sector
that were matched to the treatment stocks based on market capitalization underperformed
the market a mere -0.9%. The eﬀect is only observable over a few days, consistent with the
idea that negative Brexit media attention creates short-term selling pressure. There is no
such eﬀect of media attention among non-shorted stocks.
Additional separate analyses are performed: one conducted on stocks in general (i.e.
shorted and not shorted) to obtain the impact of media attention on returns, and the other
conducted on stock with short positions independently from media attention. Their results
show that, in the UK, stocks with a disclosed short position outperform non-shorted stocks
with similar size and industry aﬃliation. This could be caused by the high number of short
positions reductions disclosed on the day after the referendum. Only in Europe, however
does media attention in relation to the Brexit lead all stocks to lose signiﬁcantly more than
those without media coverage in the same sector and with a similar size.
To date, there has been no previous paper examining the performance of stocks receiving
high levels of media attention in the period around the Brexit referendum, let alone of shorted
stocks with open short positions. In the literature, the available studies investigating the
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potential eﬀect of a Brexit mostly analyze its economic and political eﬀects in the UK and
the EU (see, e.g., Docherty, 2016, Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, Reenen, and Vaitilingam,
2014, Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, and Van Reenen, 2016, Oliver, 2016). On the other
hand, other studies analyzing reported short positions have done so over a long-time horizon
of several years during which, however, no big-impact political event followed by a market-
wide downturn has taken place (Jones, Reed, and Waller, 2016, Jank and Smajlbegovic,
2017, Jank, Roling, and Smajlbegovic, 2017). Another expanding branch of literature is the
eﬀect of media attention on stock returns. It is well documented that mass media play a
role in shaping stock market activity by inﬂuencing investors' sentiment and trade. Many of
the results presented in the literature, for instance, suggest that media coverage often has a
positive eﬀect on stock returns (Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2018, Barber and Odean, 2008, Fang
and Peress, 2009).
3.2 Literature
Three ﬁelds of literature are central for this paper, which intends to investigate the question
whether media attention directed at shorted stocks has a negative eﬀect on the post-Brexit
referendum returns. Firstly, the literature on Brexit oﬀer insight into what eﬀects could
have been expected from a Leave vote. Secondly, the existing literature on the disclosure
regime is essential for a solid basis on how the disclosure of short positions aﬀect the returns
of the shorted stocks in calmer periods. Lastly, the literature on media coverage plays an
important role in understanding its eﬀect on stocks returns.
In the literature, the referendum and the possible eﬀects on Europe and the United
Kingdom of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU are discussed manifold. All authors have
reached a consensus that a Brexit would damage not only the UK and European economy,
but the global economy as well, although the ﬁrst to a higher degree than the other two (see,
e.g., Jensen and Snaith, 2016, Oliver, 2016, Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, and Van Reenen,
2016, Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, Reenen, and Vaitilingam, 2014).
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Most literature, however, discusses rather the economic and political than the ﬁnancial
eﬀects on the stock market. The Brexit is expected to create political instability and risk
(Oliver, 2016, Jensen and Snaith, 2016). Furthermore, trade levels between the UK and
the EU are predicted to drop, leading to a substantial GDP and household income loss
in the UK (Dhingra, Ottaviano, Sampson, and Van Reenen, 2016, Van Reenen, Dhingra,
Ottaviano, and Sampson, 2015). In an earlier paper, Ottaviano, Pessoa, Sampson, Reenen,
and Vaitilingam (2014) also analyze the potential eﬀects of the Brexit on the GDP of the
UK, concluding that it could lead to a loss similar in extent to the one experienced during
the 2008/2009 ﬁnancial crisis. Considering the less than optimistic scenarios outlined by
these analyses, there is evidence that a Leave vote would cause negative price pressure on
stocks returns. Since the referendum outcome turned Brexit from a possibility to a fact, with
all the resulting upheaval, the short selling disclosure regime allows to analyze the behavior
of investors with large short positions in times of ﬁnancial stress.
Already before the referendum, the academic literature has not only been discussing the
eﬀects of a Brexit on the economy in general, but also trying to identify its most probable
losers, which are to be found mainly in sectors that produce inside the UK and are directly
subject to losses due to a GBP/EUR depreciation from the Brexit. For instance, the car
industry in the UK is predicted to falter in case of a Brexit (Van Reenen, Dhingra, Ottaviano,
and Sampson, 2015, Docherty, 2016). More speciﬁcally, sectors with the highest likelihood of
losses will be real estate, banks, retail, insurance, travel and leisure, auto parts, and ﬁnancial
services (Docherty, 2016). In this paper I ﬁnd that the sectors in which short positions are
increased are indeed those identiﬁed by Docherty (2016).
Although some sectors are expected to be aﬀected more than others by a Brexit, the
literature shows that a Brexit would aﬀect all ﬁrms in the UK and Europe. The Brexit
referendum oﬀers a unique possibility to investigate the eﬀect of media attention on shorted
stocks because it is an unexpected event aﬀecting all ﬁrms in the UK and Europe. The fact
that the Brexit referendum outcome was unexpected means that the stock price adjustments
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to the news take place simultaneously in a short time span after the referendum. This makes
the Brexit referendum a suitable natural experiment to test the eﬀect of media attention
on shorted stocks. Similarly, Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018) make use of the US
presidential election in 2016 to test the eﬀect of tax policies on the stock returns. The fact
that the outcome of the 2016 presidential election was unexpected and the two candidates
had very diﬀerent tax policy plans, oﬀers an almost ideal experimental setting in which to
test the eﬀect of tax policy on asset prices.
The literature on disclosure regimes is still growing. In Europe, the short position dis-
closure regime has not proven to be a means for coordinated manipulative attacks (Jones,
Reed, and Waller, 2016). However, the reported short selling positions analyzed only go
back until the end of 2013. Consequently, their sample does not include large price-drop
events such as the Brexit referendum. Moreover, considering that the European short po-
sition disclosure regime was introduced to ensure the proper functioning . . . with regard(s)
to the ﬁnancial markets, and to ensure a high level of consumer and investor protection
(The European Parliament, 2012, p. 1), it is essential to test whether it fulﬁls this end also
in periods of economic turmoil. So far, judging by the results in Jones, Reed, and Waller
(2016), there is no evidence that the ﬁnancial market suﬀered under the disclosure regime
due to manipulative attacks by short sellers. Whether this holds also for the time period
after the Brexit referendum will be investigated in this paper, which will compare the post-
referendum returns of stocks with and without disclosed short positions. Using data from
the disclosure regime in Japan, Boehmer, Duong, and Huszár (2018) oﬀer evidence that the
short position reductions have a positive eﬀect on the stock price.
Another branch of research investigating European disclosure regimes focuses on the
characteristics of the short seller as an investor. Short sellers, such as hedge funds, are
found to be informed and sophisticated investors that outperform other investors (Jank and
Smajlbegovic, 2017, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008). Furthermore, short sellers have
also proven to be investors with an edge over other market participants thanks to their
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ability to analyze new information, a skill that sets them apart from the average investor.
For example, short sellers are found to analyze and incorporate the information of future
earnings announcements correctly (Christophe, Ferri, and Angel, 2004). Not only during
earnings seasons do short sellers invest smartly: Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan
(2001) also ﬁnd that they are able to identify stocks with future negative stock returns on
the basis of their fundamentals. Furthermore, Boehmer, Erturk, and Sorescu (2007) add to
the empirical evidence in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) that short sellers are sophisticated
investors that incorporate relevant information into the valuation of a company, ensuring
that the price reﬂects the fair value. Boehmer, Erturk, and Sorescu (2007) ﬁnd that the
informativeness of short seller is due to institutions being active short sellers.
Hence, on the basis of the assumption that short sellers are informed and sophisticated
traders, it could be argued that analyzing the development of disclosed short positions around
the Brexit referendum may carry informational value: this is reinforced by the academic
literature oﬀering evidence that short position disclosures also carry additional informational
value about stock prices (Jones, Reed, and Waller, 2016, Boehmer, Duong, and Huszár,
2018). In fact, such an analysis performed on the short positions disclosed on the day of
the referendum shows how some short sellers were smart enough to position themselves to
win from a Leave outcome as well. Up to this point, however, no investigation of short
position disclosures has taken into consideration the media coverage awarded to the stocks
concerned, although media attention might inﬂuence the eﬀect of short position disclosures
on stock returns.
As a matter of fact, with the market turmoil around the Brexit which made short selling
a proﬁtable strategy, short sellers became increasingly subject to media attention. For exam-
ple, Odey Asset Management LLP was reported in online articles by the Financial Times to
have proﬁted from their short positions in Intu Properties and Berkley Group; further, the
hedge funds Marshall Wace and TT International were also showcased as short sellers. This
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media coverage drew attention to the proﬁtability of short selling around the referendum (see
e.g., Jopson, 2016, Johnson, Agnew, and Childs, 2016, Reuters, June 24, 2016 and Financial
Times, June 26, 2016).
After the referendum, not only short sellers were brought into the limelight, but also the
coverage of the eﬀects of the referendum on UK and European ﬁrms increased drastically.
The referendum outcome sparked an increase in news articles speculating in what way ﬁrms
and industry sectors will react to the new developments ahead. The literature is rich in
insight concerning the interactions of media and returns. The stocks of ﬁrms with media
coverage are bought proportionately more often (see, e.g., Barber and Odean, 2008, Hillert
and Ungeheuer, 2018, Peress, 2014, Yuan, 2015). Not only media coverage is an indicator for
attention: also Google searching volume is found to be a strong predictor for extreme positive
returns (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011). Overall, the ﬁnance literature ﬁnds that the level
and changes in media coverage have predictive power about stock returns. This paper adds
to this literature and ﬁnds that post-referendum returns in Europe are negatively aﬀected
by media attention. Although a majority of the research on media attention is conducted
for the US market, Griﬃn, Hirschey, and Kelly (2011) ﬁnd in their cross-country analysis
that on days with news the stock prices ﬂuctuate more. Investigating the eﬀect of media
attention on stock returns poses the challenge of disentangling the eﬀect of the event being
reported from the news coverage itself. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) address this in their
study and ﬁnd that especially local media coverage predicts local trading activity. However,
in this paper the media attention data does not reveal the source of the media attention.
Also sentiment and tone of the media coverage aﬀect the subsequent stock returns (Tet-
lock, 2007, Fang and Peress, 2009, Gurun and Butler, 2012, Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky, and
Macskassy, 2008, Ferguson, Philip, Lam, and Guo, 2015). Tetlock (2007) analyzes how the
tone of a central Wall Street Journal column aﬀects daily stock returns: A pessimistic tone
in the column results in lower stock returns compared to days with an optimistic column.
Not only the tone of the column plays a role: Dougal, Engelberg, Garcia, and Parsons (2012)
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ﬁnd that also the author of the Wall Street Journal column has explanatory power in the
returns of the Dow Jones Industrial Averages.25 Chan (2003) and Tetlock, Saar-Tsechansky,
and Macskassy (2008) focus on negative words used in article headlines and news stories,
respectively. Both articles ﬁnd that the use of negatively slanted words predicts stock re-
turns and trading behavior. In this paper the sentiment of the online articles cannot be
investigated. The data collected through the BBC the Juicer API only shows the number
of articles published on a particular stock in combination with the Brexit. However, the ad-
ditional information on the shorting activity in the stocks presents itself as a possible proxy
for the articles sentiment.
3.3 Data
The short selling disclosure regime, introduced in 2012 in all European countries, imposes
a two step disclosure: to the local regulatory authority in case of a negative net position
amounting to at least 0.2% of the issued shares, and to the public in general if the position is
larger than 0.5% of the issued shares. Furthermore, the regulation requires that short position
changes that exceed the next 0.1% increment must be reported as well (EU, No. 236/012, Art
5[2] and Art 6[2]). Also, if short seller reduces a short position and surpasses a 0.1% increment
again, the short position must be disclosed again. In consequence, many of the disclosures
are corrections of existing short positions, such as position increase, reduction or close out.
Each European regulatory entity has been provided with a convenient downloading option
in comma-separated values (csv) format. For the following analysis, I collect the disclosed
short positions from all countries in the European Union26 from November 1, 2012 (day
of the introduction of the disclosure regime) to November 1, 2016. For each position, the
25Similarly, Uhl (2014) ﬁnds that the sentiment of Reuters articles also predict Dow Jones Industrial
Averages stock index returns.
26Table 3.10 in the Appendix lists the links to the short position data for all countries analyzed in this
study. Further, Figure 3.3 in the appendix plots the number of short positions reported from November 05,
2012 to November 1, 2016. For the considered time span, in the UK the day after the referendum marks the
date with the highest number of short position disclosures.
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position holder, the issuer, the ISIN, as well as the date of the position trade and the position
size in percentage are reported. The issuer of a position is the shorted ﬁrm. The reported
position size is the entire net short-selling position value of a position holder, expressed as
percentage of the total issued stocks shares. Moreover, once collected, the data must be
ﬁltered extensively by hand. There are vast diﬀerences in the quality of the reported short
positions: in Germany, for example, there have been some reports of short positions of the
STOXX index, and an individual trader has disclosed to have shorted 100% of UniCredit.
Such positions must be removed from the sample, because a 100% position is implausible
and a STOXX index cannot be directly shorted.27
On the basis of the stock positions owned by individual short sellers, it is possible to
determine the total amount of shorted shares of each single stock by adding up each individual
position held by the short sellers. For this computation, a position that is reduced to 0.5%
or below is considered to be closed, and so taken out of the calculation. After the Brexit
referendum, the number of disclosed short position changes has increased drastically, as the
barplot in Figure 3.3 in the Appendix shows. Especially in the UK, the highest number of
short position trades subject to disclosure has been reported on the day after the referendum
(June 24, 2016). This shows that short sellers did in fact react to the surprising referendum
outcome.
Thomsons Reuters Datastream provides ISIN, name, daily returns and market capital-
ization for all stocks traded on European markets. The daily trading turnover is calculated
using the number of shares outstanding, number of shares traded, and adjustment factor.
27Overall, the sample consists of 66,851 reported disclosures: among them, 44 occurrences can be found
in which the reported date of the disclosed position falls on a Saturday or Sunday (by deﬁnition not trading
days, see section 2), although the EU regulation clearly states that the reported date needs to be the trading
day of the position. The German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority has assured me that the positions
reported on a weekend occur due to mishaps by the position holders. Among the 44 short positions with
the trading date set on a Saturday or Sunday, 38 are reported by diﬀerent short position holders, thus
eliminating the possibility that a short seller used this method to systematically conceal information. To
include these disclosures, I set these positions on the preceding Friday, because this is the latest possible
trading day. If the position has already been disclosed on that Friday, I choose the characteristics of the
later reported disclosure, consequently interpreting the later short position report as a correction.
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Appendix 3.6.2 provides a detailed account of the calculation of the trading turnover, which
reports the proportion of shares that have been traded in a day.28 To control for industry,
the Industry Classiﬁcation Benchmark (ICB) is downloaded for each stock. The ICB has
four diﬀerent levels of classiﬁcation: industry, supersector, sector, and subsector. In this
study, the supersector level is used.
The stock-speciﬁc data collected from Datastream is matched with the disclosed short
positions according to the ISIN and the date. Of the 55,191 gathered short positions, 8%
(4,415.28) cannot be matched to the corresponding stock information, because the reported
ISIN is not found in the Datastream dataset. The data for all the stocks in the considered
countries are gathered to ensure a comparison between the return of stocks with at least one
disclosed short position and the return of stocks without any reported short position.29
Figure 3.1 plots the development of the short positions from January 2016 to January 2017
within each supersector. For the UK, in Panels (a), (c), and (e) the total short positions held
in each supersector show a clear short-term increase in the supersectors real estate, banks,
retail and construction. This supports the prognosis by Docherty (2016), who identiﬁes these
supersectors as the ones most likely to lose from a Leave vote. For Europe, Panels (b), (d),
and (f) plot the total short positions over time. Similarly, here we see a short-term increase
in reported short positions in the bank, insurance, ﬁnancial services and telecommunications
supersectors.
28Appendix 3.6.3 tests the data quality for the trading volume collected from Datastream. For Germany, I
compare the trading volume reported by the Deutsche Börse to the trading volume collected from Datastream.
29In the Appendix, Figure 3.5 plots the changes in disclosed short positions and the stock price of Aixtron
since the introduction of the short position disclosure regime. This ﬁgure shows the data stock return and
short selling data available.
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Figure 3.1: Total percentage of shorted stocks by supersector
This ﬁgure plots the number of reported short sale positions divided by the total number of outstanding
shares of the shorted stocks for each supersector. The short positions are grouped by ICB supersector and
plotted from January 1, 2016 to January 1, 2017. The development of the short positions is calculated by
cumulating the diﬀerence in disclosed short positions in the UK (left panels) and the EU (right panels) before
and after the Brexit referendum, grouped by supersector. If the number of short positions drops below 0.5%
of the total number of outstanding shares, the position is considered closed. The total of the short positions
in a supersector is measured as number of shares shorted divided by number of shares outstanding in all the
shorted stocks. The dashed vertical line indicates the day of the Brexit referendum.
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Figure 3.2: Total number of published news articles joining Brexit and a company name
by supersector
Number of published articles tagged with Brexit and company name and dealing with stocks traded on
European stock exchanges. For each supersector, the numbers of articles are aggregated and plotted from
January 1, 2016 to January 1, 2017.
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Table 3.1: Summary of media attention and disclosed short position by supersector
This table reports the change in number of articles published, average disclosed short positions, 2-day
cumulative return and average change in short positions of the stocks in each ICB supersector. Each value
is reported for the day after the referendum (June 24, 2016); the diﬀerences are between the values reported
on the day of the referendum and on the day after it.
Sector No. of Average short 2-day Average change
articles position cumulative return in short positions
UK
Real estate 8 1.457 -6.611 0.470
Automobiles & parts 0 0.000 -5.061 0.000
Banks 5 1.123 -4.492 -0.070
Construction & materials 3 1.270 -3.834 -0.040
Financial services 44 1.151 -3.561 0.000
Retail 4 2.453 -3.425 -1.780
Insurance 1 0.677 -2.315 -0.110
Technology 2 0.789 -1.434 -0.010
Industrial goods & services 63 1.331 -1.047 -0.260
Telecommunications 0 1.312 -1.013 -0.140
Travel & leisure 23 1.320 -0.940 0.110
Media 62 0.483 -0.428 -0.130
Basic resources 1 0.666 2.619 -0.300
Food & beverage 4 0.627 4.759 0.000
Oil & gas 4 1.211 5.086 0.000
Personal & household goods 9 0.649 5.372 -0.150
Utilities 0 1.170 5.709 0.000
Health care 3 0.801 6.182 0.160
EU
Travel & leisure 3 1.368 -3.164 -0.020
Insurance 4 0.347 -2.994 0.000
Banks 5 0.916 -2.956 0.370
Automobiles & parts 5 1.052 -2.792 -0.240
Industrial goods & services 65 1.577 -1.181 -0.090
Construction & materials 5 1.105 -0.227 -0.080
Financial services 37 1.785 0.055 0.000
Basic resources 5 1.438 0.303 -0.120
Technology 20 1.352 0.628 -0.080
Media 34 1.493 0.743 0.100
Oil & gas 11 2.131 0.853 0.060
Retail 20 1.491 1.010 -0.130
Personal & household goods 5 1.084 1.300 -0.200
Telecommunications 2 1.471 1.686 0.210
Food & beverage 1 0.622 2.210 -0.330
Health care 1 1.325 2.252 0.110
Utilities 2 0.585 2.284 -0.170
Real estate 26 1.070 2.611 0.000
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For this study, media coverage about the Brexit is gathered when it includes explicit
references to a company traded on a European stock exchange. To this purpose, I collect
articles tagged with the name of the stock and the term Brexit.30 This ensures that the
media coverage of the stock is mentioning the company in combination with the Brexit. The
data is gathered through the BBC Application Programming Interface (API) called The
Juicer,31 which collects, with the help of an algorithm, all articles published on 850 RRS
(Rich Site Summary) feeds of national, international, and local publications, tags them with
relevant keywords, and then gives access to this information. For every stock, the name of
the company is taken from the Datastream variable NAME; moreover, in order to ﬁnd the
most accurate matches, all general abbreviations such as PLC, GmbH or LLP are removed
from the company name.
Figure 3.2 plots the collected number of articles that are published on the companies in
each ICB supersector from January 1, 2016 to 1 January 1, 2017. For most supersectors, there
is a sharp increase in the number of articles published after the Brexit referendum. For the
UK, Panel (a) shows that the number of articles increases signiﬁcantly for the supersectors
banks, ﬁnancial services, and real estate; interestingly, the banks and real estate supersectors
experience a simultaneous increase in shorted stocks. Panel (b) reports the number of articles
on ﬁnancial services published in Europe, excluding the UK, and here we see a signiﬁcant
increase in articles mentioning stocks from the ﬁnancial services and real estate supersectors.
In Panel (c) and (d) of Figure 3.2, the number of published articles addressing the con-
sumer services and utilities industry is plotted for the UK and the rest of the European
Union, respectively. In the consumer services industry, the retail supersectors is discussed
particularly often in the media with regards to the Brexit, in both Europe and the UK.
30In the Appendix 3.6.5, the number of articles tagged with the words Brexit, referendum and Brexit
and referendum are reported, showing that the pattern is very similar for all three tags. However, the
number of articles tagged with the term Brexit is consistently higher.
31Information on the API can be fund at http://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/projects/juicer/, last accessed Febru-
ary 26, 2019.
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In Panel (e) and (f), the supersector with the most extreme reaction to the referendum is
industrial goods & services. Overall, the graphical summaries of both the short positions
and the number of articles published after the Brexit conﬁrm that the concentration does
lie in supersectors that would stand to lose from the GDP/EUR depreciation, as predicted
by Docherty (2016).
Table 3.1 reports, for each supersector, the total disclosed short positions in percentage,
the change in number of articles published, the 2-day cumulative return, and the average
change in short positions over the referendum. As Docherty (2016) predicted and the 2-
day cumulative returns after the referendum conﬁrm, supersectors which sustained losses
after the Brexit referendum were banks, travel & leisure, retail, and construction. In the
supersectors with the lowest returns, an average stock has a high number of short positions;
however, at the same time, short positions are also high in stocks which usually attract more
investments in periods of market downturn, such as those in the supersectors utilities, oil &
gas, and basic resources.
Furthermore, it can be observed that short sellers shorted both stocks that would lose
in case of a Leave vote and stocks that would lose with a Remain vote: this shows that, as
a group of investors, they were preparing for both possible outcomes. Table 3.1 shows that
especially companies in the UK and other the EU countries that are expected to lose from
a prospective Brexit have strong negative 2-day, cumulative, post-referendum returns.
To answer the question whether media attention towards a stock with disclosed short
positions leads to a signiﬁcant underperformance of returns after the referendum, it is nec-
essary to look at the stocks with both media attention and disclosed short positions. In
the summary presented in Table 3.2, the number of stocks with both a disclosed short po-
sition and media attention, their value-weighted post-referendum return, and their average
market capitalization are reported. Furthermore, Table 3.2 also give the summary statistics
for stocks with no disclosed short position and no media attention, stocks with no disclosed
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short position but with media attention, and stocks with a disclosed short position and no
media attention. In both the UK and the other European countries, the largest number of
stocks have no disclosed short position. Overall, in the UK, 170 stocks had disclosed short
positions open at the time of the Brexit referendum. Of the 170 shorted stocks, 21 also had
media attention. Stocks with both an open short position and media attention have a return
of -7.908%, which is perceptibly lower compared to the shorted stocks with an open short
position and no media attention or stocks without an open short position but with media
attention. For the EU stocks, a similar observation can be made. In the other European
countries, the total number of stocks shorted at the time of the referendum is higher with a
total of 229 ﬁrms. However, only 11 of these are also covered in the media. A total of 204
stocks are covered in the media in the European countries in connection with the Brexit.
This preliminary summary of the data suggests that especially publicly shorted stocks that
receive media attention have signiﬁcant negative returns after the referendum. However, it
is important to note that the number of stocks with both an open short position and media
attention are only 21 in the UK and 11 in the other European countries.
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Table 3.2: Summary of media attention and publicly disclosed stocks
This table reports summary statistics for the groups of stocks with and without disclosed short positions
that have media attention or not. For each of the four groups, the no. of stocks, the post-referendum returns,
and the average market value are reported. No. of stocks is the number of stocks comprised in the group
with media attention and disclosed short position characteristics. The Post-referendum return is the value-
weighted, 2-day, cumulative, market-adjusted returns after the Brexit referendum. The average market value
of the stocks is reported in millions. Panel A reports the summary statistics for the UK stocks and Panel B
reports the summary statistics for the European countries without the UK.
Panel A: UK
Not shorted Shorted
No media attention No. of stocks 1, 631 149
Post-referendum return 0.878 -3.385
Avg. market value 1, 124 3, 062
Media attention No. of stocks 99 21
Post-referendum return 0.904 -7.809
Avg. market value 5, 043 3, 825
Panel B: EU
Not shorted Shorted
No media attention No. of stocks 6, 567 193
Post-referendum return 0.081 -0.169
Avg. market value 3, 052 8, 397
Media attention No. of stocks 218 11
Post-referendum return −0.425 -3.696
Avg. market value 7, 137 9, 111
3.4 Empirical Results
This section is divided into two subsections. The ﬁrst subsection presents the main result of
this paper, namely that media attention directed at shorted stocks aﬀects negatively their
post-referendum returns. The second presents auxiliary results which show that, in the UK,
stocks with open short positions signiﬁcantly underperform the market; however, they have
signiﬁcantly higher returns than stocks matched on their market value and ICB supersector.
Furthermore, small stocks with media attention in the UK signiﬁcantly underperform the
market but do not underperform stocks of similar size and industry aﬃliation. In the EU,
open short positions have a negative eﬀect on smaller stocks, and media attention has a
negative eﬀect on larger stocks.
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3.4.1 Main Results
In this section I will show that, when it comes to UK, the post-referendum returns of shorted
stocks are negatively aﬀected by media attention. First, evidence will be given by a diﬀ-in-
diﬀ analysis. Second, a matching approach will oﬀer further evidence of the eﬀect of media
attention given to a publicly shorted stock compared to other stocks with similar size and
the same industry aﬃliation.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the diﬀ-in-diﬀ regression, where the dependent variable
is the 2-day, cumulative, market-adjusted return after the referendum.32 Assuming that
investors read the articles on a company on June 24, 2016 and then trade on this new in-
formation, this should then be reﬂected in the 2-day, cumulative, market-adjusted return.
The variables Short position and Media attention indicate whether there is a disclosed short
position in the stock on the day after the referendum (June 24, 2016) or a published article
mentioning jointedly the company and the referendum. Short position is a dummy variable
which has the value 1 for stocks with a disclosed short position larger than 0.5% of outstand-
ing shares. Furthermore, Media attention is a dummy variable with the value 1 if the stock
has been covered in the media in relation to the referendum on June 24, 2016. To control
for the cross-sectional diﬀerence in size and trading volume in each stock, the market value
and the turnover are included as control variables. More speciﬁcally, the logarithm of the
market value and the logarithm of the turnover plus 1 are included. The trading turnover is
transformed into log(1 + turnover) to account for the possibility of a stock having a trading
volume of zero. This diﬀ-in-diﬀ regression shows the eﬀect a disclosed short position or
media attention has on stocks in the cross-section and also the eﬀect both a disclosed short
position and media attention can have on the post-referendum returns of these stocks.
32Table 3.13 in the Appendix reports the same diﬀ-in-diﬀ regression with a post-referendum return of
5-days.
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For the UK, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between Short position and Media at-
tention is signiﬁcantly negative, indicating that the combination of a disclosed short position
with media attention for any shorted stock aﬀects negatively the post-referendum return of
that stock. Without controlling for trading turnover and market value, the media attention
in the UK has a slightly signiﬁcant positive eﬀect, which is in line with the literature that
ﬁnds media attention to be good for stock returns (Hillert and Ungeheuer, 2018). Overall,
this result oﬀers some evidence that media attention for a stock that has been shorted has
a negative eﬀect on that stock's return, as indicated by this analysis of the post-referendum
results.
Table 3.3: Media attention, short selling, and post-referendum returns
This table reports the results of the diﬀ-in-diﬀ regression. The dependent variable is the 2-day, cumulative,
market-adjusted return after the Brexit referendum. The variable Short position is a dummy variable with
the value 1 if the stock has a disclosed short position on June 24, 2016. The variable Media attention is a
dummy variable with the value 1 if the stock is covered in the media in relation to the Brexit referendum
on the day after the referendum, June 24, 2016. Short position * Media attention is the interaction term
between the two variables. The variables log(MV) and log(1 + turnover) are the logarithm of the market
capitalization of the stock and the logarithm of the trading turnover of the stock, respectively. The trading
turnover is the quotient of number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding in a stock. The
ﬁrst two columns report the regression results for all UK stocks, and the last two columns for all countries
in the EU excluding the UK. The t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coeﬃcient values.
UK EU
Short position 0.061 0.117 0.072 0.280∗∗∗
(0.702) (1.379) (0.749) (3.265)
Media attention 0.284 0.377∗ −0.120 0.136
(1.456) (1.878) (−0.559) (0.668)
Short position * Media attention −0.398∗ −0.437∗∗ −0.003 −0.196
(−1.676) (−2.167) (−0.001) (−0.725)
log(MV) 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗
(4.149) (2.353)
log(1 + turnover) −1.655∗∗∗ 2.581∗∗∗
(−3.803) (4.573)
Constant −0.227∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗ −0.376∗∗∗ −0.208∗∗∗
(−3.828) (−2.172) (−4.471) (−6.756)
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In the other European countries, the results diﬀer from the ones in the UK. Media
attention for a shorted stock does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the post-referendum returns.
Furthermore, stocks with media attention in relation to the referendum do not signiﬁcantly
under- or outperform the market. The coeﬃcient of the short position variable is only
signiﬁcant if the control variables are not added into the regression. Furthermore, neither
a disclosed short position nor media attention have an added signiﬁcant eﬀect on the post-
referendum returns.
In the following, the analysis will concentrate on the eﬀect media attention has on the
post-referendum returns of stocks with a disclosed short position. For this reason, the stocks
with a disclosed short position and media attention are matched to stocks with an open short
position but no media attention (Barber and Lyon, 1997). The matching approach allows to
compare the return of stocks with short positions and/or media attention while controlling
for unobserved factors that may inﬂuence the stocks returns. The treatment stocks  namely
stocks with a disclosed short positions and media attention  are matched to stocks with a
disclosed short position and no media attention (control stocks) according to the stock's size
and the supersector it belongs to. Conducting the matching based on supersectors is in this
case especially important because the outcome of the referendum has aﬀected supersector
in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways. Suitable control stocks are identiﬁed among all those with a
disclosed short position and no media attention by ﬁrst identifying all stocks in the same
ICB supersector, and then selecting among these the one with the market value closest to
that of the treatment stocks.
Table 3.4 reports the results for the UK stocks, both value- and equally-weighted. Aggre-
gating the stocks on a value- and equally-weighted basis allows to investigate the diﬀerent
eﬀect of media on shorted stocks with a larger and smaller market capitalization, respectively.
For example, Ferguson, Philip, Lam, and Guo (2015) ﬁnd that the eﬀect of media attention
is higher for larger ﬁrms, motivating the analysis of the value-weighted and equally-weighted
aggregation. Table 3.4 shows that after the referendum stocks with media attention and an
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open short position underperform their matched stocks signiﬁcantly. This means that media
attention in a publicly shorted stock in the UK has a negative eﬀect on the stock returns after
the referendum. This may be due to the fact that the media attention in this case is more
likely negative, because the open short positions show that investors have a bearish outlook
on this stock. This eﬀect is similar irrespective of whether the mean post-referendum return
is value- or equally-weighted, suggesting that this eﬀect is independent of size. In Table 3.4
the returns of stocks with an open short position and media attention reverse slightly. The
5-day, market-adjusted, cumulative returns are less negative than the 2-day cumulative re-
turn. Although this reversal is not signiﬁcant, it is consistent with a negative price pressure
caused by negative media attention that is not backed up by fundamentals.
Table 3.5 reports the results of the same matching approach for the other countries in
the European Union. As for the UK, also in the rest of the EU media attention for a shorted
stock has a negative eﬀect on its post-referendum returns compared to the matched stocks.
In magnitude, however, this eﬀect is smaller than for the UK stocks. In contrast to the
results of the diﬀ-in-diﬀ regression, this result for the EU stocks shows that, unlike what
happens with the matches, media attention for a shorted stock has a negative eﬀect on the
post-referendum returns. In the EU, the eﬀect of media attention on a shorted stock is more
signiﬁcant in larger stocks, supporting results of Ferguson, Philip, Lam, and Guo (2015) that
the eﬀect of media attention is more extreme in larger stocks.
Overall, the analysis presented shows evidence that media attention for a shorted stock
does inﬂuence negatively its post-referendum returns, be it because journalists are aware of
the disclosed short positions, or because they are as well informed as analysts and therefore
direct their interest to similar stocks. The presence of webpages such as the short interest
tracker by Castellain Capital LLP called ShortTracker+ or WhaleWisdom33 make the public
short positions easily accessible. Easier accessibility of the short data may lead to media
attention being directed at shorted stocks because of the short positions themselves.
33The ShortTracker+ can be found at https://shorttracker.co.uk/, last accessed July 20, 2019. WhaleWis-
dom can be found at https://whalewisdom.com/short_position, last accessed July 20, 2019.
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Table 3.4: Matching approach to examine the eﬀect of media attention on shorted stocks
in the UK
For UK stocks, Panel A (Panel B) reports the post-referendum, cumulative, value-weighted (equally-
weighted), market-adjusted returns of treatment stocks and control stocks. The treatment stocks are all
stocks with media attention and any open short positions on the day of the referendum, whereas the control
stocks have an open short position but no media attention. The control stocks are matched to the treatment
stocks based on size and supersector. The ﬁrst (second) column reports the value-weighted (equally-weighted)
returns of the control stocks and treated stocks, respectively. The third column reports the diﬀerence in
returns between the two. Returns are expressed as percentages. T-statistics are reported in brackets below
the estimates.
Control Treatment Treatment - Control
Panel A: Value-weighted
5-day cumulative return -2.098 -3.777 -1.962
(-1.785) (-1.565) (-0.605)
4-day cumulative return -1.465 -4.416 -3.185
(-1.344) (-2.205) (-1.146)
3-day cumulative return -1.085 -6.050 -5.127
(-0.965) (-3.415) (-2.099)
2-day cumulative return -0.899 -7.809 -7.065
(-1.000) (-3.180) (-2.477)
1-day return 0.004 -0.047 -0.052
(0.961) (-2.902) (-3.338)
Panel B: Equally-weighted
5-day cumulative return 0.156 -4.625 -4.781
(0.229) (-1.359) (-1.492)
4-day cumulative return 0.739 -4.667 -5.406
(1.203) (-1.428) (-1.740)
3-day cumulative return 1.447 -5.606 -7.053
(1.259) (-2.88) (-3.227)
2-day cumulative return 0.84 -5.886 -6.726
(0.690) (-2.178) (-2.544)
1-day return 0.017 -0.032 -0.049
(2.480) (-1.810) (-3.157)
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Table 3.5: Matching approach to examine the eﬀect of media attention on shorted stocks
in the EU (excluding UK)
For European stocks excluding UK stocks, Panel A (Panel B) reports the post-referendum, cumulative, value-
weighted (equally-weighted), market-adjusted returns of treatment stocks and control stocks. The treatment
stocks are all stocks with media attention and any open short positions on the day of the referendum, whereas
the control stocks have an open short position but no media attention. The control stocks are matched to
the treatment stocks based on size and supersector. The ﬁrst (second) column reports the value-weighted
(equally-weighted) returns of the control stocks and treated stocks, respectively. The third column reports
the diﬀerence in returns between the two. Returns are expressed as percentages. T-statistics are reported
in brackets below the estimates.
Control Treatment Treatment - Control
Panel A: Value-weighted
5-day cumulative return -0.503 -3.515 -3.989
(-0.296) (-2.004) (-2.127)
4-day cumulative return -0.49 -3.401 -3.666
(-0.390) (-2.016) (-2.155)
3-day cumulative return -0.212 -4.391 -4.599
(-0.244) (-3.277) (-3.248)
2-day cumulative return -0.336 -3.696 -3.684
(-0.378) (-2.440) (-1.988)
1-day return -0.001 -0.028 -0.026
(-0.114) (-3.043) (-2.200)
Panel B: Equally-weighted
5-day cumulative return -2.420 -4.258 -1.838
(-1.304) (-3.415) (-1.708)
4-day cumulative return -1.746 -3.974 -2.228
(-1.077) (-2.907) (-2.458)
3-day cumulative return -0.797 -3.811 -3.014
(-0.840) (-2.203) (-1.902)
2-day cumulative return -0.894 -2.837 -1.943
(-0.887) (-1.606) (-0.931)
1-day return -0.002 -0.014 -0.012
(-0.253) (-1.529) (-0.977)
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3.4.2 Further Results
For a further analysis, the treatment sample includes four groups of stocks: stocks with
open short positions (independently from media attention), stocks with media attention
(independently from short positions), stocks with media attention and short positions, and
stocks with open short positions but no media attention. The possible control stocks are
to be chosen among all stocks that cannot be included in the treatment sample considered
because they do not have the characteristics required. They are found by ﬁrst identifying all
stocks in the same ICB supersector, and then selecting among these the one with the market
value closest to that of the treatment stocks. This procedure is applied for each diﬀerent
group in the treatment sample.
Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 present the average cumulative return of the 4 diﬀerent groups of
treatment stocks and of the matched control stocks for the UK and for other EU countries,
respectively. The treatment stocks in Panel A are all stocks with open short positions; in
Panel B, all stocks with media coverage; Panel C includes all stocks with media attention
and disclosed short positions, and Panel D all stocks with open short positions and no media
attention. The cumulative returns are the 1-day to 5-day, cumulative, market-adjusted
returns after the Brexit referendum.
For the UK, Panel A in Table 3.6 shows that, after the referendum, stocks with an open
short position did not exhibit signiﬁcantly higher losses compared to non-shorted stocks in
the same supersector with a similar size. Furthermore, Table 3.8 Panel A shows that larger
ﬁrms with an open short position actually signiﬁcantly outperform after the referendum
compared to their matches without short positions. This could be attributed to the large
number of short position reductions after the referendum. The average percentage of short
position in the month before the Brexit is 1.11%, but in the month after the Brexit this value
is reduced to 1.08%. The diﬀerence of 0.17 percentage points is signiﬁcant (t-stat=2.973)
and indicates that a stock with an open short position is much more likely to proﬁt from the
positive return eﬀect of a short position reduction (see, Boehmer, Duong, and Huszár, 2018,
for an example on the Japanese disclosure regime).
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Furthermore, Panel B in Table 3.6 shows that, compared to their matches, stocks with
media attention did not suﬀer signiﬁcantly higher losses; this result also holds for larger
stocks. In Panel C, the treatment stocks are stocks with both media attention and an open
short position on the day after the referendum. After the referendum, stocks with media
attention and an open short positions also did not lose to a signiﬁcantly higher degree than
their matches. The same holds for stocks with an open short position and no media attention.
For larger stocks, Table 3.8 shows that the post-referendum returns are -2.87 percentage
points lower for stocks with media attention and an open short position. However, this
eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, these results show that, on an equally-weighted
basis, in the UK public short positions did not worsen the post-referendum adverse reaction of
shorted stocks compared to their matches; moreover, the same can be said of media attention
in general, which also had no negative inﬂuence on post-referendum returns. These results
do not test the additional eﬀect media attention has on a shorted stock, therefore they do
not stand in contrast to the main results reported above.
Table 3.7 reports the results of the matching approach for all EU countries excluding
the UK. In Panel A, stocks with an open short position are shown to underperform their
matches. For large stocks, the diﬀerence in return is not statistically signiﬁcant. This stands
somewhat in contrast to the UK results, where stocks with an open short position do not
signiﬁcantly underperform the matched stocks. This may be because in the EU the number
of short position reductions after the referendum are fewer than in the UK.34
34The barplot in Panel B, Figure 3.7, conﬁrms the lower number of short position reductions (downticks)
in the other European countries excluding the UK after the referendum.
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Table 3.6: Equally-weighted matching approach results for UK stocks
This table reports the cumulative, equally-weighted, market-adjusted returns after the Brexit referendum
of treatment stocks and control stocks. The treatment stocks are: in Panel A all stocks with at least an
open short position on the day of the referendum, in Panel B all stocks with media coverage, in Panel C
all stocks with media attention and disclosed short positions, and in Panel D all stocks with short positions
and no media attention. The ﬁrst column reports the equally-weighted returns of the control stocks. The
second column reports the equally-weighted returns of the treatment stocks. The third column reports the
diﬀerence in returns between the two. Stock are matched on market value and supersector. Returns are
expressed as percentages. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the estimates.
Control stocks Treatment Treatment - Control
Panel A: Short positions
5-day cumulative return -6.162 -5.265 0.897
(-5.597) (-7.608) (0.667)
4-day cumulative return -5.351 -5.351 0.000
(-5.159) (-7.989) (0.000)
3-day cumulative return -4.541 -4.926 -0.385
(-6.615) (-7.292) (-0.458)
2-day cumulative return -4.638 -5.218 -0.580
(-6.328) (-7.384) (-0.667)
1-day return -0.018 -0.022 -0.004
(-3.758) (-5.108) (-0.713)
Panel B: Media attention
5-day cumulative return -5.101 -5.170 -0.069
(-3.639) (-3.545) (-0.612)
4-day cumulative return -4.578 -4.635 -0.057
(-4.820) (-4.781) (-0.519)
3-day cumulative return -2.057 -2.135 -0.077
(-3.457) (-3.735) (-0.293)
2-day cumulative return 0.342 0.397 0.054
(0.560) (0.708) (0.174)
1-day return 0.006 0.006 0.000
(1.710) (1.767) (-0.178)
Panel C: Media attention and short positions
5-day cumulative return -8.292 -4.625 3.667
(-2.547) (-2.915) (1.449)
4-day cumulative return -7.185 -4.667 2.518
(-2.271) (-3.777) (0.840)
3-day cumulative return -6.062 -5.606 0.456
(-1.626) (-2.880) (0.130)
2-day cumulative return -5.766 -5.886 -0.120
(-1.292) (-2.178) (-0.030)
1-day return -0.026 -0.032 -0.006
(-1.046) (-1.810) (-0.276)
Panel D: Short positions and no media attention
5-day cumulative return -6.037 -5.307 0.730
(-5.104) (-5.314) (0.550)
4-day cumulative return -5.175 -5.395 -0.220
(-4.752) (-5.998) (-0.187)
3-day cumulative return -4.619 -4.882 -0.263
(-6.800) (-6.881) (-0.305)
2-day cumulative return -3.859 -5.174 -1.316
(-5.569) (-7.051) (-1.504)
1-day return -0.013 -0.021 -0.008
(-2.927) (-4.794) (-1.422)
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Table 3.7: Equally-weighted matching approach results for EU (excluding UK) stocks
This table reports the cumulative, equally-weighted, market-adjusted returns after the Brexit referendum
of treatment stocks and control stocks. The treatment stocks are: in Panel A all stocks with at least an
open short position on the day of the referendum, in Panel B all stocks with media coverage, in Panel C
all stocks with media attention and disclosed short positions, and in Panel D all stocks with short positions
and no media attention. The ﬁrst column reports the equally-weighted returns of the control stocks. The
second column reports the equally-weighted returns of the treatment stocks. The third column reports the
diﬀerence in returns between the two. Stock are matched on market value and supersector. Returns are
expressed as percentages. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the estimates.
Control Treatment Treatment - Control
Panel A: Short positions
5-day cumulative return 0.373 -0.874 -1.247
(0.682) (-2.203) (-1.950)
4-day cumulative return 0.325 -0.698 -1.023
(0.679) (-1.783) (-1.779)
3-day cumulative return 0.513 -0.326 -0.839
(1.377) (-0.916) (-1.816)
2-day cumulative return 0.912 -0.153 -1.065
(2.375) (-0.427) (-2.338)
1-day return 0.010 0.006 -0.004
(3.871) (2.226) (-1.406)
Panel B: Media attention
5-day cumulative return 2.089 1.876 -0.214
(4.588) (3.803) (-1.695)
4-day cumulative return 2.000 1.827 -0.174
(5.249) (4.277) (-1.309)
3-day cumulative return 2.970 2.748 -0.222
(7.934) (6.895) (-1.818)
2-day cumulative return 3.665 3.516 -0.149
(8.783) (8.134) (-1.204)
1-day return 0.022 0.021 -0.001
(7.489) (6.836) (-1.711)
Panel C: Media attention and short positions
5-day cumulative return 1.763 -4.258 -6.021
(1.098) (-2.286) (-5.694)
4-day cumulative return 1.681 -3.974 -5.655
(1.011) (-2.193) (-3.577)
3-day cumulative return 0.353 -3.811 -4.164
(0.397) (-2.203) (-2.439)
2-day cumulative return 0.818 -2.837 -3.655
(0.707) (-1.606) (-2.677)
1-day return 0.011 -0.014 -0.024
(1.918) (-1.529) (-2.582)
Panel D: Short positions and no media attention
5-day cumulative return -5.519 -0.680 4.838
(-2.685) (-1.081) (2.347)
4-day cumulative return -4.964 -0.510 4.454
(-2.403) (-0.887) (2.155)
3-day cumulative return -4.504 -0.126 4.378
(-5.393) (-0.351) (4.898)
2-day cumulative return -3.716 0.000 3.717
(-4.464) (0.001) (4.302)
1-day return -0.013 0.007 0.019
(-2.549) (2.591) (3.604)
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Table 3.8: Value-weighted matching approach results for UK stocks
This table reports the cumulative, value-weighted, market-adjusted returns after the Brexit referendum of
treatment stocks and control stocks. The treatment stocks are: in Panel A all stocks with at least an open
short position on the day of the referendum, in Panel B all stocks with media coverage, in Panel C all stocks
with media attention and disclosed short positions, and in Panel D all stocks with short positions and no
media attention. The ﬁrst column reports the value-weighted returns of the control stocks. The second
column reports the value-weighted returns of the treatment stocks. The third column reports the diﬀerence
in returns between the two. Stock are matched on market value and supersector. Returns are reported in
percentage. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the estimates.
Control Treatment Treatment - Control
Panel A: Short positions
5-day cumulative return -5.064 -2.474 2.881
(-5.587) (-3.291) (2.862)
4-day cumulative return -4.366 -2.519 2.017
(-5.392) (-3.724) (2.217)
3-day cumulative return -4.42 -2.884 1.592
(-5.934) (-4.315) (1.822)
2-day cumulative return -5.061 -3.736 1.536
(-6.181) (-5.137) (1.643)
1-day return -0.031 -0.014 0.018
(-5.829) (-2.891) (2.716)
Panel B: Media attention
5-day cumulative return -1.053 0.108 -0.097
(-0.675) (0.074) (-0.168)
4-day cumulative return -0.41 0.481 -0.201
(-0.299) (0.371) (-0.367)
3-day cumulative return 0.335 0.857 -0.476
(0.26) (0.663) (-0.861)
2-day cumulative return 0.024 0.923 -0.218
(0.016) (0.68) (-0.357)
1-day return -0.013 0.001 0.004
(-1.333) (0.119) (1.134)
Panel C: Media attention and short positions
5-day cumulative return -1.445 -3.777 0.014
(-0.209) (-1.565) (0.003)
4-day cumulative return -1.004 -4.416 -1.523
(-0.157) (-2.205) (-0.308)
3-day cumulative return -1.924 -6.050 -2.873
(-0.376) (-3.415) (-0.691)
2-day cumulative return -0.764 -7.809 -5.720
(-0.123) (-3.180) (-1.224)
1-day return -0.001 -0.047 -0.039
(-0.030) (-2.902) (-1.503)
Panel D: Short positions and no media attention
5-day cumulative return -3.502 -2.361 1.996
(-5.268) (-2.992) (1.972)
4-day cumulative return -2.668 -2.356 1.103
(-4.430) (-3.309) (1.168)
3-day cumulative return -2.925 -2.612 1.160
(-4.842) (-3.713) (1.256)
2-day cumulative return -3.209 -3.385 0.323
(-5.340) (-4.480) (0.344)
1-day return -0.020 -0.011 0.008
(-4.653) (-2.204) (1.257)
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Table 3.9: Value-weighted matching approach results for EU (excluding UK) stockss
This table reports the cumulative, value-weighted, market-adjusted returns after the Brexit referendum of
treatment stocks and control stocks. The treatment stocks are: in Panel A all stocks with at least an open
short position on the day of the referendum, in Panel B all stocks with media coverage, in Panel C all stocks
with media attention and disclosed short positions, and in Panel D all stocks with short positions and no
media attention. The ﬁrst column reports the value-weighted returns of the control stocks. The second
column reports the value-weighted returns of the treatment stocks. The third column reports the diﬀerence
in returns between the two. Stock are matched on market value and supersector. Returns are reported in
percentage. T-statistics are reported in brackets below the estimates.
Control Treatment Treatment - Control
Panel A: Short positions
5-day cumulative return 0.357 -0.351 -0.669
(0.962) (-0.987) (-1.536)
4-day cumulative return 0.155 -0.194 -0.331
(0.465) (-0.585) (-0.837)
3-day cumulative return -0.187 -0.251 -0.012
(-0.606) (-0.856) (-0.033)
2-day cumulative return -0.305 -0.388 -0.064
(-1.016) (-1.270) (-0.177)
1-day return 0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(1.258) (-1.459) (-2.213)
Panel B: Media attention
5-day cumulative return -2.21 -2.645 -0.463
(-5.438) (-6.336) (-3.022)
4-day cumulative return -2.039 -2.46 -0.448
(-5.189) (-6.032) (-2.86)
3-day cumulative return -2.024 -2.528 -0.525
(-5.531) (-6.623) (-3.231)
2-day cumulative return -2.19 -2.593 -0.421
(-5.524) (-6.438) (-2.977)
1-day return -0.017 -0.02 -0.003
(-6.113) (-7.116) (-3.176)
Panel C: Media attention and short positions
5-day cumulative return 0.397 -3.515 -4.284
(0.333) (-2.004) (-3.236)
4-day cumulative return 0.567 -3.401 -4.322
(0.551) (-2.016) (-3.047)
3-day cumulative return 0.200 -4.391 -4.854
(0.260) (-3.277) (-4.108)
2-day cumulative return -0.238 -3.696 -3.462
(-0.257) (-2.440) (-3.157)
1-day return 0.004 -0.028 -0.032
(1.225) (-3.043) (-3.750)
Panel D: Short positions and no media attention
5-day cumulative return -0.035 -0.141 -0.167
(-0.087) (-0.394) (-0.341)
4-day cumulative return -0.281 0.019 0.240
(-0.793) (0.057) (0.550)
3-day cumulative return -0.419 0.023 0.408
(-1.269) (0.079) (1.030)
2-day cumulative return -0.399 -0.169 0.146
(-1.186) (-0.552) (0.359)
1-day return 0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.835) (-0.492) (-1.19)
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In Panel B, stocks with media attention on June 24, 2016, directly after the referendum,
seem to outperform the market returns; however, their return is still signiﬁcantly lower than
that of the matched stocks. The value-weighted returns in Table 3.9, Panel B, show that
large stocks with media attention signiﬁcantly underperform the market and their matched
counterparts as well. Compared to the UK, media coverage of EU stocks could be more
unfavorable, causing the media attention to have a negative eﬀect on the post-referendum
returns, whereas in the UK the media coverage may be more balanced.
3.5 Conclusion
This analysis of the stock returns around the Brexit referendum is able to establish that
media interest for publicly shorted stocks has proven to signiﬁcantly intensify the negative
reaction to the referendum outcome, this eﬀect being more pronounced for the UK stocks.
This ﬁnding strongly suggests that, in times of economic upheaval, media attention on stocks
with a disclosed short position has a measurable inﬂuence on their returns. This reported
eﬀect can be seen as a risk arising from the European disclosure regime, whose stated aim
is to ensure the transparency of short positions without unduly detracting from the beneﬁts
that short selling provides to the quality and eﬃciency of markets (European Securities
and Markets Authorities, 2012, (5) p.L86/2). In fact, the disclosure rules mandated by it,
facilitating access and analysis of short-selling data previously out of reach of the wide public,
also seem to have the unintended eﬀect of developing and intensifying the interaction between
media and markets. This case study oﬀers ﬁrst evidence of this phenomenon, showing that
publicly shorted stocks are negatively aﬀected by media attention after a market downturn.
The outcome of the Brexit referendum oﬀers a unique possibility to study the eﬀect of
media attention on stocks with an open short position and this for two reasons. First, it came
as a surprise and thus triggered sudden and complete stock price adjustments in the days
following the referendum. Second, it aﬀected all stocks in the European Union making this
a unique example where media attention is similar for all stocks. This stands in contrast to
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the relatively small number of stocks with both media attention and an open short position.
Extending the analysis to calmer periods will be necessary to be able to conclusively make
an assertion on the eﬀect of media attention on shorted stocks.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Additional Tables
Table 3.10: Sources for national short position disclosure data
Weblinks to the regulatory authorities websites in the European Union countries. The short position data
can be collected from these websites. These websites were last visited on January 27, 2018.
Country Link
Austria https://webhost.fma.gv.at/ShortSelling/pub/www/QryNetShortPositions.aspx
Belgium http://www.fsma.be/en/Supervision/fm/ma/shortselling.aspx
Finland http://www.ﬁnanssivalvonta.ﬁ/en/Supervision/Market_supervision/Short_positions/
Previous_positions/Pages/Previous_positions.aspx
France http://www.amf-france.org/en_US/Acteurs-et-produits/Marches-ﬁnanciers-et-infrastructures/
Ventes-a-decouvert/Consolidation-des-publications.html
Germany https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ebanzwww/wexsservlet?page.navid=
nlpstarttonlpstart_new&nlp_search_param.extended_search=true&session.sessionid=
d29e7e68660725ada211383360a5c17d
Greece http://www.hcmc.gr/en_US/web/portal/shortselling1
Hungary https://www.kozzetetelek.hu/en/short_selling/list
Ireland http://www.centralbank.ie/regulation/securities-markets/shortselling/Pages/
PublicDisclosure.aspx
Italy http://www.consob.it/mainen/markets/short_selling/intro_updated_data.html?queryid=
ultimasegnalazioneSS&resultmethod=ultimavenditascoperto&maxres=1&search=1&
symblink=/mainen/markets/short_selling/pnc_updated_data.html
Luxembourg http://shortselling.cssf.lu/
Netherlands http://www.afm.nl/en/professionals/registers/alle-huidige-registers.aspx?type=\protect\
T1\textbraceleft129CD296-003C-4D56-8633-E1C7A83A9820\protect\T1\textbraceright
Poland https://rss.knf.gov.pl/RssOuterView/
Portugal http://web3.cmvm.pt/english/sdi/emitentes/shortselling/index.cfm
Spain http://www.cnmv.es/portal/Consultas/Busqueda.aspx?id=29
Sweden http://www.ﬁ.se/Folder-EN/Startpage/Register/Short-Selling/
United Kingdom http://www.fca.org.uk/ﬁrms/markets/international-markets/eu/short-selling-regulations/
notiﬁcations-disclosures
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Table 3.11: Summary of the largest disclosed short positions after the Brexit
Summary of the largest disclosed short positions from June 23, 2016 (the day of the referendum) to June 29,
2016. For each day, the four largest positions are reported. For each positions, position holder, issuer and
position size expressed as percentages are reported as they appear in the disclosures themselves. Furthermore,
each position is labeled as a downtick or an uptick according to the previous disclosure. The uptick or
downtick size is also expressed as percentages. The last column indicates the sector of the issuer ﬁrm.
Date Position Holder Issuer
Position Size
in %
Downtick
or Uptick
Size of Uptick
or Downtick
Sector
June 23, 2016
Odey Asset Management LLP Lancashire Holdings LTD 5.05 Downtick -0.19
Financial
Services
Odey Asset Management LLP Ashmore Group PLC 4.23 Downtick -0.11
Financial
Services
Odey Asset Management LLP Tullow Oil PLC 4.20 Downtick -0.12 Oil and gas
Discovery Capital Management, LLC Ocado Group PLC 3.75 Uptick 0.06 Retail
June 24, 2016
Discovery Capital Management, LLC Ocado Group PLC 3.90 Uptick 0.15 Retail
Jericho Capital Asset Management L.P. Ocado Group PLC 3.90 Downtick -0.32 Retail
Henderson Global Investors Marston's plc 2.37 Downtick -0.11 Travel
Odey Asset Management LLP INTU Properties PLC 2.26 Uptick 0.11 Real estate
June 27, 2016
Odey Asset Management LLP Ashmore Group PLC 4.38 Uptick 0.15 Financial Services
UBS Global Asset Management (UK) Ltd New Melrose Industries PLC 3.93 Downtick -0.44 Construction and materials
Odey Asset Management LLP INTU Properties PLC 2.36 Uptick 0.1 Real estate
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited Carillion PLC 2.31 Uptick 0.06 Industrial goods
June 28, 2016
Discovery Capital Management, LLC Ocado Group PLC 4.09 Uptick 0.19 Retail
Jericho Capital Asset Management L.P. Ocado Group PLC 4.02 Uptick 0.12 Retail
Odey Asset Management LLP INTU Properties PLC 2.40 Uptick 0.04 Real estate
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited Brammer PLC 2.30 Uptick 0.01 Industrial goods
June 29, 2016
Schroder Investment Management Limited J.D. Wetherspoon PLC 1.41 Uptick 0.03 Travel
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited BBA Aviation PLC 1.10 Uptick 0.04 Travel
BlackRock Institutional Trust Company, National
Association
Firstgroup PLC 1.03 Downtick -0.25 Travel
Marshall Wace LLP CYBG PLC 1.03 Uptick 0.05 Banks
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(a) Panel A: UK
(b) Panel B: Europe
Figure 3.3: Short position disclosures
This ﬁgure shows the daily total number of short position disclosures from November 5, 2012 to November
1, 2016. Panel A shows the short positions disclosed in the UK and Panel B those disclosed in all other EU
countries. The red vertical line indicates the day of the Brexit referendum, June 23, 2016.
117
3.6.2 General Turnover Calculation
In the empirical analysis, I compute turnover as the value of daily traded stocks divided
by their respective market capitalization. In Datastream codes this translates in (V O ∗ P ∗
U.P )/MV , where VO is the daily number of shares traded adjusted for capital changes; P is
the adjusted price; U.P reports the units in which the price is reported, and MV is the market
capitalization of the stock. For Germany, VO cannot be used because it only reports the
trading volume on the Frankfurt stock exchange (a detailed analysis of the German trading
volume can be found in the next subsection of the appendix). The price variable P must be
multiplied with U.P (reported units of P) because for some companies in the UK price is
not reported in pounds but rather in pence, making this adjustment necessary.
In the existing literature, Ferreira and Matos (2008) calculate the daily turnover using
the number of stocks traded and the number of shares outstanding. In Datastream codes, the
turnover is calculated as follows: V O/(NOSH/AF )), where NOSH is the number of shares
outstanding not adjusted for capital changes and AF is the adjustment factor, which indicates
which kind of capital changes have been made, so that the number of shares outstanding
can be adjusted for this factor.
I compare these two methods for calculating the turnover and ﬁnd that they obtain the
same trading turnover measure. This exercise assesses the data quality in Datastream and
conﬁrms that the datatypes in Datastream are correctly coordinated, because calculating
the trading turnover using diﬀerent variables does not change the result.
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3.6.3 Germany Trading Volume
Since Ince and Porter (2006) reviewed the data quality of Datastream (DS)  examining the
return data in Datastream and comparing it to the data for the US market available on CRSP,
 and found signiﬁcant data errors, the importance of data screenings has become evident.
For the German market, I have access to monthly trading volume data available from the
Deutsche Börse (German Stock Exchange, from here on DB) and use it to investigate the
quality of the trading volume data gathered from Datastream.
For Germany, downloading the trading volume data presents a challenge in itself, due
to the diﬀerent data type codes. For other countries except Japan, the trading volume has
data code VO, whereas in Germany four diﬀerent data codes are available for the trading
volume measured in number of shares: VZ, VO, VC and VQ. Table 3.12 summarizes the
available data codes in Datastream for the German volume in number of shares. Choosing
the code to use in order to select the data required some reﬂection. VO is not appropriate
for Germany because, returning only the number of shares traded on the Frankfurt stock
exchange, it signiﬁcantly underestimates the number of shares traded, since the Frankfurt
stock exchange is neither the only nor the largest stock exchange in Germany. VQ only
reports the trading volume on the stock exchange on which the stock is predominantly
traded, and therefore misses again a large part of the trading volume. Furthermore, the
stock exchange with the highest trading volume for a given stock may change over time.
VZ counts every trade double because it counts the sell side and buy side of a trade, thus
inﬂating the total trading volume of a stock. VC returns the total trading volume of the
stock across all German stock exchanges and is therefore the code which generates the most
accurate picture of stock demand on the German market.
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Table 3.12: List of available German trading volume variables in Datastream
This Table summarizes the data codes in Datastream associated with German trading volume measured in
the number of shares.
Data code Data description
VZ Trading volume on all stock exchanges, sell side and buy side.
VO Trading volume in Frankfurt
VC Entire trading volume of any given stock on all exchanges
VQ Trading volume of a stock on the exchange it is mostly traded on
The trading volume data gathered from the DB35 reports the trading volume of a stock
in one month for the Frankfurt stock exchange and the Xetra stock exchange, as well as the
sum of these two stock exchanges. For my purposes, I compare the data from DB to the VC
Datastream code. Since the latter includes a larger number of stock exchanges, I expect the
trading volume obtained from Datastream VC data to be larger on average than that from
the DB.
To allow a meaningful comparison with the trading volume reﬂected by the DB data, the
trading volume obtained with Datastream has to be adapted, since the Datastream data is
adjusted for capital changes while the DB data is not. This means that, in order to compare
the trading volume from the two data sources, I have to either remove the adjustment of the
Datastream trading volume or measure it in Euro, which has the same eﬀect because, after a
capital change, the value of the shares stays the same. To remove the adjustment for capital
changes, Datastream VC data has to be multiplied with the adjustment factor (data code
AF). Furthermore, to check the validity of the Datastream data, it is necessary to convert
the trading volume in number of shares into trading volume in value: to this end it has to
be multiplied with the adjusted price of the same trading date (data code P). Lastly, I have
to aggregate to a monthly level the daily data I gathered, by calculating the sum over all
35The trading volume reported by the Deutsche Börse can be found at: http://www.
deutsche-boerse-cash-market.com/dbcm-en/instruments-statistics/statistics/cash-market-statistics/
order-book-statistics, last accessed July 20, 2019.
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trading days. To account for missing data in Datastream, I only compare the months with
more than 20 trading days.
Figure 3.4 compares the monthly trading volume in number of shares between DB and
DS. As expected, the DB volume is in general lower because it does not include the trading
volume of smaller stock exchanges such as the Stuttgart, Berlin or Hamburg stock exchanges.
The correlation between the DS and DB trading volume over time is 0.989, conﬁrming that
the data quality available in DS is high. Therefore, to measure the trading activity in German
stocks it is reasonable to use the trading volume variable VC available in DS.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison between monthly Deutsche Börse and Datastream trading volumes
in number of shares traded
The monthly volume reported on the Deutsche Börse website for each stock traded is aggregated and com-
pared to the Datastream trading volume of the same stocks. The Datastream data is daily data aggregated
at monthly level. The monthly number of shares traded are reported in millions.
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3.6.4 Short Positions and Stock Returns
Figure 3.5: Aixtron short position reductions and increases vs. stock price
This ﬁgure shows the daily short positions reductions and increases disclosed from November 05, 2012 to
January 23, 2017. Each color in the barplots shows the diﬀerent short sellers. The line graph is the stock
price of the Aixtron stock.
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3.6.5 Brexit vs. Referendum
When investigating the media coverage of the shorted stocks, it is important to choose
accurately which term to use in order to ﬁnd an appropriate measure for the media coverage.
In Figure 3.6, the number of articles with the tags Brexit, Referendum, and Brexit and
Referendum is plotted. For each of these three tags, we observe an increase in number of
articles after the day of the Brexit referendum. The tag Brexit is consistently used more
frequently than the other two. This indicates that, although the Brexit itself will not happen
for a few years after the referendum, the media coverage and the tagging algorithm from
the BBC Juicer is using the term Brexit in connection to the outcome of the referendum,
justifying the use of the Brexit tag to analyze the media coverage of shorted stocks in
connection to the Brexit referendum outcome.
Figure 3.6: Comparison of media coverage with the term referendum vs. Brexit
This line graph plots the number of articles published with the tag referendum (solid black line), the tag
Brexit (dashed black line) and the tag Brexit and referendum (blue line). The articles with these tags
are collected from the BBC Juicer API.
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3.6.6 Robustness Check
Table 3.13: Media attention, short selling, and post-referendum returns (5 days)
This table reports the results of the diﬀ-in-diﬀ regression. The dependent variable is the 5-day, cumulative,
market-adjusted return after the Brexit referendum. The variable Short position is a dummy variable with
the value 1 if the stock has an open short position on June 24, 2016. The variable Media attention is a
dummy variable with the value 1 if the stock is covered in the media with relation to the Brexit referendum
on the day after the referendum, June 24, 2016. Short position * Media attention is the interaction term
between the two variables. The variables log(MV) and log(1 + turnover) are, respectively, the logarithm of
the market capitalization of the stock and the logarithm of the trading turnover of the stock. The trading
turnover is the quotient of number of shares traded to the number of shares outstanding in a stock. The
ﬁrst two columns report the regression results for all UK stocks and the last two columns for all countries
in the EU excluding the UK. The t-statistics are reported in brackets below the coeﬃcient values.
UK EU
Short selling 0.300∗∗ 0.111 0.168 0.592∗∗∗
(2.524) (0.901) (1.139) (4.470)
Media attention 0.927∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗ −0.131 0.362
(3.002) (2.285) (−0.398) (1.151)
Short position * Media attention −0.957∗∗ −0.791∗ −0.098 −0.465
(−2.019) (−1.680) (−0.228) (−1.115)
log(MV) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(3.421) (2.016)
log(1 + turnover) −2.136 70.867∗∗∗
(−0.355) (7.356)
Constant −0.037 −0.163∗∗ −0.439∗∗∗ −0.242∗∗∗
(−1.383) (−2.211) (−3.390) (−5.075)
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3.6.7 Event Study
In order to analyze the returns yielded by stocks shorted during the period around the Brexit
referendum, I conduct event studies using a market model whose parameters (intercept and
slope) are estimated within the period from November 1, 2012 (introduction of the disclosure
regime) to June 22, 2016 (day preceding the Brexit referendum). This pre-event window has
been chosen because it allows for a long estimation horizon and excludes the post-Brexit
observations. The daily abnormal returns, i.e. the diﬀerence between the actual stock
returns and the expected (normal) returns predicted by the market model, are then used to
estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) across the event window. The CARs are
calculated for the UK and all other European countries separately, using appropriate market
returns for each CAR calculation.
The biases arising from the use of CARs in long-term event studies have been discussed
by Barber and Lyon (1997); however, most of them are not relevant for the short event
window chosen for these event studies.36 Furthermore, Fama (1998) argues that CARs reduce
the bad-model problem that arises from using asset-pricing models to estimate expected
returns. The risk of a bad model problem is further reduced by the use of the market model,
which estimates the expected returns on a ﬁrm-speciﬁc level instead of using methods that
put constraints on the cross-section of expected returns (Fama, 1998). Applying this event
study methodology will give a representative summary of the eﬀect of the Brexit referendum
result on the stock returns of shorted stocks.
A possible alternative to the CARs would be to use the buy-and-hold returns (BAHRs),
but the two methods obtain very similar results for short-horizon studies like the present
one. In Figure 3.7, the number of disclosed short positions is presented in a barplot that
36CARs ignore compounding, which will only results in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results over longer time
horizons. This means that the CARs in this case test the null hypothesis that the daily abnormal returns
are not equal to zero, but not that the abnormal returns over the entire testing periods are equal to zero.
However, for this short time period of daily returns the diﬀerence is minimal.
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indicates whether a short position is a downtick, an uptick or a new position. The cumulative
abnormal returns of the stocks with a disclosed short position between June 1, 2016 and July
24, 2016 are plotted in red on top of the barplot. The event studies for the UK and for all
other EU countries are conducted separately.
The event study for the UK, reported in Panel A of Figure 3.7, shows in the line graph
that the day after the referendum the stocks with a disclosed short position had signiﬁcantly
negative returns compared to the market return. Before the referendum, these stocks had
a slightly negative trend: in this period (June 1, 2016 to June 23, 2016), the cumulative
abnormal return was -1.437% (t = -2.325∗∗∗). During the period after the referendum,
between June 24, 2016 and July 6, 2016, the cumulative abnormal return is -8.736% (t =
-7.518∗∗∗): this unambiguously conﬁrms that the shorted stocks underperformed signiﬁcantly
their expected return. Some evidence of overreaction to the news of the UK planning to leave
the EU can be found in the cumulative abnormal returns until July 6, 2016, during which
period the prices fall and then rebound, although never to the pre-Brexit level. Overall, the
shorted stocks markedly underperform compared to the market return, before rebounding
between July 7, 2016 and July 23, 2016 with a cumulative abnormal return of 4.4239% (t=
7.262∗∗∗).
The barplot in Figure 3.7, Panel A, reports the disclosed short-selling positions in the
UK, diﬀerentiating between uptick, downtick, and new positions. There is a clear spike
of disclosures on June 24, 2016, mostly downticks and, at the same time, the returns fall
signiﬁcantly. The high number of downticks after the referendum may depend on it being a
Friday: since short sellers are not permitted to trade over the weekend, they would close some
of their positions on Fridays in order to reduce the risk, as pointed out by Chen and Singal
(2003), who ﬁnd that speculative short sellers contribute to the weekend eﬀect by covering
their short positions on a Friday  so that they are not short over the weekend  and re-
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opening the position on the following Monday. This behaviour of short sellers contributes to
the weekend eﬀect, which entails positive returns on a Friday and then negative returns on the
following Monday (Chen and Singal, 2003). The weekend following the Brexit referendum,
the short sellers behave according to the weekend eﬀect  covering short positions on Friday
and reopening them on Monday  although this does not have a positive eﬀect on the stock
return on Friday, which is compelling evidence that the majority of other traders is still
selling these stocks. This theory is supported by the increased number of upticks on the
Monday following the Brexit referendum, June 27, 2016. On this Monday, the number of
disclosures falls to 64, with more upticks than downticks, and the stock returns continue
to fall. Furthermore, in the UK 66 new short positions are opened between June 24, 2016
and July 23, 2016, a high number compared to mere 10 during the same time in the other
European countries.
In Panel A, it emerges also that the number of new positions increases substantially after
the Brexit referendum, going from 7 between June 20 and June 23, 2016, to 17 in the four
trading days after the referendum (an increase of 142%). This surge in short positions and
the corresponding cumulative abnormal returns of these stocks in the UK are evidence that
short sellers have good stock picking and timing ability.
In Panel B, the same event study is conducted for the stocks with a disclosed short posi-
tion in all other EU countries, in order to illustrate the diﬀerent reaction in these countries.
Before the referendum, between June 1, 2016 and June 23, 2016, the shorted stocks have
a cumulative abnormal return of -4.1262 (t = -8.521∗∗∗); after the referendum, we see both
an increase in short positions, although not as drastic as in the UK, and also a decrease
in cumulative abnormal returns, again less extreme than in the UK. In non-UK European
countries, the cumulative abnormal return from the day after the referendum to July 6, 2016
amounts to -7.6167% (t = -12.16∗∗∗) which is, again, lower than the cumulative abnormal
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return observed in the UK. In these European countries, the weekend eﬀect is also observed:
on Friday there is a higher number of downticks than upticks. Even so, the cumulative
return does not decrease on the Friday after the referendum, and so the downticks cause a
positive price pressure on these stock markets. The following Monday, the number of upticks
increases compared to downticks, and the returns are signiﬁcantly negative. In the European
countries the eﬀect of the referendum outcome on the returns is signiﬁcantly less extreme.
The returns in Europe and the UK diﬀer signiﬁcantly before the Brexit referendum: the
shorted stocks in the UK present returns that remain close to zero, whereas the returns in
Europe are signiﬁcantly negative and such as one would expect from stocks that are being
shorted. Thus, the returns in the UK before the Brexit suggest that short-seller in the UK
are actively shorting those stocks that would react strongly to the outcome of the Brexit
referendum. In contrast, in the other European countries considered, short sellers are less
focused on shorting stocks that would react strongly to the Brexit referendum outcome,
otherwise the returns before the Brexit would be less negative than in the UK. I do not see
an increase in shorting before the referendum; however, the returns in the UK shows that a
preparation for the Brexit referendum has been made.
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(a) Panel A: UK
(b) Panel B: EU
Figure 3.7: Cumulative returns, new positions, downticks, and upticks around the Brexit
referendum
The line graph shows the cumulative log returns over time of all ﬁrms with a disclosed short position around
the Brexit. The barplot shows the reported disclosures on each trading day since June 1, 2016 until July 15,
2016. Each bar is subdivided into number of downticks (black), number of new positions (dark grey), and
number of upticks (light grey) reported on each day. The highest bar with 74 disclosures is on the day after
the referendum, June 24, 2016. Panel A shows the reported short position changes and the stock return for
Great Britain and Panel B for the rest of the European Union.
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4 Procyclical Leverage in Europe and its Role in Asset
Pricing
Coauthored by: Markus Baltzer and Stefan Reitz
130
4.1 Motivation
Banks' leverage is procyclical. This is emphasized in the paper by Adrian and Shin (2010),
which demonstrates that ﬁnancial intermediaries manage their balance sheets so as to adjust
to changes in asset prices and value-at-risk calculations. Using some simple arithmetics, the
authors show that during a market downturn banks face the devaluation of their assets as
well as a decline in their equity. Assuming relatively constant liabilities, the resulting lever-
age increase forces banks to sell assets. Since leverage constraints are binding for all banks,
sales across all risky assets are to be expected, which are bound to provoke further delever-
aging: this mechanism has been dubbed the loss spiral by Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2009). However, the procyclicality of leverage also contributes to the acceleration of market
upturns. With increasing asset prices, a decline in leverage leaves room for additional asset
purchases ﬁnanced by short-run debt. This expansion of the balance sheet recovers leverage
but also tends to increase asset prices, again revealing the mutually reinforcing nature of the
relationship between market liquidity and leverage. In fact, as has been observed during the
ﬁnancial crisis, these accelerating dynamics have severe consequences outside the ﬁnancial
sector, too.
Thus far, the procyclicality of ﬁnancial intermediaries' balance sheet management has
been empirically documented mainly on the US market. Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian,
Etula, and Muir (2014) show that asset growth and leverage growth exhibit a strong positive
co-movement for US broker-dealer banks, in contrast to non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and households.
The last group, in particular, seems to abstain from active balance sheet management,
leading to a negative correlation between asset growth and leverage. While the reinforcing
balance sheet behavior of ﬁnancial intermediaries has been identiﬁed in Adrian and Shin
(2010), Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) investigate the role of broker-dealer leverage in asset
pricing. Thanks to their ﬁndings, which corroborate the exceptionally high explanatory
power of the leverage factor for pricing a large cross-section of US portfolios, the authors are
able to close the outlined feedback loop of banks' balance sheets and asset market liquidity.
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This paper adds empirical evidence from non-US ﬁnancial markets to this important
relationship between asset prices and ﬁnancial intermediary leverage. Using German and
European data, we follow the approach taken by Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and test
whether shocks to leverage are a useful pricing kernel in a diﬀerent geographical setting. As
a starting point, Figure 4.1 presents the growth rates of total assets and leverage, deﬁned as
(TotalAssets)/(TotalAssets−TotalLiabilities) of diﬀerent groups of German and European
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.37
Figure 4.1 unambiguously conﬁrms that increases in asset values are associated with
increases in leverage, supporting the view that ﬁnancial ﬁrms actively manage their balance
sheets during market upturns and downturns.38 In the rest of the paper, we will show
that the procyclicality of German broker-dealer leverage explains the excess returns of a
large cross-section of test assets. Applying standard two-pass regressions to data ranging
from 1971 to 2016, we ﬁnd that broker-dealer leverage on the German cross-section of stock
market portfolios has an explanatory power similar to competitor models such as the Fama-
French three-factor framework. This is remarkable in the sense that the time series of shocks
to leverage might be quite noisy, while the latter factors are derived from the underlying
test asset returns. The results are conﬁrmed using data from European broker-dealers with
somewhat lower R2s due to the shorter sample ranging from 1999 to 2016. Thus, our results
lend support to the feedback loop described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and stress
the potential of ﬁnancial intermediaries' balance sheet management to accelerate booms and
busts in asset markets.
In addition, recent theoretical contributions such as Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2010)
and Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015) suggest that the leverage price of risk is time-varying in
a predictable fashion. In times of tight funding constraints such as those experienced during
the ﬁnancial crisis, the balance sheet exposure of intermediaries is low, implying a high
marginal value of wealth. Given that low asset prices allow higher expected future returns,
37For details on the grouping of banks see the data section of this paper.
38For example, the Pearson correlation coeﬃcient is 0.73 for German broker-dealer banks.
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broker-dealer leverage should forecast future asset returns. Applying the dynamic asset
pricing (DAPM) model of Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2015a), we test for this systematic
time-variation in the price of risk. In line with Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016), we ﬁnd
that German broker-dealer leverage negatively forecasts one-quarter-ahead returns, thereby
lending support to the proposition that this balance sheet factor is also a driver of the market
price of risk.
Figure 4.1: Leverage growth vs. asset growth
The graphs plot leverage growth (x-axis) against asset growth (y-axis). The ﬁrst three report the relationship
of the leverage and asset growth for German broker-dealer, main, and savings banks. The fourth and ﬁfth
plots report the relationship for European broker-dealer and commercial banks. The last plot shows the
relationship for US broker-dealers.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: The next section describes the
related literature; this is followed by an overview of the cross-sectional empirical approach
and the data used for Germany and Europe; we then develop a DAPM framework for the
diﬀerent regional areas; the last section concludes.
4.2 Related Literature
In his presidential address to the American Finance Association, Cochrane (2011) delivers
a plea for reconsidering the concept of the average investor and discusses intermediated
markets. Investors ﬁnance intermediaries with diﬀerent types of claims such as debt and
equity. When losses appear, the managers of intermediaries will try to avoid bankruptcy
by selling risky assets, thus possibly provoking so-called ﬁre sales" and illiquidity spirals":
hence the importance of balance sheet data from leveraged intermediaries.
Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) take these considerations into account and shift their
attention from measuring the stochastic discount factor (SDF) of the average household to
measuring the SDF of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries ﬁt the assumptions
of modern ﬁnance theory nicely, being sophisticated investors capable of using the whole
spectrum of investment strategies. The authors link information from broker-dealers' balance
sheets data  namely the leverage ratio deﬁned as the ratio of assets to equity  to explain
the cross-sectional variation of asset returns. Indeed, they are able to show that intermediary
leverage has strong pricing potential in the cross-section of US asset returns.
There are several theoretical models that assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries inﬂuence
asset prices. In Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the authors show how funding liquidity
enters the pricing kernel when investors are risk-neutral and face funding constraints. Their
model is concerned with market and funding liquidity. Investors may experience initial losses
which cause funding problems to arise, requiring them to reduce their positions. Under some
circumstances, the result can be liquidity spirals, i.e. the drying up of liquidity when several
investors have to reduce leverage. Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) argue that the leverage of
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ﬁnancial intermediaries can be used as a proxy for funding conditions. Another approach by
Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2010) also considers risk-neutral intermediaries subjected to
a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. In their model, investors' risk appetite may be time-varying
because of the VaR-constraints even if preferences are constant. Asset prices depend on the
level of eﬀective risk aversion and hence on the leverage of the intermediaries  in times of
low intermediary leverage, eﬀective risk aversion is high. As a result, ﬁnancial intermediary
leverage directly enters the equilibrium SDF.
Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015) develop an equilibrium model of the macroeconomy
where intermediaries are subjected to risk-based funding constraints that give rise to an
equilibrium representation, with intermediary leverage as a key state variable. The equi-
librium pricing kernel can be expressed as a function of shocks to ﬁnancial intermediary
leverage, which represents funding conditions, and shocks to output. When intermediaries
experience an adverse shock to their funding, their eﬀective risk aversion endogenously in-
creases as their leverage declines. Therefore, Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015) predict that
the price of risk of intermediary leverage is positive, which is consistent with our empirical
results.
An alternative approach to modeling an intermediary pricing kernel is proposed by He
and Krishnamurthy (2013). In their setup, intermediary wealth, rather than intermediary
leverage, is the key state variable. They argue that ﬁnancial intermediaries are the marginal
investor, and, as a result, the SDF is proportional to the wealth growth of the intermediary
sector, giving an intermediary CAPM. Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2014) develop a closely
related equilibrium asset pricing model with ﬁnancial intermediaries where intermediation
arises as an outcome of principal-agent problems. Their model also predicts that shocks
to intermediary wealth are the relevant measure of systematic risk. In addition, both He
and Krishnamurthy (2013) and Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2014) feature countercyclical
intermediary leverage, thus predicting a negative price of risk of intermediary leverage.
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The ﬁnding that ﬁnancial institutions' balance sheets contain information about the real
economy and expected asset returns has only recently received more attention in empiri-
cal studies. Adrian and Shin (2010) examine the relationship between asset growth and
leverage growth for diﬀerent investor groups. They document that, unlike private house-
holds, for example, security broker-dealers adjust their ﬁnancial leverage aggressively as
economic conditions change. Broker-dealers' active balance sheet management practices re-
sult in highly procyclical leverage, whereas households exhibit a more passive balance sheet
management. Recently, Adrian, Etula, and Shin (2015b), Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010),
Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016), and Etula (2013) have shown that broker-dealer leverage
has a strong predictive power for asset prices. Furthermore, equity forecasts and risk pre-
mia of intermediaries are especially high around ﬁnancial crises (Muir, 2013). The predictive
power of intermediaries' balance sheets for stock and bond returns indicates that they contain
valuable information about the evolution of risk premia over time. Adrian, Etula, and Muir
(2014) connect the cross-section of returns to the exposures to broker-dealer leverage shocks,
showing that broker-dealer leverage can price assets. An adverse shock to the leverage of
intermediaries increases their eﬀective risk aversion endogenously, so that the equilibrium
pricing kernel can be expressed as a function of shocks to the intermediaries' leverage.
Lastly, but importantly, Haddad and Muir (2018) show that the relationship between
intermediaries' balance sheet factors and asset returns is not merely a co-movement. The
authors document a larger resiliency of the risk premia of intermediated assets, such as credit
default swaps and FX, to changes in intermediary risk appetite, implying that intermediary
funding constraints have a strong impact on assets that households can hardly access.
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4.3 Data
To conduct our analysis, we need two sets of information: the data to calculate the balance
sheet factor, and the portfolio returns on which to test the leverage factor.
We follow Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and use shocks to the leverage of intermediaries
as a proxy for shocks to the pricing kernel. Broker-dealer (BD) leverage is deﬁned as:
LeverageBDt =
TotalAssetsBDt
TotalAssetsBDt − TotalLiabilitiesBDt
=
TotalAssetsBDt
TotalEquityBDt
(4.1)
and the leverage factor is then computed as the residual of the AR(1) process of the
leverage series.
We collect leverage and portfolio data for both the European and German market. In
the following, we will give some details on the data used in our analysis.
4.3.1 Leverage
Starting with German ﬁnancial institutions, a relatively long time series comparable to the
database of US studies is available. Aggregate quarterly balance sheet data from June 1971 to
June 2016 of German ﬁnancial intermediaries are obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank's
banking statistics, which groups banks according to their role in the German ﬁnancial system.
The group of banks closest to the US broker-dealers are classiﬁed as depository institutions
larger than savings banks but smaller than the big or money center banks. These ﬁnancial
institutions provide services such as securities brokerage, investment banking, insurance
sales, and mutual fund and pension fund management, which is why in the following we
refer to them as broker-dealer banks. This group of banks comprises relevant ﬁnancial
intermediaries that play a decisive role in the German broker-dealer business. As a robustness
test, we also investigate the role of savings banks' leverage for German asset pricing. Since
this group of ﬁnancial institutions is focused on the regional supply of mortgages and loans
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to small-size ﬁrms, the time series of leverage shocks should not provide any explanatory
power in Fama-MacBeth regressions.39 The Deutsche Bundesbank database also reports
the leverage of the big money center banks  called `main banks'  which are substantially
engaged in providing loans to the public and private sector: for this reason, and due to the
German universal banking system, their business is more balanced. Their aggregate balance
sheet indicators are also used for comparison purposes.
To apply our analysis to a European context, we also build a sample of European broker-
dealers. We use bank-level data of the constituents of the Europe Stoxx600 Banks, which
is a sector index of the Europe Stoxx600 comprising European companies in the banking
sector whose activity is expected to have a signiﬁcant impact on ﬁnancial markets. We cover
the period ranging from the beginning of this index in January 2000 up to June 2016. The
construction of this dataset requires the aggregation of two sources: Datastream for market
data and Bloomberg for the ﬁnancial statements of the ﬁnancial companies. The sample
consists of 80 listed banks operating in continental Europe  including Switzerland  plus
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Scandinavian countries.
Since the prevailing European business model is universal banking, where investment
banking and commercial banking co-exist, albeit in diﬀerent proportions, in the same insti-
tution, we have to investigate whether and how diﬀerent proportions of investment versus
commercial banking aﬀect leverage procyclicality. In our sample, there are banks where the
traditional commercial banking activity is prevalent and other ﬁnancial institutions which
are more focused on investment banking. To identify the latter, we follow the strategy
of Baglioni, Beccalli, Boitani, and Monticini (2013) to distinguish commercial banks from
investment banks. Investment banks are deﬁned as intermediaries whose ratio between in-
terest income and net revenues is below the median ratio of the whole sample of banks;
consequently, commercial banks have a ratio above the median. We check this ratio quar-
terly and allocate the respective ﬁnancial institution to one of the two groups.
39As a ﬁrst indication, we observe a Pearson correlation coeﬃcient of 0.07 between the changes in leverage
ratios of German broker-dealers and savings banks, which reﬂects a diﬀerence in leverage management.
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The banks in the sample are the largest in Europe, and after our classiﬁcation into invest-
ment and commercial banks, many signiﬁcant diﬀerences emerge. Over the whole sample
period, commercial ﬁnancial institutions have a median total asset size of 129 billion euro,
whereas the second group, classiﬁed as investment banks, covers a median total asset size of
204 billion euro. The median ratio between interest income and net revenues signiﬁcantly
exceeds 50%, thus conﬁrming the prevalence of the universal banking business model. The
median level of leverage, measured as total assets over equity for each quarter, is 20.5 for
commercial and 24.7 for investment banks.
Figure 4.2 displays long-term leverage movements for US, German, and European ﬁnan-
cial institutions. For comparability, we standardize each series, setting mean to zero and
using a unit variance. To capture long-term developments, we use ﬁve-year averages. Note
that, due to the limited data availability, the long-term series for European ﬁnancial insti-
tutions do not start before 2004, which excludes these series from a long-term comparison.
For the much longer series for US and German ﬁnancial institutions, we interestingly ﬁnd
comparable ﬁnancial cycles. We observe dips both around the 1987 stock market crash and
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis. Moreover, there also seems to be a widespread long-term
consensus developing in support of the idea of common (global) ﬁnancial cycles followed
by the internationally-oriented ﬁnancial institutions (Rey, 2015). Correlation between the
long-term leverage of US and German broker-dealers exceeds 70%, whereas German main
banks and US broker-dealers show a slightly negative correlation. Even German main banks
and broker-dealers have a comparable low correlation, not exceeding 28%.
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Figure 4.2: Long-term leverage movements
Long-term leverage movements for US, German, and European ﬁnancial institutions. The ﬁrst plot
reports the leverage movements of US broker-dealer banks, the second those of European broker-
dealer and commercial banks, and the last plot the leverage movements of German broker-dealer,
savings and main banks. Each series is standardized to have a mean of zero and a unit variance.
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To identify the potential procyclical behavior of banks' balance sheets, as brieﬂy outlined
in the motivation of this paper, Figure 4.1 plots leverage growth against asset growth. As
conﬁrmed by Table 4.1, containing the respective correlation coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd positive
correlation for all regions and across all banks' business models, with coeﬃcients ranging
between 0.31 and 0.85. This strongly supports the view that ﬁnancial institutions in general
actively manage their balance sheets during market upturns and downturns. Of course, this
does not imply that all banks might be perceived as marginal investors on asset markets. The
literature reviewed above suggests that, rather than regional savings banks, for instance, it
is the broker-dealers that oﬀer the most promising data for analyzing asset portfolio returns,
due to their strong trading activity and constant presence on asset markets.
The diﬀerence in business models can be illustrated by the impact of the ﬁnancial crisis
on the associated balance sheet changes. German savings banks report for 2008 the amount
of 247 billion euro of stocks (68 billion euro) and bonds (179 billion euro), while loans to non-
banks accumulate to 726 billion euro. Total assets sum up to 1071 billion euro in 2008. After
major stock markets plummeted and the ﬁnancial crisis had fully unfolded in the balance
sheets of banks, tradable assets (stocks and bonds) even increased to 270 billion euro. As
a result, total assets also slightly increased and savings banks' balance sheets seem to be
largely unaﬀected.
When looking at the respective group of German broker-dealers, in contrast, the following
interesting observations can be made. These banks report a total of 145 billion euro of stocks
and bonds and total assets amounting to 791 billion euro in 2008. In 2009, a strong decrease
of 47.1% in stocks induced a signiﬁcant decline (-9.5%) of total assets in this banking group
to 723 billion euro.
A similar picture emerges when looking at balance sheet positions of main banks. To-
tal assets also signiﬁcantly declined by 11.7%, mainly driven by the strong balance sheet's
dependence on ﬁnancial assets. However, main banks are much bigger than the above men-
tioned group of German broker-dealers. The four main banks comprise a sum of total assets
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of 1,292 billion euro at the end of 2009. These ﬁgures already show that these banks have
a much broader business model and are much more universal than the ﬁnancial institution
involved in the broker-dealer business. Therefore, we also provide empirical results for this
group of banks as a further robustness test.
With respect to Figure 4.1, the diﬀerence between banks' business models emerges from
the size of the growth rates of leverage and banks' assets. While we ﬁnd growth rates
for broker-dealers quite often exceeding 5%, growth rates for savings banks are typically
conﬁned to lower numbers. This is mirrored in the respective average absolute growth rates.
In contrast to average absolute growth rates of 2.2% (leverage) and 2.4% (assets) for broker-
dealers, the average absolute growth rates for savings banks are 1.3% and 1.6%. Again, the
reason for this diﬀerence in growth rates is the structure of the bank group balance sheets.
Table 4.1: Correlation of leverage and asset growth
This table presents the correlation of intermediaries' leverage growth with asset growth. For German
broker-dealers, main, and savings banks, the correlation is calculated for the period from Q3 1971 to
Q2 2016. For the European commercial and broker-dealer banks, the correlation is calculated from
Q1 2000 to Q4 2016. For comparison purposes, the correlation between US broker-dealer leverage
growth and asset growth is reported for the period from Q3 1971 to Q2 2016. For German data,
we exclude extreme values/outliers linked to the uniﬁcation (Q2-Q3 1990) and to the introduction
of the Euro (Q1 1999).
Germany Europe USA
Broker-dealer Main banks Savings banks Investment Commercial Broker-dealer
Rho 0.73 0.85 0.61 0.31 0.35 0.75
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
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Overall, savings banks, which focus on regional supply of mortgages and loans to small
ﬁrms, typically lack a substantial balance sheet position for market-traded assets such as
stocks and bonds. The contrary is true for broker-dealers, by whom a relatively large fraction
of traded ﬁnancial assets can be found. These substantial diﬀerences in the impact of the
ﬁnancial crisis on banking groups' balance sheets suggest that it should be broker-dealer
leverage that explains asset prices. By contrast, there is very little room for German savings
banks to act as marginal investors. We use the latter proposition as an opportunity for
robustness tests.
4.3.2 Portfolios and Factors
In order to test whether the leverage of intermediaries is able to explain the cross-section of
asset returns, we use for the European market the stock return data of 25 size and book-to-
market portfolios from Kenneth French's data library.40 For the German market, we obtain
portfolio stock return data from Richard Stehle's website of the Humboldt University of
Berlin.41 Here, the asset portfolios are the intersections of German stocks double-sorted in 4
groups by size and 4 groups by book-to-market value. Summing up all possible combinations,
we get the returns of a total of 16 portfolios. In addition, 10 portfolios sorted on momentum
(the past 12 months return) are constructed as in Fama and French (2012). For the European
and the German sample, we choose to include additional German government bond portfolios
with a maturity of 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10 years, as a representative investment in a risk-free
European asset. While the European data set ranges from 2000 to 2016, the German sample
already starts in 1971.
40Kenneth French's data library can be found at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
french/data_library.html, last accessed July 20, 2019.
41A description of the dataset is given by Brückner, Lehmann, Schmidt, and Stehle (2015), found at https:
//www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/de/professuren/bwl/bb/data/fama-french-factors-germany, last accessed August
3, 2019.
143
In a ﬁrst step, we explain these return data with well-known asset pricing models: the
CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), and the four-factor model of
Carhart (1997). For the CAPM, we construct the market factor as the diﬀerence between
the market return and the return of a risk free asset. In the Fama-French three-factor
model, we additionally add a small-minus-big factor (SMB), which is based on ﬁrm size and
measures return diﬀerences between portfolios with small vs. big capitalized companies.
The third factor, high-minus-low (HML), is based on the book-to-market ratio and measures
return diﬀerences between portfolios with high book-to-market ratios minus portfolios with
low book-to-market ratios. Finally, for the Carhart four-factor model we add a momentum
factor (MOM) based on the return diﬀerence between the winner and the loser portfolios of
the past 12 months. All these factors are available for the European data from the Kenneth
French's website and for the German data from Richard Stehle's website.
4.4 Empirical Results from a Linear Factor Model
We investigate the role of broker-dealer leverage in pricing the cross-section of asset returns
using a standard linear factor model.42 As a starting point, the asset pricing literature
assumes that there exists a stochastic discount factor Mt+1 so that
Et[Mt+1Ri,t+1] = 0, (4.2)
where Ri,t+1 denotes the return of asset i in excess of the risk-free rate.
43 The associated
beta representation can be derived using the covariance deﬁnition, so that
Et[Ri,t+1] = −Cov[Mt+1Ri,t+1]
Et[Mt+1]
. (4.3)
42The derivation of the estimators follows Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2015a).
43See, for instance, Cochrane (2005).
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If the percentage shocks to the pricing kernel are linear in the shocks to the vector of k
risk factors (ft+1), i.e.
Mt+1 − Et[Mt+1]
Et[Mt+1]
= λtΣ
−1/2
f ft+1 (4.4)
and assuming a constant λt = Σ
−1/2
f λf ,
44 we ﬁnd
Et[Ri,t+1] = β
′
i,fλf . (4.5)
Regarding the set of risk factors, this paper focuses on an empirical model combining ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries' balance sheet indicators and the market return to explain the excess
returns of test assets. This is motivated by the theoretical contributions reviewed above,
namely that the market return, as a long-run risk factor, and the intermediaries' balance
sheet measure, as an important medium-term risk factor, are both a proxy for shocks to
consumption growth. Aside from their theoretical contributions showing how balance sheet
factors enter the pricing kernel, Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) stress the importance of
information and transaction costs. The latter prevent the average household from partic-
ipating regularly in asset markets, which is why a stochastic discount factor based on the
marginal value of household wealth alone will not accurately reﬂect diﬀerences in assets' ex-
cess returns. This argumentation leaves room to introduce broker-dealers into the analysis,
since they may be perceived as highly-informed agents trading heavily in ﬁnancial markets.
The potential importance of information and transaction costs also allows for a robustness
test, with which we estimate the asset pricing model using balance sheet factors of Ger-
man and European credit banks not focussing on the broker-dealer business.45 Given that
these ﬁnancial institutions have a strong focus on monitoring their borrowers, their balance
44In the next section, the time-variation of prices of risk is explicitly taken into account.
45Unfortunately, data on German household wealth are unavailable.
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sheet factors should be less informative in pricing the cross-section of stocks. All balance
sheet factors are compared using the Fama-French three-factor (FF) and Carhart four-factor
(FF&MOM) models as a benchmark (Fama and French, 1993, Carhart, 1997).46 Reﬂecting
the ongoing discussion in the literature about the exact speciﬁcation of the intermediaries'
balance sheet factor, we will also provide results for both book equity and leverage.47
The risk exposures βi and the prices of risk λf of the above model are estimated
using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two-pass procedure. As a ﬁrst step, risk exposures are
derived from the time-series regression of excess returns Ri,t on the k risk factors ft for each
asset i = 1,...,N:
Ri,t = ci + β
′
i,fft + i,t, i = 1, ..., N. (4.6)
To estimate the cross-sectional price of risk associated with the factors f , the second step
is a cross-sectional regression of time-series excess return means on risk factor exposures
E[Ri,t] = β
′
i,fλf + ζi, i = 1, ..., N, (4.7)
yielding estimates of cross-sectional prices of risk λ.
In line with most of the related literature, we measure the size of pricing errors by means
of the cross-sectional adjusted R2 (adjR2 = 1− σ
2
ζ
σ2R
(N−1
N−k )) and the mean absolute pricing error
(MAPE = 1
N
Σ |ζ|) . In order to correct the standard errors for the pre-estimation of betas,
we report the t-statistics of Shanken (1992). Indeed, shocks to intermediary leverage stem
from a large set of diﬀerent sources, such as a capital regulation, making the leverage factor
a noisy regressor. Although Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) argue that this feature aﬀects
the quality of the ﬁrst-stage time-series regression but not the cross-sectional regression,
Kleibergen and Zhan (2015) indeed stress a potential upward bias of second-stage R2s.
46It has to be borne in mind that, in contrast to the intermediary leverage model, the competitor models
apply factors derived from the returns of the set of test assets.
47Since a large subset of German intermediaries are not listed, however, we are unable to use market
capitalization as a balance sheet factor. See the discussion on book equity versus market capitalization in
Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016). 146
To deal with the problem, we perform the suggested likelihood ratio (LR) test, with which
we test the null-hypothesis of whether the leverage factor betas are all equal to zero against
the alternative hypothesis that the leverage factor betas are unequal to zero.
In the following subsections, we will outline the results of the geographical and temporal
extensions we have made to the work of Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014). First, we apply
and calculate the leverage factor model to data from Germany and, second, we test the
application of the leverage factor model to the broader but shorter sample of European
data.
4.4.1 Broker-Dealer Leverage
Table 4.2 presents the cross-sectional prices of risk for the factor models from Germany. The
table is split into two panels. Panel A presents the pricing performance of the diﬀerent factor
models with respect to our set of 33 test portfolios, including equity and bond portfolios,
while Panel B reports the results obtained using only the equity portfolios sorted on size
and book-to-market as well as momentum. This allows for the identiﬁcation of a potential
specialization of German broker-dealers on stock markets.
Starting the discussion with Panel B, we ﬁnd that the Fama-MacBeth two-step regression
with broker-dealer leverage as single factor performs fairly well in explaining the cross-
sectional excess returns with an adjusted R2 of 53%. The positive and signiﬁcant estimate λ
conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) and reveals the reinforcing balance
sheet behavior of the broker-dealers in Germany. By contrast, the market factor exhibits low
explanatory power. The leverage factor model also outperforms the FF model, which yields
an adjusted R2 of 18.2%. Only the FF&MOM model does better, obtaining an adjusted R2
of 78.5%. Regarding the alpha coeﬃcient, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant and relatively
large estimate of 10.2%, which is somewhat bigger than in the CAPM model but smaller
than in the FF model.48 Overall, our ﬁndings suggest that the FF&MOM model does better
48Only the FF&MOM yields a statistically insigniﬁcant intercept.
147
in explaining the excess returns of the cross-section of test assets than the leverage factor
model. However, as pointed out in Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010), the high adjusted
R2 may be misleading, because a relatively large number of factors may easily capture the
variation of returns of highly correlated test assets.49
Table 4.2: Fama-MacBeth regressions for German broker-dealer leverage
This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression for Germany. Panel A reports the results
for 16 size and book-to-market portfolios, 10 momentum portfolios and 7 German bond portfolios sorted by
maturity. The factors used are market, small-minus-big (SMB), high-minus-low (HML), momentum (MOM )
and leverage (LevFac). Panel B presents only the results of the Fama-MacBeth regression for 16 size and
book-to-market portfolios and 10 momentum portfolios, excluding the 7 German bond portfolios. The 33
portfolios in Panel A and the 26 portfolios in Panel B are used to test the performance of the following
ﬁve factor models: CAPM, Fama-French three-factor model (FF ), Fama-French three-factor model with
momentum factor (FF&MOM ), leverage factor model (Lev), and leverage factor model with market factor
(Lev&Mrkt). Portfolios, Fama-French and momentum factors are provided by the Humboldt University of
Berlin. The leverage is calculated from the monthly German broker-dealer balance sheet data obtained from
the Bundesbank and then aggregated to quarterly data. LevFac is the residual of the AR(1). The results
are for annualized quarterly data from Q3 1971 to Q2 2016. The Shanken t-statistics are reported under the
Fama-MacBeth prices of risk. The likelihood ratio (LR) test statistics and p-values are reported in the last
row. The one-percent critical value for the LR test is 134.64 (bonds included) and 109.96 (bonds excluded).
Panel A: Bond portfolios included
CAPM FF FF&MOM Lev Lev&Mrkt
Constant 1.719∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 8.102∗∗∗ 2.144∗∗∗
(3.833) (6.464) (2.418) (4.138) (4.146)
Market 9.459∗∗∗ 9.162∗∗∗ 11.189∗∗∗ 11.058∗∗∗
(3.133) (3.052) (3.723) (3.639)
SMB −3.253∗ −2.862
(−1.805) (−1.565)
HML 2.980 5.537∗∗∗
(1.608) (2.937)
MOM 9.410∗∗∗
(3.398)
LevFac 9.827∗∗∗ 9.541∗∗
(3.088) (2.336)
Adj. R2 0.526 0.514 0.906 0.128 0.662
MAPE 15.653 13.862 12.806 26.057 15.602
LR 711.68 1642.74 1956.46 32.88 746.28
p-Value 0 0 0 1 0
Panel B: Bond portfolios excluded
CAPM FF FF&MOM Lev Lev&Mrkt
7.826∗∗ 16.541∗∗∗ −6.009 10.165∗∗∗ 10.973∗∗
(2.443) (3.696) (−1.311) (4.041) (2.666)
2.242 −6.463 18.093∗∗∗ 1.158
(0.508) (−1.146) (3.135) (0.224)
−3.626∗∗ −2.623
(−2.010) (−1.437)
4.013∗∗ 5.653∗∗∗
(2.182) (3.000)
9.910∗∗∗
(3.523)
11.594∗∗∗ 11.775∗∗∗
(3.679) (2.801)
-0.026 0.182 0.785 0.532 0.515
19.255 16.918 15.857 30.974 19.195
702.60 1596.01 1904.03 25.99 731.25
0 0 0 1 0
49Estimating asset pricing models with each of the factors individually shows that the closest competitor
to the leverage factor is the momentum factor, which yields an adjusted R2 of 30%.
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When incorporating the seven bond portfolios, as in Panel A of Table 4.2, the leverage
single-factor model is inferior, while the CAPM substantially gains in explanatory power.
With respect to the information and transaction costs argument of Adrian, Etula, and Muir
(2014), it can be concluded that German broker-dealers seem to concentrate on stock mar-
kets. Incorporating the market factor into the leverage factor model, the Fama-MacBeth
two-step regression with leverage factor again outperforms the FF factor model with an
adjusted R2 of 66.2%. In addition, we also observe a substantial decline in the estimated
constant, as well as in the MAPE statistic. The associated LR test statistic of 746.28 has
a zero p-value, implying a strong rejection of the null hypothesis that all betas are jointly
zero.
Table 4.3 presents the results of the time-series regressions for the German asset pricing
model using market and leverage factor. We report the average return of each portfolio, beta
and t-statistic of the leverage factor, and the R2 of the time-series regression. Conﬁrming
the LR test statistic, the results reveal a reasonable ﬁt of the ﬁrst-stage regressions, using a
noisy variable such as intermediaries' leverage.
In conclusion, broker-dealers in Germany seem to be informed market participants strongly
involved in asset market trading. Thus, a stochastic discount factor based on their leverage
can reasonably be expected to help explain the variation of excess returns in the respective
test portfolios. The positive and signiﬁcant leverage price of risk supports the view that the
balance sheet behavior of the broker-dealers in Germany is reinforcing booms and busts in
asset markets. For the broader set of test assets, we ﬁnd the factor model with both leverage
and market factor to be the superior approach over the model with leverage as the single fac-
tor. Its relatively small constant in Table 4.2 further supports this conclusion. The greater
ability to explain the cross-sectional variation in expected returns of stocks and bonds thus
conﬁrms the choice of our preferred model, stressing the importance of the role of a long-run
factor combined with a medium-term factor as motivated by the theoretical contributions
reviewed in the literature section.
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Table 4.3: Time-series betas for Germany
Results of the time-series regression for the model Rei,t = ci + β
′
i,LevfacLevFact + β
′
i,MarketMarkett + i,t.
This table reports betas and t-statistics of the leverage factor. The R2 of the leverage and market factor
time-series regressions are expressed as percentages. The time-series regression is estimated for each of the
33 portfolios.
Low Book-to-Market High
Average return
Small 3.882 6.476 7.834 11.288
Size
7.601 8.715 10.593 11.520
6.895 9.566 9.404 14.672
Big 7.891 11.108 10.872 13.587
Betas, β′i,Levfac
Small -0.415 -0.447 -0.288 -0.247
Size
-0.085 -0.192 -0.292 -0.264
-0.240 -0.205 -0.450 -0.125
Big -0.192 0.048 -0.024 0.051
t-stat
Small -1.993 -2.398 -1.560 -1.159
Size
-0.532 -1.268 -1.818 -1.451
-1.676 -1.409 -3.046 -0.707
Big -1.298 0.382 -0.229 0.445
R2 in %
Small 29.159 32.347 49.967 42.622
Size
47.267 53.175 51.144 52.384
53.793 58.222 60.860 60.716
Big 75.546 82.231 84.917 82.113
Momentum portfolios Bond portfolios
Average return Betas t-stat R2 Average return Betas t-stat R2
6.746 -0.552 -2.102 56.803 0.199 -0.004 -0.752 2.239
3.584 -0.525 -2.319 60.599 0.398 -0.005 -0.804 2.199
9.231 -0.415 -2.527 72.459 0.583 -0.006 -0.816 2.213
6.260 -0.106 -0.721 71.997 0.691 -0.007 -0.936 2.355
8.599 -0.308 -2.059 71.531 0.827 -0.008 -0.987 2.426
8.726 -0.175 -1.293 73.659 0.947 -0.009 -1.016 2.450
11.822 0.157 1.128 68.292 1.133 -0.010 -1.054 2.516
11.813 -0.051 -0.352 65.452
12.493 0.016 0.109 66.368
19.284 0.300 1.305 48.728
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We now extend our analysis to the European asset market. Table 4.4 reports the results
of the Fama-MacBeth regressions for Europe. The returns of the twenty-ﬁve stock and
seven bond portfolios are denominated in euro in order to eliminate a potential exchange
rate eﬀect. The leverage factor arises from European broker-dealers as deﬁned in the data
section. In the ﬁrst column of Panel A, which includes the seven German bond portfolios
sorted on maturity, the market return is the sole pricing factor; in the second column, the
Fama-French three-factors are used as pricing factors and achieve an adjusted R2 of 75.3%.
As it was the case for Germany, the Fama-French three-factor model plus momentum factor
in column three obtains the highest adjusted R2 value of 84.8%. In the fourth column, the
only pricing factor is the European leverage factor based on broker-dealer banks, while the
ﬁfth column represents the preferred model where the market factor is also considered. The
empirical results concur with those of Germany as presented above. The adjusted R2 of the
model using the leverage factor alone is low, while in the ﬁfth column we see the adjusted R2
increase to 46.1%. This again suggests that, in order to account for cross-sectional variation
in the returns of bond portfolios, it is important to include the market return as a long-run
risk factor. For the Fama-MacBeth results reported in Panel B, which does not include
the bond portfolios, the adjusted R2 of the leverage factor model is 24.1%, and adding the
market factor substantially lowers the MAPE. Overall, the second-stage regressions deliver
relatively high adjusted R2s for our preferred model including the market factor together
with the leverage factor, making the latter a useful SDF for European asset pricing.
Table 4.5 reports the results of the time-series regressions for the European asset pricing
model using market and leverage. Similarly to the time-series results of Adrian, Etula, and
Muir (2014), we see an increase in the betas of the leverage factor and an increase in its t-
statistic when the average return of the portfolios increases. The pattern of signiﬁcant betas
in the time-series regression indicates that our results are unlikely to be due to a spurious
regression. Overall our sample, circumscribed to European data, largely conﬁrms the above
ﬁndings for Germany and those for the US presented in Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014).
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Table 4.4: Fama-MacBeth regressions for European broker-dealer leverage
This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the European market. Panel A reports
the Fama-MacBeth regression results for 25 European equity portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market
plus 7 German bond portfolios sorted on maturity. Panel B presents only the results of the Fama-MacBeth
regression for 25 test portfolios sorted on size and book-to-market for Europe. The 25 portfolios sorted on
size and book-to-market, the Fama-French factors and the momentum factor come from the data library
curated by Kenneth French. The factors used are market, small-minus-big (SMB), high-minus-low (HML),
momentum (MOM ) and leverage (LevFac). The leverage factor is the residual of the AR(1) process of the
natural logarithm of the leverage of the investment banks in the Stoxx600 Europe Banks Index. The results
are reported in quarterly frequency from Q1 2000 to Q4 2016. Risk premia and returns are reported as yearly
variables. The Shanken t-statistics are reported under the Fama-MacBeth prices of risk. The likelihood ratio
(LR) test statistics and p-values are reported in the last row. The one-percent critical value for the LR test
is 131.14 (bonds included) and 106.39 (bonds excluded).
Panel A: Bond portfolios included
CAPM FF FF&MOM Lev Lev&Mrkt
Constant 1.165∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 6.003 1.067∗∗∗
(6.469) (4.803) (4.140) (1.536) (5.012)
Market 6.020 5.211 6.671 4.084
(1.317) (1.159) (1.487) (0.906)
SMB 13.792∗ 14.215
(1.839) (1.572)
HML 19.576∗∗ 18.611∗
(2.567) (2.013)
MOM 18.416∗
(1.907)
LevFac −0.488 22.512∗∗
(−0.024) (2.131)
Adj. R2 0.337 0.753 0.84 -0.033 0.461
MAPE 10.687 8.639 8.540 26.044 10.282
LR 436.803 818.046 891.334 1.219 516.592
p-val 0 0 0 1 0
Panel B: Bond portfolios excluded
CAPM FF FF&MOM Lev Lev&Mrkt
24.564∗∗∗ 14.687∗∗ 1.219 9.975 22.584∗∗∗
(3.696) (2.040) (0.134) (1.417) (2.865)
−16.413∗∗ −8.115 5.948 −16.309∗
(−2.039) (−0.964) (0.591) (−1.810)
13.005∗ 14.169
(1.713) (1.585)
18.267∗∗ 18.585∗
(2.356) (2.037)
17.949∗
(1.876)
24.586∗∗ 23.447∗∗
(1.992) (2.226)
0.142 0.657 0.7 0.241 0.313
12.829 10.210 9.951 31.433 12.296
405.93 770.47 828.611 0.980 469.916
0 0 0 1 0
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Table 4.5: Time-series betas for Europe
Results of the time-series regressions for the model Rei,t = ci+β
′
i,LevfacLevFact+β
′
i,MarketMarkett+i,t for
Europe. This table reports betas and t-statistics of the leverage factor. The R2 of the leverage and market
factor time-series regressions is expressed as percentages. The time-series regressions are estimated for each
of the 33 portfolios.
Low Book-to-Market High
Average Return
Small −2.537 3.423 6.375 8.688 11.570
Size
3.135 7.511 9.536 11.557 13.090
3.608 8.155 9.829 11.172 12.260
6.463 8.395 10.159 10.914 9.790
Big 1.960 5.727 4.849 7.560 6.407
Betas, β′i,Levfac
Small 0.106 0.149 0.132 0.202 0.212
Size
0.066 0.136 0.127 0.161 0.186
0.107 0.101 0.113 0.159 0.148
0.024 0.083 0.041 0.110 0.095
Big -0.046 0.019 -0.076 -0.059 -0.017
t-stat
Small 1.531 2.444 2.801 4.086 3.871
Size
0.877 2.618 2.621 2.928 2.917
1.534 2.240 2.685 3.554 2.363
0.444 2.429 1.001 2.292 1.355
Big -0.867 0.578 -2.309 -1.254 -0.262
R2 in %
Small 82.059 84.225 89.436 86.879 82.575
Size
80.502 88.970 87.945 84.621 79.761
82.678 89.689 90.155 88.983 81.460
87.418 92.870 89.982 87.657 80.063
Big 82.258 91.356 93.759 88.279 85.375
Bond Portfolios
Average return Betas t-stat R2
0.049 -0.002 -0.994 16.327
0.181 -0.004 -1.288 20.160
0.359 -0.004 -1.175 18.907
0.503 -0.004 -1.137 19.190
0.672 -0.004 -1.062 19.312
0.800 -0.004 -1.014 18.778
1.109 -0.004 -0.960 21.129
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4.4.2 Other Banking Groups' Leverage and Equity Factor
The balance sheet data available for Germany and Europe give us the opportunity, ﬁrstly, to
further investigate to what extent information and transaction costs inﬂuence the suitability
of ﬁnancial intermediary leverage as an asset pricing factor and, secondly, to collect empirical
evidence in order to answer the question as to whether leverage or equity is the appropriate
factor for cross-sectional asset pricing.
For the ﬁrst purpose, we report in Table 4.6 the Fama-MacBeth regression results ob-
tained using the leverage factor of main banks' and savings banks' balance sheets for Germany
and commercial banks' balance sheet for Europe. Assuming that this group of ﬁnancial in-
termediaries is mainly dealing with loans to the public and private sectors, the results of
the asset pricing models should be less convincing than in the case of broker-dealer leverage.
Since in the previous sections we ﬁnd that the leverage factor plus market factor outperforms
other speciﬁcations in explaining the cross-sectional variation in stock and bond portfolio
returns, for this analysis we decided to add the market factor to the leverage factor of main
and commercial banks.
In contrast to the results for broker-dealers discussed in the previous section, the results
for Germany presented in Table 4.6 show no signiﬁcant price of risk for the leverage factor
based on main banks, which remains insigniﬁcant with both speciﬁcations with and without
market factor. The leverage based on the savings banks also exhibits no signiﬁcant price
of risk for the leverage factor.50 For the European market, the leverage model based on
the commercial bank leverage produces a negative price of risk, which is in contrast to
the theoretical work presented before. Overall, these ﬁndings support the suggestion that
particularly broker-dealers in close proximity to asset markets might be viewed as marginal
investors and their leverage as a signiﬁcant pricing factor.
50In Germany, Sparkassen and Volksbanken are both savings banks. The results reported are for the
Sparkassen group; however, the results are qualitatively the same for both groups.
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Table 4.6: Fama-MacBeth regressions for non broker-dealer leverage
This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the leverage factor based on the balance
sheet leverage of German main and savings banks and European commercial banks. Test portfolios and
market factor are provided by the Humboldt University of Berlin for Germany and by the Kenneth French
data library for Europe. The results are reported in quarterly frequency from Q1 2000 to Q4 2016 for Europe,
and from Q3 1971 to Q2 2016 for Germany. Risk premia and returns are reported as yearly variables. The
Shanken t-statistics are reported under the Fama-MacBeth prices of risk.
Germany Europe
Main banks Savings banks Commercial banks
LevFac&Market LevFac LevFac&Market LevFac LevFac&Market LevFac
Constant 1.713∗∗∗ 2.269∗∗ 1.529∗∗∗ 7.611∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗ 0.673
(4.132) (2.222) (5.743) (2.713) (3.601) (0.584)
Market 9.475∗∗∗ 9.265∗∗∗ 5.301
(3.141) (3.038) (1.149)
LevFac 0.185 −8.481 -0.985 -0.486 −43.593∗∗ −36.530
(0.049) (−1.116) (-0.490) (-0.104) (−2.373) (−1.256)
Adj. R2 0.51 0.013 0.508 -0.032 0.504 0.514
To pursue our second aim of collecting further empirical evidence to answer the question
of whether leverage or equity is the appropriate factor to use for cross-sectional asset pricing,
we test a risk factor based on innovations to book equity of broker-dealers. Our approach
is similar to the exercise for US data provided by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016), who
conclude that the leverage factor is preferable when pricing a cross-section of assets.51 On
the basis of Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016), in Table 4.7 we report the risk premia for the
equity factor model both with the market factor and without it. For Germany, the results
in Table 4.7 show that the equity factor for German broker-dealers fails to explain cross-
sectional variation in the bond and equity market any better than the broker-dealer leverage
factor. Furthermore, the risk premium of the equity factor is negative and contradicts the
positive risk premia reported by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016) for the US market: this is
51Note that He and Krishnamurthy (2013) stress that market capitalization is the appropriate variable
to use. However, this is unavailable for German and European broker-dealers. As a consequence, the results
presented here have to be interpreted with caution.
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an indication that the equity model fails to price the market in a correct way. For Germany,
a low adjusted R2 and insigniﬁcant equity factor coeﬃcients show that the equity factor can
do little to explain the cross-sectional variation of the test asset returns. For Europe, the
adjusted R2 of the factor model reaches 49.3% without the market factor and 47.0% with
it; however, the risk premia of the equity factor remain negative for Europe as well. These
results conﬁrm the view that in Europe and Germany broker-dealer leverage is a more useful
risk factor than book equity.52
Table 4.7: Fama-MacBeth regressions for German and European equity factor
This table presents the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions with the equity factor (EQFac) for Germany
and Europe. The test portfolios are those used for the Fama-MacBeth regression in the previous section
without the 7 German bond portfolios. The factors used are market and equity (Market and EQFac). The
results are reported in a quarterly frequency from Q1 2000 to Q4 2016 for Europe and from Q3 1971 to Q2
2016 for Germany. Risk premia and returns are reported as yearly variables. The Shanken t-statistics are
reported under the Fama-MacBeth prices of risk.
Germany Europe
EQFac EQFac & Market EQFac EQFac & Market
Constant 9.280 7.646∗∗ 13.629 13.056
(1.489) (2.271) (1.650) (1.108)
Market 2.510 −6.143
(0.552) (−0.472)
EQFac −0.090 −0.087 −0.636∗ −0.643
(−0.638) (−1.357) (−1.806) (−1.536)
Adj. R2 -0.011 -0.041 0.493 0.47
52Note that data on market equity is unavailable for German broker-dealers.
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4.4.3 Cross-Country Leverage
In Table 4.8 we test whether and to what extent a leverage factor based on broker-dealers of
diﬀerent countries aﬀects German and European portfolios. Germany being part of the Eu-
ropean Union, it may be plausible to employ the German broker-dealer leverage to price the
European portfolios and vice versa. Furthermore, broker-dealer banks in the United States
may be inﬂuential on the German and European markets as well. To test the explanatory
power of US broker-dealer leverage, we use data from Table L.130 of the Federal Reserve
Flow of Funds, Z.1 release, which corresponds to the broker-dealer leverage for the US.53 All
the Fama-MacBeth results are reported for both equity and bond portfolios and include the
market return as a second risk factor.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 4.8 show the results obtained from testing the European
and US leverage factor on the German market. The European leverage factor oﬀers very
little explanation for the cross-sectional variation of returns resulting in an adjusted R2 of
only 1.9%, indicating that the European broker-dealers' behavior has no explanatory power
for the German equity and bond markets. The US leverage factor, by contrast, performs
substantially better as a relevant risk factor for German equity and bond portfolios' returns.
If we use the US leverage as the only factor in the model, we ﬁnd an adjusted R2 of 56.8%
with a λ-coeﬃcient signiﬁcant at a 10% level. However, including both the German and the
US leverage in the model shows that the US leverage factor seems not to carry any pricing
information that the German leverage factor fails to capture. For the European equity and
bond portfolios, the model with German broker-dealer leverage factor and market factor
results in a negative price of risk, and the US broker-dealer leverage factor is statistically
insigniﬁcant. Overall, there is very little evidence of cross-market inﬂuence of broker-dealer
leverage. If the general notion of US investors' dominance on European asset market is true,
then it does not appear to work through broker-dealer leverage.
53Since the study conducted by Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014), the broker-dealer data has been moved
from table L.129 to L.130 and the total liability calculation has also substantially changed.
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Table 4.8: Fama-MacBeth regressions for cross-country leverage
Results of the cross-country Fama-MacBeth regressions for Germany and Europe. The factors used are the
balance sheet leverage for Germany, the US, and Europe. The results are reported in quarterly frequency,
from Q3 1990 to Q4 2016 for Europe and from Q3 1971 to Q2 2016 for Germany. When the European
leverage factor is included, the time period goes only from Q1 2000 to Q4 2016 due to data availability. The
leverage factors are the broker-dealer leverages for each country. All the speciﬁcations test the factor model
on the equity and bond portfolios for Germany and Europe. The risk premia reported in column one are for
the European leverage and German market factors; in column two those for US broker-dealer leverage and
German market; and in column three for US leverage, German leverage and German market factor. For the
European portfolios, column four reports the risk premia for German leverage and European market, and
column ﬁve reports the risk premia for US leverage and European market factor. Column six reports the
risk premia of US leverage, European leverage, and European market factor. Risk premia and returns are
based on annualized quarterly data. The Shanken t-statistics are reported under the Fama-MacBeth prices
of risk.
Germany Europe
EU LevFac US LevFac US & DE LevFac DE LevFac US LevFac US & EU LevFac
Constant 6.657∗∗∗ 1.772∗∗∗ 2.159∗∗∗ 0.128 0.718∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗
(13.711) (3.446) (3.996) (0.846) (3.206) (3.206)
Market 7.422 10.447∗∗∗ 11.018∗∗∗ −2.303 6.167 5.080
(1.436) (3.460) (3.630) (−0.413) (1.310) (1.129)
US LevFac 1.662 -1.761 24.693∗ 18.930
(1.662)∗ (-0.162) (1.720) (1.488)
EU LevFac 0.023 14.353
(0.829) (1.164)
DE LevFac 2.489∗∗ −7.984∗∗
(2.539) (−2.452)
Adj. R2 0.019 0.568 0.651 0.207 0.698 0.77
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4.5 Empirical Evidence from a Dynamic Asset Pricing Model
The empirical results in the preceding section suggest that, in times of tight funding con-
straints, ﬁnancial intermediaries have to deleverage, thereby raising their marginal value of
wealth. Under these circumstances, assets that covary positively with leverage must provide
a risk premium in terms of higher cross-sectional expected returns. Thus, showing a signiﬁ-
cantly positive price of risk and relatively low pricing errors, broker-dealer leverage seems to
perform well as an intermediary stochastic discount factor. As argued by Adrian, Etula, and
Muir (2014), however, a constant price of risk such as it emerges from the Fama-MacBeth
regressions might be too restrictive. In fact, theoretical contributions point to a time-varying
λ. For instance, Danielsson, Shin, and Zigrand (2010) derive a negative relationship between
leverage and eﬀective risk aversion when intermediaries are facing a value-at-risk constraint.
In Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015), the deleveraging of broker-dealers further spurs volatil-
ity, thereby triggering a vicious cycle in ﬁnancial markets, with the testable implication that
the price of risk is a time-varying function of intermediary leverage.
To capture a time-varying price of risk, we follow Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016) and
apply the dynamic asset pricing model (DAPM) of Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2015a).
The systematic part of an economy's risk is proxied by the time series of shocks arising from
the vector autoregression (VAR) of risk factors and price of risk factors. Risk factors are
deﬁned as state variables that are contemporaneously correlated with returns, while price
of risk factors show forecasting power for future excess returns in the time series, which is
why they are also called forecasting factors. The DAPM framework is ﬂexible in the sense
that any given variable might be a risk factor, a price of risk factor, or both. Based on the
results of the US market documented in Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016) and the results
in the preceding section, we concentrate on a speciﬁcation that employs the market return
(RM) as a risk factor and the single balance sheet measure (BSF ) both as risk and as price
of risk factor.
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Thus, the VAR is given by
 RMt+1
BSFt+1
 =
 µRM
µBSF
+
φRM ,RM φRM ,BSF
φBSF,RM φBSF,BSF
×
 RMt
BSFt
+
 uR
M
t+1
uBSFt+1
 . (4.8)
Assuming linearity of the pricing kernel and the prices of risk being aﬃne in BSFt, the
beta representation of our DAPM model can be written as
Rit+1 = β
RM
i (λ
RM
0 +Λ
RM ,BSF
1 BSFt+u
RM
t+1)+β
BSF
i (λ
BSF
0 +Λ
BSF,BSF
1 BSFt+u
BSF
t+1 )+e
i
t+1. (4.9)
Equation (4.9) reveals that, in contrast to a standard beta representation, the price of
risk is now time-varying. Thus, the expected excess return depends on the βs and the set
of λt = λ
i
0 + Λ
i,j
1 BSFt.
54 For the parameter estimations, we implemented the two-stage
procedure of Adrian, Crump, and Moench (2015a). Aside from showing the consistency and
asymptotic normality of estimated coeﬃcients, the authors also provide heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors, which are used to calculate t-statistics of coeﬃcients.
The following Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 contain the estimation results of the DAPM model
for German and European data. In Panel A of each table, we report the results of simple
regressions of the stock market return (RM), the 10-year German government bond return
(BUND10), the diﬀerence between BUND10 and the 3-month Euribor rate (SPREAD),
and the return from a corporate bond portfolio (CBP ) on lagged shocks to balance sheet
factors. The intent behind this preliminary exercise is to reveal the potential suitability of the
balance sheet measures to serve as forecasting factors. Panel B shows estimates of ΛR
M ,BSF
1
54The framework nests the Fama-MacBeth estimator as a constraint speciﬁcation (Λi,j1 = 0 and φi,j = 0).
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and ΛBSF,BSF1 together with the MAPE for comparison purposes.
55 We also calculate the
average prices of risk for the market return and the balance sheet factor, denoted by Λ¯R
M
and Λ¯BSF , respectively.
Panel A of Table 4.9 shows that the leverage of German broker-dealers exhibits potential
to forecast future excess stock market returns, suggesting that this particular balance sheet
factor is a successful driver of a time-varying price of risk. The negative coeﬃcient is consis-
tent with the expected role of the broker-dealer leverage. If broker-dealers are buying stocks,
both their leverage and stock market prices increase. The price impact implies that future
stock returns will be compressed. This funding constraint eﬀect can also be observed with
main banks, but in this case the forecasting power is related to the return of the German
Bund. Here, improved funding conditions primarily trigger bond purchases. These funding
constraint mechanics are in contrast to Haddad and Sraer (2018), who show that, if banks'
balance sheet management is dominated by interest rate risk considerations, a larger than
average net exposure of banks to long-term assets should be a predictor of larger bond risk
premia. Interestingly, this is true for savings banks largely focusing on local credit supply.
As a result, the estimation result reveals positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the case of
German government bonds and corporate bonds, but not for the stock market return.
Panel B of Table 4.9 largely conﬁrms these ﬁndings. The estimated coeﬃcient measuring
the inﬂuence of leverage on the market price of risk is statistically signiﬁcant (at the 10%
level) and negatively signed only with broker-dealers. Moreover, the unconditional prices
of risk are all positive and the time-variation of λ obtains a slightly lower mean absolute
pricing error compared to the Fama-MacBeth regressions.56 The time series of λR
M ,BSF
t is
presented in Figure 4.3 for illustration purposes. Due to the fact that market price of risk
is supposed to be driven by shocks to broker-dealer leverage, it clearly shows substantial
volatility around its long-run mean. Marked episodes, however, may be in accordance with
55The cross-section of absolute pricing errors is available from the authors upon request.
56Table 4.9 also reports the Wald-statistic (together with its p-value) of joint beta signiﬁcance of the
time-series regressions, as recommended by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016). The strong rejection of the
null hypothesis of βi = 0 suggests that weak instrument problems are not an issue here.
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the above argumentation. For instance, in the run-up to the ﬁnancial crisis, increasing asset
prices led to a loosening of funding constraints, giving rise to a downward trending market
price of risk to below-average levels. This trend is immediately corrected thereafter in the
fourth quarter of 2008 when funding started to dry up.
Table 4.9: Time-varying price of risk for German intermediary leverage
This table contains the time-varying price of risk estimates for alternative German leverage factors: broker-
dealer leverage (LevBD), main banks leverage (LevMain), and savings banks leverage (LevSav). Λ¯R
M
and Λ¯BSF denote the unconditional price of risk for RM and BSF , respectively. ΛR
M ,BSF
1 and Λ
BSF,BSF
1
are the estimated coeﬃcients of the price of market risk on lagged balance sheet factors and the price of
balance sheet risk on lagged balance sheet factors, respectively. MAPE denotes the mean absolute pricing
error. Wald reports the test statistic (together with its p-value) of joint beta signiﬁcance in the time-series
regressions, as recommended by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016) (the 1% critical value for this F -test is
4.73). The sample ranges from Q1 1971 to Q4 2016. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level.
LevBD LevMain LevSav
Panel A
RM -0.49∗∗ 0.08 -0.06
(1.97) (0.45) (0.11)
BUND10 0.01 -0.12∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.13) (2.38) (2.75)
SPREAD -0.04 -0.01 -0.09
(1.14) (0.30) (1.17)
CBP 0.01 -0.02∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(1.01) (2.23) (4.22)
Panel B
ΛRM ,BSF -0.47∗ 0.22 0.03
(1.80) (1.11) (0.06)
ΛBSF,BSF 0.04 0.03 -0.82∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.15) (2.62)
Λ¯R
M
13.58∗∗∗ 11.60∗∗∗ 11.89∗∗∗
(4.29) (3.76) (3.94)
Λ¯BSF 9.06∗∗ 1.33 0.71
(2.46) (0.34) (0.43)
MAPE 15.27 15.28 15.23
Wald 55.95 81.60 122.69
p-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00
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In the case of savings bank leverage, Table 4.9 reports a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence of
leverage on the leverage price of risk, which is in line with Adrian and Boyarchenko (2015).
The estimated unconditional prices of risk for leverage are statistically insigniﬁcant for main
banks and savings banks, conﬁrming the results of the Fama-MacBeth regressions above.
Taken together, the empirical evidence from the DAPM model points to a time-variation of
the prices of risk along the lines of the theoretical contribution of Adrian and Boyarchenko
(2015). This conﬁrms earlier results for the US market as documented in Adrian, Moench,
and Shin (2016).
Figure 4.3: Time-varying lambda
The solid black line is the time series of λR
M ,BSF
t and the dashed line is its long-run mean expressed as
percentages.
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Table 4.10: Time-varying price of risk for European intermediary leverage
This table contains the time-varying price-of-risk estimates for two European balance sheet factors: broker-
dealer leverage (LevBD) and commercial banks leverage (LevCom). Λ¯R
M
and Λ¯BSF denote the uncondi-
tional price of risk for RM and BSF , respectively. ΛR
M ,BSF
1 and Λ
BSF,BSF
1 are the estimated coeﬃcients
of the price of market risk on lagged balance sheet factors and the price of balance sheet risk on lagged
balance sheet factors, respectively. MAPE denotes the mean absolute pricing error. Wald reports the test
statistic (together with its p-value) of joint beta signiﬁcance in the time-series regressions as recommended
by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016) (the 1% critical value for this F -test is 4.99). The sample ranges from
Q4 1999 to Q4 2016. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
LevBD LevCom
Panel A
RM 0.16 -0.13
(0.90) (1.15)
BUND10Y 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗∗
(2.30) (2.00)
TERM 0.001 0.01
(0.06) (0.72)
CBP 0.03 0.07∗∗∗
(1.18) (3.37)
Panel B
ΛR
M ,BSF
1 0.20 -0.09
(1.63) (0.78)
Λ1BSF,BSF -0.17 -0.26
(0.58) (0.69)
Λ¯R
M
5.34 7.16
(1.23) (1.48)
Λ¯BSF 23.37∗∗ -39.98∗∗
(2.52) (2.46)
MAPE 10.11 9.97
Wald 1,109.53 199.24
p-Value 0.00 0.00
The empirical results for European ﬁnancial intermediaries are comparable to those of
German main banks and savings banks. The positive relationship between banks' leverage
and future returns of the German Bund shown in Panel A of Table 4.10 may be explained
by resorting not only to interest rate risk management, as in Haddad and Sraer (2018), but
also to a `ﬂight-to-quality' eﬀect, as suggested by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and
Acharya and Pedersen (2005). The latter work suggests that, in a market downturn, ﬁnancial
intermediaries face increasing liquidity risks of stock holdings, which lead them to substitute
them with safe assets such as German government bonds and  in the case of main banks 
also corporate bonds. Buying bonds in a situation of negative leverage shocks raises bond
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prices, thereby lowering future returns as signiﬁed by the positive sign.57 A statistically
signiﬁcant inﬂuence of leverage on future stock returns, however, cannot be identiﬁed. This
is also reﬂected in Panel B of Table 4.10. Although the MAPEs are slightly lower than
in case of the Fama-MacBeth regressions, there is little evidence in favor of a signiﬁcant
time-variation of λ for European broker-dealers.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence on the reinforcing nature of ﬁnancial intermediaries'
balance sheet management during boom and bust cycles on European markets. We start by
showing that the ﬁndings of Adrian, Etula, and Muir (2014) for US broker-dealers also hold
for other important ﬁnancial markets. Particularly, the Fama-MacBeth two-step regression
reveals that including broker-dealer leverage as a risk factor explains German asset returns
with an adjusted R2 of up to 66%. To provide some additional evidence on the question
of whether or not broker-dealers can be perceived as marginal investors, we also investigate
the role of savings banks' leverage. Focusing on mortgage loans and loans to private-sector
ﬁrms, this group of ﬁnancial institutions is not strongly engaged in asset market trading. In
line with this conjecture, the time series of leverage shocks does not provide any explanatory
power in Fama-MacBeth regressions: This is supported by the empirical results from Euro-
pean data since 1999. In addition, a cross-country perspective does not reveal any indication
of foreign broker-dealer inﬂuence.
Moreover, we consider the suggestions by Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2016), who stress
that a constant price of risk as derived from Fama-MacBeth regressions might be too restric-
tive. To capture a time-varying price of risk, the authors' dynamic asset pricing model is
applied to German and European data sets. Here, the systematic part of an economic risk is
proxied by the time series of shocks arising from the vector autoregression of risk factors and
price of risk factors. Risk factors are deﬁned as state variables that are contemporaneously
57Given the low fraction of stocks in savings banks' balance sheets, a ﬂight-to-quality eﬀect is less likely.
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correlated with returns, while price of risk factors show forecasting power for future excess
returns in the time series. We ﬁnd that the leverage of German broker-dealers exhibits po-
tential for forecasting future excess stock market returns, suggesting this particular balance
sheet factor as a successful driver of a time-varying price of risk.
From a policy perspective, it can be concluded that broker-dealer leverage shows procycli-
cality and signiﬁcantly explains excess asset returns, thus supporting the view that ﬁnancial
intermediaries play a central role in propagating shocks in the ﬁnancial sector and stressing
the importance of macro- and microprudential policies.
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